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Executive Summary
How does the world look on the fundamental level? This question has intrigued
physicists and philosophers alike. Most physicists think that the basic objects that
constitute the world are particles or fields, and that it is the task of physics to
find laws for the behavior of such objects. Philosophers have di erent categories;
many of them think that the world is made of substances and properties, and they
debate the status of the laws of nature. Until recently, these two camps worked
rather independently of each other. In this dissertation, I combine both disciplines;
in particular, I relate the debate about the ontology of quantum mechanics with
current results in metaphysics and show that many arguments can be applied to
classical physics as well.
What is not yet available is a comprehensive analysis of the ontological status of
the most important physical entities, namely, particles, fields, forces, mass, charge,
and the wave-function. I have two objectives in filling this gap. First, I argue that
the existence of all these entities depends on the status of laws of nature. Second, I
show that physics and metaphysics can renounce the concept of properties. In my
analysis, I refer to classic texts by Isaac Newton, Albert Einstein, and John Bell,
as well as to recent developments in philosophy of physics.
In Chapter 1, I introduce John Bell’s notion of local beables and contrast it with
the now popular primitive ontology. I show that both are indi erent to the status
of properties, and so I introduce primitive stu  ontology, which consists of local
objects that don’t bear intrinsic properties. The chapter concludes with a critique
of popular versions of ontic structural realism.
In Chapter 2, I discuss in detail the most important metaphysical theories on
the status of laws of nature, namely, Humeanism, primitivism about laws, and
dispositionalism. Here I develop a novel account of Humeanism that no longer
has local qualities as part of its mosaic. I show that the status of properties has
been hitherto completely ignored in primitivist frameworks. I then argue that
ontic structural realism applied to laws of nature is best understood as relational
dispositionalism.
In Chapter 3, I introduce Newtonian mechanics from an ontological point of view.
I then discuss whether forces and mass exist.
Chapter 4 deals with classical electrodynamics. Here I emphasize that this the-
ory su ers from a flaw that is as severe as the quantum measurement problem,
namely, the self-interaction problem. The only way to avoid this pitfall is to de-
velop a new theory of electromagnetic fields. Three strategies are presented: the
Wheeler–Feynman theory, the Born–Infeld theory, and the Bopp–Podolsky theory.
Moreover, I show that the famous argument by Mathias Frisch on the inconsistency
i
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of electrodynamics is an immediate consequence of the self-interaction problem. I
discuss the debate between Adolf Grünbaum and John Earman about backward
causation and conclude (with Grünbaum) that there is indeed no backward cau-
sation in the Maxwell–Lorentz theory. I then briefly sketch Dirac’s idea of mass
renormalization and end with two sections on the ontology and usefulness of fields
in general.
In Chapter 5, I introduce de Broglie–Bohm quantum theory. I contrast de
Broglie’s first-order formulation with Bohm’s second-order formulation and show
that with respect to explanatory value the first-order formulation doesn’t lose
against the second-order formulation. Then, I argue that the problem of indis-
tinguishable particles, which is to my mind not solvable in theories that lack a
primitive stu  ontology, finds a straightforward solution in the de Broglie–Bohm
theory.
Chapter 6 discusses the status of the wave-function relative to the status of laws
of nature. I point out that in the nomological view the universal wave-function is
not a law, nor is the e ective wave-function quasi-nomological. I then present a
new Humean interpretation of the wave-function and contrast this with the ideas
of David Albert and Barry Loewer. After this, I o er several ways of construing
the wave-function as representing dispositions. This chapter also sketches a new
way to interpret the wave-function as a multi-field.
This dissertation points out three things. First, a primitive stu  ontology is
a necessary ingredient for all fundamental physical theories, and the ontology of
physics is not easily read o  from mathematical formalism. Second, Humeanism
and primitivism about laws can dispense with properties. Third, if properties play
any role at all, they must be dispositional.
Several future projects could follow from this dissertation. First, it o ers the first
steps in developing a new kind of metaphysics: one that only contains primitive
stu  and primitive laws. Second, it sketches a new interpretation of the wave-
function as a multi-field. Third, provided that there is a consistent field theory, the
status of fields within a primitive stu  ontology is particularly interesting.
ii
Reflection on philosophical problems has convinced me that a much larger number
than I used to think, or than is generally thought, are connected with the principles of
symbolism, that is to say, with the relation between what means and what is meant.
In dealing with highly abstract matters it is much easier to grasp the symbols (usually
words) than it is to grasp what they stand for. The result of this is that almost all
thinking that purports to be philosophical or logical consists in attributing to the world
properties of language.
— Bertrand Russell
iii

Preface
Why philosophy of physics? I didn’t know that this branch of research existed
until 2011, when I met Michael Esfeld. I only knew that I was frustrated about
how physics was taught in universities. We learnt an awful lot of mathematics:
calculus, linear algebra, ordinary di erential equations, partial di erential equa-
tions, di erential geometry, tensor calculus, functional analysis. I had had the
sense that mathematics was a tool for doing physics, but it turned out that the
physical problems we needed to solve were almost always mathematical problems.
In fact, I intended to study mathematics in order to understand physics. I wasn’t
primarily interested in using Green’s functions to solve linear di erential equations
or Sobolev inequalities to find the lower bounds of complicated integrals. These
were just tools, for I thought physics was ultimately about the world. While solving
(or rather while trying solve) the exercises we were given, I hoped to someday tackle
deep physical questions:
- What is space and time?
- What are particles?
- What is mass?
- What are fields?
- What are forces?
- What is the wave-function?
It was only when I met Michael Esfeld that I realized there were people working
full-time on these rather conceptual questions: philosophers of physics. I don’t
blame my physics and maths professors for teaching the way they teach, but I do
think that they should have confessed that they don’t have time for these kinds of
problems. Physics is now far too complicated, and academic life obliges physicists
to publish technical papers.
Just as you get referred to a specialist when a doctor has reached her capabilities
and can no longer treat you, physics and maths professors should refer students
that are interested in conceptual riddles.
And no, philosophers aren’t failed physicists or unskilled mathematicians; they
work on di erent aspects of the same scientific theories. There are experts, like
Christiano Ronaldo, who score goals, but there are also experts, like Philip Lahm,
whose job it is to establish a good defense. A physicist is like Ronaldo: she forms
v
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new theories, invents new experimental set-ups, and wins the Nobel prize. A
philosopher is rather like Lahm: she organizes arguments, questions the words
of physicists, and reflects on old questions. Unfortunately, physicists often forget
that we all play for the same team: the exploration of nature.
I learnt that the philosophical tradition had a lot to contribute to current philos-
ophy of physics. Philosophers have worked on orthogonal questions about nature
for millennia:
- What is a law of nature?
- What are properties?
- Are there modal connections?
- Is there a fundamental level in the world?
- What is causation?
I’m so glad to have had the opportunity to write a thesis on exactly these pivotal
physical and metaphysical questions. In working on these topics I really began to
see and appreciate that the best physicists can be excellent philosophers, too. Isaac
Newton, Albert Einstein, and John Stuart Bell are still tremendously influential for
physics and philosophy alike.
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Introduction: Physics Needs An
Ontology
Cars, airplanes, telephones, computers, microwaves, MRI, GPS—they have all rev-
olutionized our everyday life since the last century. They have created the prosper-
ity of the western world. Just imagine how you would go to work, how you would
contact your friends, how you would prepare your food without these wonderful
technologies. This is the success of physics!
And the costs of new technologies have increased so much that a single country
can no longer handle them. So the development of new technologies is now a
matter of international agreements and cooperation. The richest countries in the
world agreed to spend billions of dollars on the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) in
Switzerland. Another several billion are yearly spent on the international space
station program or the European ESA, plus all the other national space agencies,
such as NASA (USA), FKA (Russia), or CNSA (China). Clearly, governments
and other funding institutions hope for the development of new gadgets that can
facilitate our life even more—or that at least increase our GDP.
Definitely, without physics we wouldn’t have built the Ottomotor; nor would
we have landed on the moon. But is the goal of physics really to provide new
technologies? Do physicists go into their lab in hope of developing the means for
the transportation or communication of the 21st century? Maybe, but not solely.
There is something deeper that encouraged geniuses such as Newton, Maxwell,
Einstein, or Schrödinger to devote their entire life to it, something that reaches
beyond our well-being: a never-ending curiosity about how the world works.
It’s by no means obvious that matter consists of electrons, protons, and neutrons.
Nor is it obvious that planetary motions are caused by forces, that matter curves
space-time, or that light can be a wave or a bunch of particles. For we human beings
perceive the world completely di erently: we see tables and chairs and small dots
in the sky. From the impressions we get from our senses we form a pre-theoretic
everyday image of the world (Maudlin, 2015, p. 349).
By doing experiments we try to go beyond our senses. We try to measure elec-
trons in particle accelerators, or we try to find pulsars with radio telescopes. But
what do we actually measure? What do we do in an experiment? First and fore-
most, experiments deliver data. Data are patterns on a detector or statistics on a
piece of paper. And this is what we actually see from experiments.
The crucial task of physics is to explain these data. There are two main ap-
proaches. Most physicists are satisfied if they cook up some recipes that allow
them to predict and explain the data. Physics is about experiments, and the ex-
ix
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periment is the only standard by which to measure the success of a theory. A
good example is textbook quantum mechanics. Its tremendous empirical success is
beyond any doubt. Yet it has strange consequences about how the structure of the
world. Complementarity, naive realism about operators, the role of consciousness,
the measurement problem. . . we can endure all this because quantum mechanics
explains empirical data.
Luckily, there are others—by far the great minority. They have endeavored to
revise quantum mechanics. They correctly pointed out that textbook quantum me-
chanics lacks an ontology. Quantum mechanics stares at us in cluelessness about
the nature of the electron, proton, and neutron. What is the electron? Is it a par-
ticle? Or a wave? A matter-wave? The wave-particle dualism is a desperate move
to bring light into the darkness, since it’s totally obscure under which conditions
the electron will show wave-like behavior or particle-like behavior.
It’s therefore not enough to provide us with certain algorithms to account for
experimental data. In the end, physics must come up with an ontology, that is,
with some well-defined objects in our world—no wave-particle dualism, no com-
plementarity principle, no mysterious observers on whose behavior the fate of in-
nocent cats depend. An ontology can introduce particles, fields, or even strings.
It’s not important what the objects are, but there has to be something in space
and time—something that builds up measurement devices and that generates all
physical phenomena.
To my mind, the de Broglie–Bohm pilot-wave theory is the best non-relativistic
quantum theory that we have. For the simple introduction of particles on contin-
uous paths, let us understand how the world behaves from the microscopic level
of electrons, protons, and neutrons to the macroscopic one of tables, chairs, and
galaxies. Did I mention that there is no longer a measurement problem?
I don’t really grasp why physicists refuse to appreciate ontology, although the
old masters, like Newton and Einstein, told us a lot about the basic constituents
of the world. Maybe it’s the influence of quantum mechanics, because students are
still instructed to forget everything about classical mechanics in their first quantum
mechanics class. The quantum world is just too weird. Or maybe it’s because Niels
Bohr is widely regarded as having won out over Einstein in the battle for the right
interpretation of quantum mechanics. I don’t know.
Mathematical and physical problems have become so di cult that physicists
no longer have time to ponder philosophical or conceptual questions. Reflection
on these issues has been left to philosophers. And with the complexity of the
physical theories the complexity of the conceptual problems have increased as well.
But philosophy has its own history, a history that is sometimes indi erent to the
results of physics. So philosophers have developed their own way of uncovering the
ontology of the world by the mere act of hard thinking. Since the time of Aristotle
this discipline has been named metaphysics.
But Tim Maudlin reminds us that metaphysics ignorant of physics is empty:
Metaphysics is ontology. Ontology is the most generic study of what exists.
x
Evidence for what exists, at least in the physical world, is provided solely
by empirical research. Hence the proper object of most metaphysics is the
careful analysis of our best scientific theories (and especially of fundamental
physical theories) with the goal of determining what they imply about the
constitution of the physical world. (2007a, p. 104)
Physics starts with an ontology. It postulates the existence of the basic entities
of matter. But matter cannot simply exist. It has to exist somewhere—somewhere
in a three-dimensional Euclidean space, or a four-dimensional Minkowski, or an
eleven-dimensional space with seven compactified dimensions.
The way to the manifest image—the image of our everyday observations—then,
is long and dirty. If physics contains only space and matter, we couldn’t explain
how matter behaves. This is the job of the laws of nature: they tell us how matter
moves. Particles, fields, and strings have to move in some way to form atoms;
these form molecules; these form macromolecules; these form organic or inorganic
structures. The organic structures are the basis for all living beings making up
cells, organs, and organisms, which finally can read the measurement outcomes of
a particle accelerator. Of course, physics cannot explain all the tiny details from
the microscopic to the macroscopic level, but it has to make the transition from
the small to the big objects plausible.
Physics is composed of two parts: an ontology and the laws of nature. Physics
has to say what the ontology looks like. What is the structure of space-time?
What is matter? And physics has to say what the laws of nature are. Metaphysics
complements physics. It asks whether there is more in the ontology or whether
particles have intrinsic properties. What are properties in the first place? And
metaphysics questions the status of laws of nature. Do laws really exist or do they
just summarize what matter is doing?
These are the basic questions I pose in this thesis. And I pose these questions to
three physical theories: Newtonian mechanics, classical electrodynamics, and the
de Broglie–Bohm pilot-wave theory. Let’s start!
xi

Part I.
The Metaphysics of Physics
1

1. The Ontology of Fundamental
Physics
1.1. The Legacy of John Bell
1.1.1. What Is a Measurement?
The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics postulates a division be-
tween observers and the physical systems to be observed. The act of observation
changes the state of the system. The act of observation creates the position of the
electron. The act of observation kills the cat. Observations and measurements are
indeed peculiar processes in quantum mechanics, but what was once believed to be
a revolution in science turned out to be a malicious hoax and a source of confusion.
To John S. Bell’s great merit, he pointed out this artificial division:
The usual approach, centred on the notion of ‘observable’, divides the world
somehow into parts: ‘system’ and ‘apparatus’. The ‘apparatus’ interacts
from time to time with the ‘system’, ‘measuring’‘observables’. During ‘mea-
surement’ the linear Schrödinger evolution is suspended, and an ill-defined
‘wavefunction collapse’ takes over. There is nothing in the mathematics to
tell what is ‘system’ and what is ‘apparatus’, nothing to tell which natural
processes have the special status of ‘measurements’. Discretion and good
taste, born of experience, allow us to use quantum theory with marvelous
success, despite the ambiguity of the concepts named above in quotation
marks. But it seems clear that in a serious fundamental formulation such
concepts must be excluded. (Bell, 1987, p. 174)
The notions that Bell puts in scare quotes are obscure and ill-defined in textbook
accounts of quantum mechanics unless they are explained by a physical ontology.
Observables, system, apparatus, and measurement have no clear meaning if they
are taken to be primitive concepts. Instead, the system and the apparatus are
built of the very same basic entities, which can be particles, fields, or strings, etc.
And the behavior of these objects determines the behavior of the system and the
apparatus.
The special role of measurement is ensured by one of the axioms of quantum
mechanics, which states that whenever a system is measured its wave-function
instantaneously changes into one of the eigenfunctions of a certain mathematical
operator. For physicists, operators represent observables whose value is measured
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by an apparatus. It is not clear, however, what observables are supposed to be in
the ontology.
The collapse of the wave-function, however, is a mathematically precise concept
resulting in the eigenfunction of a certain operator. But it remains unclear under
which precise physical circumstances a collapse can occur. To say that there is
a collapse whenever an observer observes a proton or whenever a measurement
apparatus measures an electron doesn’t explain anything. We go round in circles.
Quantum mechanics just doesn’t tell us what makes up for the di erence between
a measurement apparatus and the system that is supposed to be measured.
These ontological di culties notwithstanding, quantum mechanics has been ap-
plied with tremendous success. Physicists therefore think that either the ontology
of a theory is completely irrelevant or there is no ontology at all, such that a theory
is only about measurement results.
It would seem that the theory is exclusively concerned with ‘results of mea-
surement’ and has nothing to say about anything else. When the ‘system’
in question is the whole world where is the ‘measurer’ to be found? Inside,
rather than outside, presumably. What exactly qualifies some subsystems to
play this role? Was the world wave function waiting to jump for thousands
of millions of years until a single-celled living creature appeared? Or did it
have to wait a little longer for some more highly qualified measurer—with
a Ph.D.? If the theory is to apply to anything but idealized laboratory op-
erations, are we not obliged to admit that more or less ‘measurement-like’
processes are going on more or less all the time more or less everywhere?
Is there ever then a moment when there is no jumping and the Schrödinger
equation applies? (Bell, 1987, p. 117)
Here Bell makes the point that there is no physical feature that distinguishes a
measurement process from a general physical interaction between two systems.
So “‘measurement-like’ processes are going on more or less all the time more or
less everywhere” because physical interactions are going on more or less all the
time more or less everywhere. Nevertheless, we call certain physical interactions
“measurements”, and we do so because measurements tell us something about the
world. But the kind of interaction that occurs between an apparatus and a quantum
system is the same as that between two quantum systems, namely the one explained
by the theory.
If we want to measure the momentum of an electron, we build a device whose
behavior lets us deduce the momentum of the particle. The way the device is to be
built is inspired by the theory, since only the theory can tell us what and how we’re
able to measure. At the end of the measurement, we can read a certain number on
a screen and with the help of some calculations we come to know the momentum.
Since a measurement is nothing but the interaction between two physical systems
the apparatus will change the state of the system. This is the very nature of an
interaction. But physicists often claim that this is a unique feature of quantum
mechanics: the act of measurement kills the cat. And they claim that the situation
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is di erent in classical mechanics. For a classical measurement doesn’t change the
state of the measured system, it rather reveals pre-existing quantities.
But this explanation is wrong: it doesn’t respect how classical physics describes
interactions (Bohm and Hiley, 1993, p. 108). Let’s imagine two systems, A and
B. Both systems are composed of particles whose behavior is governed by the
gravitational and electromagnetic force. So A feels the force of B, and B feels the
force of A. The interaction changes the positions of the particles of both systems.
Nothing prevents us from choosing A as our measurement device. Therefore, the
measurement of B changes the configuration of A. So the act of measurement does
change the state of systems in classical physics, too.
The Di erence between Classical and Quantum Measurements
But why do we have the impression that the measurements of classical systems
are di erent from the measurements of quantum systems? There are two reasons
for this. One is the size of the system we measure and the sensitivity of the mea-
surement apparatus. If the measured system is big enough, the gravitational and
electromagnetic forces disturb the system just a little. So if we want to measure
the velocity of a car, the only things that we need are a clock and light. We can
prepare the starting and end position with a photoelectric sensor, which is coupled
to a clock such that the car will cross both sensors at a certain time. The car is so
big that the light beams don’t disturb the motion of the car in any significant way,
and therefore we have the impression that we have found the pre-determined value
of the velocity of the car. But the light beam does indeed changes the velocity of
the car – though so little that we cannot measure it.
Second, for any classical physical quantity there is a fact about the value of this
quantity before any measurement is performed, and it is even possible to retrieve
this “undisturbed” value. Here is an example. We want to measure the temperature
of a liquid by means of a thermometer. Before the measurement the liquid had
temperature Tl and the thermometer Tth. When we bring the thermometer into
thermal contact with the liquid they will reach a state of thermal equilibrium with
the same temperature T after some time. But the thermometer only gives us the
temperature T of the liquid after the measurement, and not Tl. How do we get the
temperature of the liquid before the measurement? In principle, this is easily done.
If we knew certain parameters of the liquid and the thermometer, thermodynamics
gives us the temperature of the liquid before the measurement. So even if the
measurement disturbs the thermodynamic state of the liquid, we can recover its
initial state.
This is di erent in quantum mechanics. In the de Broglie–Bohm theory this is
particularly evident if we consider an electron in a superposed spin state. Since spin
is contextual we cannot say that the particle before measurement has spin-up or
spin-down. The way we measure the electron determines its spin state. One mea-
surement may show that the electron has spin-up, while a di erent measurement
may show spin-down, even if the electron has the very same initial position.
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1.1.2. Local Beables
How can we redefine measurements in quantum mechanics? The first step is to
clarify what can exist in the world:
In particular we will exclude the notion of ‘observable’ in favour of that of
‘beable’. The beables of the theory are those elements which might correspond
to elements of reality, to things which exist. Their existence does not depend
on ‘observation’. Indeed observation and observers must be made out of
beables. (1987, p. 174)
The beables constitute the ontology of a physical theory; these are the entities that
are supposed to exist in the world independently of any observation. In particular,
the beables do not depend on measurements. As Bell has emphasized, measurement
apparatus, observers, and all physical objects, from a grasshopper to the moon, are
composed of beables.
He distinguishes one crucial subclass of beables:
We will be particularly concerned with local beables, those which (unlike
for example the total energy) can be assigned to some bounded space-time
region. For example, in Maxwell’s theory the beables local to a given region
are just the fields E and H, in that region, and all functionals thereof. [. . . ]
Of course we may be obliged to develop theories in which there are no strictly
local beables. That possibility will not be considered here. (Bell, 1987, p.
53)
The electromagnetic field is a local beable of classical electrodynamics. It’s a beable
because it exists independently of the sources, and it’s local because it’s defined on
space-time. So classical electrodynamics proposes two kinds of local beables: fields
and particles. Another candidate for a local beable is Newton’s gravitational field.
This is introduced as another physical entity in space-time apart from particles.
Bell’s definition of local beables as those entities “which [. . . ] can be assigned to
some bounded space-time region” might be a little unfortunate because it inclines
us to think that the entire beable must be restricted to a bounded region of space-
time in order to be a local one. Then the gravitational field would not be local, for
it spreads out throughout the universe. And the electromagnetic field would not
be a local beable, either, as it propagates infinitely far with the speed of light.
So what Bell really meant by a local beable was something di erent. Let’s chop
up space-time into many small regions that cover it completely. There are no
restrictions on the form or sizes of the regions. Some regions may even overlap. If
a beable takes values in at least one of the regions, and if by addition of the values
of all the regions we can recover the entire beable, then this beable is local. With
these precisifications, Newton’s gravitational field and the electromagnetic field are
indeed local beables.
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The Wave-Function Is Not a Local Beable
The wave-function, however, isn’t a local beable. In general, one cannot recover
the entire wave-function from its values on bounded space-time regions. And that
is because of entanglement. With two particles in a product state Â = |„Í1 |‰Í2, ,
for any covering of bounded regions in space-time we can retrieve Â because both
„ and ‰ are defined in three-dimensional space – we can uniquely retrieve „ and ‰
even if they overlap.
The wave-function, however, isn’t a local beable. In general, one cannot recover
the entire wave-function from its values on bounded space-time regions. And that is
so because of entanglement. Having two particles in a product state Â = |„Í1 |‰Í2,
then for any covering of bounded regions in space-time we can retrieve Â because
both „ and ‰ are defined on 3-dimensional space—we can uniquely retrieve „ and
‰ even if they overlap.
This is no longer possible if two particles are in an entangled state Â˜ = |„Í1 |‰Í2+
|‰Í1 |„Í2 (modulo normalization). In fact, Â˜ lives on configuration space and is not
an entity on space-time. Although its summands |„Í1 |‰Í2 and |‰Í1 |„Í2 can be
retrieved from their values in physical space, the superposition only makes sense on
configuration space. We cannot say that there is a superposition of each component
since |„Í1 |‰Í2 + |‰Í1 |„Í2 ”= |Â + „Í1 |„+ ÂÍ2. As entanglement is a ubiquitous
phenomenon in quantum mechanics, the wave-function per se cannot be local.
Local Beables and Measurements
When studying quantum mechanics, John Bell identifies two major problems that
every physical theory faces. On the one hand, there is an ontological problem:
What are the basic entities a physical theory is about? On the other hand, there
is an epistemic problem: How does the theory make empirical contact with the
real world? He considers local beables to be a solution to both problems, and I
have already pointed out how to answer them. Regarding the first one, a physical
theory has to state what exists. Among beables, local ones exist in space-time. In
particular, matter is composed of local beables, but other entities that we do not
regard as matter can be local beables, too, like the electromagnetic field.
Bell’s answer to the second epistemic question also answers the status of mea-
surement devices.
The concept of ‘observable’ lends itself to very precise mathematics when
identified with ‘self-adjoint operator’. But physically, it is a rather woolly
concept. It is not easy to identify precisely which physical processes are to
be given the status of ‘observations’ and which are to be relegated to the
limbo between one observation and another. So it could be hoped that some
increase in precision might be possible by concentration on the beables, which
can be described in ‘classical terms’, because they are there. The beables
must include the settings of switches and knobs on experimental equipment,
the currents in coils, and the readings of instruments. ‘Observables’ must be
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made, somehow, out of beables. The theory of local beables should contain,
and give precise physical meaning to, the algebra of local observables. (1987,
p. 52)
A measurement apparatus is build out of local beables like any physical body,
and the behavior of the local beables is covered by the physical theory. What we
see after a measurement process is the final configuration of local beables of the
measurement device, and this configuration with the help of the physical theory
allows us to make empirical contact with the world. Hence, the requirement to
have an ontology is not only motivated by the personal metaphysical need to have
a picture of the world, but also by physics itself in order to make the transition from
the theoretic to the empiric. Bell describes this transition again in the following
famous passage:
The name is deliberately modelled on ‘the algebra of local observables’. The
terminology, be-able as against observ-able, is not designed to frighten with
metaphysic those dedicated to realphysic. It is chosen rather to help in mak-
ing explicit some notions already implicit in, and basic to, ordinary quantum
theory. For, in the words of Bohr, ‘it is decisive to recognize that, however
far the phenomena transcend the scope of classical physical explanation, the
account of all evidence must be expressed in classical terms’. It is the am-
bition of the theory of local beables to bring these ‘classical terms’ into the
equations, and not relegate them entirely to the surrounding talk. (Bell,
1987, p. 52)
Local beables aren’t only the fundamental constituents of matter; they also account
for what we perceive and describe in experiments. The “classical term” Bell refers to
above doesn’t mean that we have to describe an experimental set-up with classical
mechanics; rather, “classical terms” is used synonymous with “everyday language”.
Bell uses the term “beable” for many kinds of entities: particles, fields, energy,
wave-functions. We can, within reason, doubt whether we should have all these
entities in the ontology. Indeed, energy shouldn’t have beable status. The issue of
particles, fields, and wave-functions is more complicated, and the goal of this thesis
is to illuminate their ontological status.
1.2. Primitive Ontology
1.2.1. Di erent Ontologies
The ontology of the world comprises all the entities that exist. It’s a fact that there
are flowers and pigs but not angels or unicorns. So flowers and pigs are part of the
ontology of the world, whereas angels and unicorns are excluded. When we talk
about the ontology of the world, we presuppose an objective reality out there, which
is independent of our perception. The world is totally indi erent to how we think
about or perceive it. It is, however, utterly astonishing that we have the capacity
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to dig into the physical secrets of the world way beyond what we can directly see,
hear, feel, smell, or taste.
There is a distinguished subset of the world’s ontology. The fundamental or basic
ontology includes all the entities that are the building blocks of the ontology as a
whole. This definition presupposes that the world is not infinitely divisible, that
there is some end if we zoom in to look at the structure of the world, and that there
is on one level a set of primitive entities that make up all things and beings in the
world.
One way to get to know more about the ontology of the world is to form physical
theories. Physics is ultimately concerned with the behavior of matter. And in
order to account for that behavior a physical theory poses its own ontology of what
is matter and what entities have to exist such that matter behaves in the way
that it behaves. Ideally, the ontology of physics will match the ontology of the
world so that physics will come to an end and we will have a complete theory of
everything. In reality, physics strives to match the world’s ontology and develops
further theories to o er better and better explanations and predictions.
It is possible, however, that the ontology of physics is still a proper subset of the
ontology of the world, even in the ideal case where we have found the true physical
theory. For example, God may exist, or it might turn out that our mind is an entity
on its own, somehow detached from the brain. For minds and Gods are not part
of any physical theory—even quantum mechanics has to make do without minds.
A future physical theory of everything may be capable of explaining what the
mind and consciousness are. Current physical theories that explicitly mention the
mind introduce it as a primitive entity, however. In the many-minds interpretation
(Albert and Loewer, 1988) or the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics,
the mind is presupposed to explain physics.
1.2.2. What Is a Primitive Ontology?
Not all entities of the fundamental physical ontology are directly involved in ob-
servable phenomena. Absolute space is clearly part of the fundamental ontology
of Newtonian mechanics, but in observations, like the motions of planets, abso-
lute space cannot be directly experienced or measured. Particles are di erent from
absolute space because they constitute the motion of the planets. For that rea-
son, particles have a distinguished role because they constitute observable objects.
Entities, like particles, are elements of the primitive ontology.
This notion was introduced by Dürr, Goldstein, and Zanghì:
What we regard as the obvious choice of primitive ontology—the basic kinds
of entities that are to be the building blocks of everything else [. . . ]—should
by now be clear: Particles, described by their positions in space, changing
with time—some of which, owing to the dynamical laws governing their evo-
lution, perhaps combine to form the familiar macroscopic objects of daily
experience. (Dürr et al., 1992, p. 850)
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This passage somehow misrepresents the true meaning of the primitive ontology
because it seems to be rather a description of a fundamental ontology. But it’s
evident from the use of this notion in the literature that it bears an epistemic
component. The primitive ontology selects those entities of the fundamental ontol-
ogy that havea distinguished role in accounting for observable behavior (Maudlin,
2015). Therefore, the primitive ontology is defined as located in three-dimensional
space or four-dimensional space-time (see, for instance, Allori, 2013).
The requirement that elements of the primitive ontology are situated in three- or
four-dimensional space makes it easier to account for experiments. Having the prim-
itive ontology in some other space, like Albert’s marvelous point in high-dimensional
configuration space, the connection between the primitive ontology and experiments
and experience is much more di cult (see Albert, 2013, and a critique thereof in
Maudlin, 2013). Our manifest image one is of objects moving in three-dimensional
space. So not just any kind of basic entity is a suitable candidate for a primitive
ontology.
Examples of a Primitive Ontology
There are three prominent examples of a primitive ontology. The flash ontology
(Tumulka 2006, p. 826; Bell 1987, Chap. 22) was developed for the GRW quantum
theory (Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber, 1986). In a nutshell, the idea of GRWf is to
have point-size events in space-time as the basic entities of the world. Whenever
there is a spontaneous localization of the wave-function in a very high-dimensional
space, corresponding events come into being in space-time. There are no continuous
lines of flashes; rather, the universe consists of discrete successions of events through
time. Bell described this flash ontology in lucid language:
So we can propose these events as the basis of the ‘local beables’ of the
theory. These are the mathematical counterparts in the theory to real events
at definite places and times in the real world (as distinct from the many
purely mathematical constructions that occur in the working out of physical
theories, as distinct from things which may be real but not localized, and as
distinct from the ‘observables’ of other formulations of quantum mechanics,
for which we have no use here). (Bell, 1987, p. 205)
Another proposal for the ontology of GRW theory has been worked out by Ghi-
rardi, Grassi, and Benatti (1995), and is dubbed GRWm. Instead of having discrete
stu  distributed in space-time, they introduce a continuous matter density spread
out in three-dimensional space. The collapse of the wave-function in configura-
tion space represents a contraction of the matter density in physical space, thereby
accounting for discrete physical objects with which we are familiar.
The oldest proposal for a primitive ontology for quantum mechanics was intro-
duced by the de Broglie–Bohm pilot-wave theory. This theory presupposes a parti-
cle ontology, in which particles move on continuous trajectories in three-dimensional
space.
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Are Local Beables the Elements of the Primitive Ontology?
There are subtle but decisive di erences between local beables and the elements of
a primitive ontology. The primitive ontology has two features that local beables
don’t have: it is defined in three-dimensional space, and it is primitive. John Bell
never specified the space in which local beables are defined. He seems to be open
to there being local beables in high-dimensional spaces. David Albert’s marvelous
point and the wave-function would then be local beables in configuration space,
but they aren’t part of a primitive ontology. Similarly, John Bell doesn’t mention
whether his local beables can be composed of other smaller entities. The primitive
ontology, on the other hand, is defined to as a subset of the fundamental ontology.
1.2.3. What Are Particles?
Particles aren’t particles. There are particles in classical mechanics, classical elec-
trodynamics, Bohmian mechanics, quantum field theory, and special and general
relativity. These particles are not all the “same.” But the di erences notwithstand-
ing, all particles must fulfill the following two requirements:
1. Particles have a precise location in space and time.
2. For any particle there is a time interval in which the particle exists for any
time t of that interval, and during this very interval the particle is at rest or
moves on a continuous line.
The GRW flashes form a discrete primitive ontology, too. Though they meet
the first condition of particles (flashes have a precise location in space and time),
they violate the second: there are no continuous lines. The average time for a
collapse of a one “particle” wave-function is several billion years. The apparently
continuous existence through time of macroscopic objects can be accounted for
by GRWf because they are assigned a wave-function on a very high-dimensional
space. And this wave-function collapses very frequently in a short period of time
so that there are many flashes with respect to our usual time scale. Zooming in on
a physical body, we will not find any dots that exist for longer than a moment of
time. It’s even possible that on a single simultaneity slice there will be no object
in space-time because at this moment there may be no flashes.
The Bohmian particles are particles proper. They have a precise location in
space and time, and for every particle there is a time-interval in which it moves on
a continuous line. In fact, this time interval is the same for all Bohmian particles:
it lasts from the beginning to the end of the universe. According to Bohmian
mechanics, there are a finite number of particles that constitute all objects, and
this number of particles stays the same throughout time. Furthermore, the particles
don’t have any spatial extension; they are point-size objects. It would be possible
to grant the particles some spatial extension—they could be very tiny balls, and
the location in space of the particle would be the location of the center of the
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ball. In knowing the diameter we know which region of space is occupied by the
particle. The spatial extension of particles, however, has to be somehow reflected
by the physical theory. There has to be a physical di erence whether or not the
particles are extended in space. Since the extension of the particles doesn’t make
any empirical di erence, it’s more parsimonious to assume the particles to be point-
sized objects.
The Pre-Socractics
The idea of particles is in fact very old. It was spelled out by the pre-Socratic
philosophers Leucippus and Democritus in their early theory of atomism:
[. . . ] substances infinite in number and indestructible, and moreover without
action or a ection, travel scattered about in the void. When they encounter
each other, collide, or become entangled, collections of them appear as water
or fire, plant or man. (fragment Diels-Kranz 68 A57, quoted in Graham,
2010, p. 537)
The pre-Socratics imagined that the world was composed of infinite particles, in
contrast to Bohmian or Newtonian mechanics. And their particles didn’t attract
or repel each other from a distance; instead, they thought, particles can only inter-
act via action-by-contact. When two particles touch, they either collide and move
apart, or they stick to each other and move together. Of course, the word “entan-
gled” in the quote has nothing to do with quantum entanglement. In order for two
particles to stick together, the pre-Socratics imposed some spatial structure on the
particles. They were thought to be spatially extended, and they could have hooks
and hollows such that two separate particles could join to form a kind of chain.
Particles in Newtonian Mechanics
What the pre-Socratics didn’t have, though, was a physical theory. It took more
than two thousand years and the genius of Isaac Newton to fill this gap. His
ontology is similar to his forefathers’:
[I]t seems probable to me, that God in the Beginning form’d Matter in solid,
massy, hard, impenetrable, moveable Particles, [. . . ] the Changes of cor-
poreal Things are to be placed only in the various Separations and new
Associations and Motions of these permanent Particles[.] (1952, p. 400)
For Newton, the di erent configurations and motions of particles also fully account
for the behavior of macroscopic objects. But he developed the conceptual and
mathematical means to make quantitative predictions. Like the Bohmian particles,
Newtonian ones have the following features in addition to our minimal conditions:
1. They have no spatial extension.
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2. Mass and charge are intrinsic properties of particles, and therefore there are
certain species of particles.
3. There are a finite number of particles, and the total number of particles
remains constant.
4. Every Newtonian particle forms one long continuous trajectory from the be-
ginning to the end of the universe.
In addition to these characteristics, Newtonian particles are generally interpreted
to have the capacity to generate fields. There are two kinds of fields that classical
particles can create: the gravitational field and the electromagnetic field. Both
fields are related to the intrinsic properties of particles. In virtue of having mass the
particle generates a gravitational field, and in virtue of having charge it generates
an electromagnetic field. The fields then reach out into space and influence all the
other particles. Unlike the pre-Socratic particles, Newtonian particles don’t have
an internal structure that allows them to hook onto one another; fields are the
cause of the repulsion and attraction of particles.
Point 2 is particularly interesting since Bohmian particles also have mass and
charge as intrinsic properties. How do Bohmian masses relate to their classical
counterparts?
Newtonian mechanics and Bohmian mechanics are di erent physical theories, and
so there is no a priori reason why the notions of one theory should be compatible
with the notions of the other.
But when we look at the Bohmian laws, we recognize two parameters, m and
q. At this stage, we don’t know their relation to mass and charge yet. So we
can replace them with some arbitrary parameters, say – and —. In most cases the
parameters – and — have nothing to do with mass and charge. Only in the classical
limit, when the Bohmian trajectories are approximately Newtonian, does it turn
out that we can identify – and — with m and q; we have to compare Bohmian
laws of motion with the classical laws (Dürr and Teufel, 2009, Sec. 8.1). So if –
and — are interpreted as representing intrinsic properties of particles then they are
di erent properties to classical mass and charge. We could name them “Bohmian
mass” and “Bohmian charge,” which seem to resemble classical properties in the
classical limit.
The Creation and Annihilation of Particles
The idea that particles subsisted through space and time once they were created
is no longer valid in modern quantum field theory (QFT). There are indeed many
versions of QFT that would need to be further developed to be recognized as mature
physical theories, although the Standard Model is the generally agreed framework.
One attempt to o er a primitive ontology for QFT presupposes a particle ontology
(Bell, 2004a). These particles meet the two minimal criteria of all particles: they
have a precise location in space and time, and they follow continuous trajectories.
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But contrary to Newtonian and Bohmian mechanics, there isn’t one long tra-
jectory for every particle from the beginning to the end of the universe. Instead,
these particles can be created and annihilated. Therefore, the trajectories can have
jumps in them. Once a particle is created it exists for a certain period of time and
moves along a continuous trajectory. But it can be annihilated and thus cease to
exist, until it pops into existence again and continues to move along a continuous
trajectory. Of course, a deeper physical and philosophical analysis of Bell-type
QFT and the mechanism of particle creation and annihilation will shed light on
whether a particle keeps its identity through jumps in the trajectory. It strikes
me as strange that once particle P1 is annihilated the very same particle P1 can
reappear later out of nowhere at another location. It seems more reasonable to
dismiss a cross-trajectory identity for particles.
An alternative suggestion is the Dirac sea model of QFT (Dirac, 1934). Deckert
et al. (2016) explain how we can use the Dirac sea for a Bohmian QFT. The idea
is that there is in fact no creation and annihilation of particles. The universe has
a finite amount of particles, but most particles are in the vacuum state (the Dirac
sea) and cannot be observed because they don’t interact with other particles. Only
excited particles can interact and form all observable objects, and they follow a
deterministic non-local law of motion.
1.3. Primitive Stu  Ontology
The primitive ontology doesn’t distinguish between objects and their properties.
This may lead to a paradox. Imagine a Newtonian and a Bohmian particle each
with mass m and charge q. Obviously, the two particles move on di erent trajec-
tories. But if they share the same properties, shouldn’t they behave in the same
way? To avoid this question I suggest separating properties from their bearers. A
particle is a propertyless object. It’s not defined by its mass or charge or any other
kind of intrinsic property. Particles have just one feature: they have well-defined
position. And particles can only do one thing: they move. Let’s call an ontology
of propertyless objects a primitive stu  ontology.
How the elements of a primitive stu  ontology move is determined by laws. New-
tonian particles move according to Newtonian laws of motion; Bohmian particles,
move according to Bohmian laws of motion. We don’t need properties to further
specify motion.
Allori et al. introduce a primitive stu  ontology for the GRWm theory:
Moreover, the matter that we postulate in GRWm and whose density is given
by the m function does not ipso facto have any such properties as mass or
charge; it can only assume various levels of density. (2014, pp. 331–2)
Originally, the matter density of GRWm was called “mass” density, but this assigns
an intrinsic property to the matter density for every definition. It’s not obvious
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how this continuous matter-distribution can have the same property as Newtonian
particles.
The Role of Properties
Properties may be introduced but only to reduce the laws of motion. This leads
either to Humeanism or dispositionalism. For the Humean, properties are local
qualities whose identity doesn’t depend on the nomological role they have in our
world. And laws are the best summary of the distribution of those qualities.
The dispositionalist regards properties of particles as intrinsic and dynamic-
nomological. In contrast to Humean local qualities, dispositions are defined by
their causal role in the world. So a Newtonian particle moves in the way it does
because of its mass and charge. The laws, then, are a representation of what
dispositions are doing (more details will follow in Chapter 2).
Advantages of a Primitive Stu  Ontology
The primitive-stu  ontology separates physics from metaphysics. The task of
physics is to discover the primitive stu  and the appropriate laws. Metaphysics,
on the other hand, is concerned with the status of the laws of nature and the
meaning of properties. With the help of primitive stu , we can compare current
metaphysical theories on laws of nature and properties (see Chapter 2).
But the most important advantage of a primitive-stu  ontology lies elsewhere.
The primitive stu  ontology is su cient for a complete ontology of matter. We
can dispense with properties altogether, whether intrinsic or relational. Physics is
the science of matter in motion, not the science of properties. And by throwing
properties out of the ontology, we don’t need to tackle purely metaphysical questions
about the status and meaning and consequences of properties. Throughout this
thesis we will encounter these metaphysical questions, and yet appreciate that we
can ignore them without losing any physical insight. It’s the task of metaphysics
to help us understand physics, not to make it more obscure.
1.3.1. Does Primitive Stu  Have Haecceity?
Let’s look closer at particles interpreted as primitive stu . How can we distinguish
di erent particles if they don’t have any properties? The only dividing feature
of particles interpreted as primitive stu  is their location. These particles are
all identical or indistinguishable as such, but they can be distributed in di erent
positions in space.
There is a metaphysical invention intended to help keep physically indistinguish-
able particles in the ontology. The idea is to equip particles with a primitive identity
or haecceity—a kind of metaphysical distinction between the particles. This means
that there is a primitive fact about particle P , namely that it is particle P regardless
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of any physical features it may possess. Though two particles may be indistinguish-
able with respect to all intrinsic physical features, they are nevertheless discernible
because of the primitive identity they always “carry” along with them. The major
drawback of haecceity is that it’s stipulated independently of any physical theory
as an ad hoc metaphysical feature of particles or any other physical object. And
current physical theories don’t require the concept of haecceity. Haecceitism says
that it’s metaphysically possible that our world could have di erent identities with
the same physics and phenomenology:
Imagine the following alternative history of the world: Things are qualita-
tively just as they actually are. There is no di erence in anything like the
shape, size, or mass of objects. There is no di erence in the number of en-
tities. Even so, there is a non-qualitative di erence and it concerns you in
particular. According to this alternative history, you fail to exist. In your
place, there is a distinct individual, Double. Double has all the qualitative
properties, whether mental or physical, you actually have, but, despite all
these similarities, you and Double are distinct individuals. So, according to
this alternative history, you do not exist. (Cowling, 2015)
Although physics never asks for haecceitism there is a mathematical structure
that seems to indicate a primitive identity of particles. Usually, the configuration
of n particles is represented by an n-tuple Q := (Q1, . . . ,Qn). Here, particle P1
has spatial coordinate Q1; particle P2 has spatial coordinate Q2, and so on. A
permutation of positions of the first two particles is written as QÕ := (Q2,Q1, . . . ).
Now particle P1 is at Q2, and particle P2 is at Q1. So particles seem to be
equipped with a primitive identity, since the n-tuple distinguishes the order of the
positions. But the introduction of a primitive identity of particles is unnecessary
unless the motion varies under permutation of the configuration as well, that is,
with Q and QÕ leading to di erent trajectories. It may be reasonable to introduce
a primitive identity of particles if the physical theories are built in such a way. But
why should the trajectories change under permutation when the particles are phys-
ically indistinguishable? Is it possible that a permutation leads to new trajectories
solely because of the haecceity of the particles?
No, it’s not. In fact, when a physical theory doesn’t distinguish between parti-
cles, the laws of motion must be permutation invariant. So any di erence between
the particles must be reflected by the laws of motion so that the permutation of
distinguishable particles results in di erent trajectories. There is no physical theory
that claims that there are physically absolutely identical particles that nevertheless
di er because of a primitive identity. If there is a physical di erence between parti-
cles then this di erence can usually be explained by the particles’ having di erent
physical properties; they may have di erent mass or charge.
By definition, we have no empirical access to the primitive identity of particles—
if it exists. We gain knowledge about the particles only through their motion in
space and time. And if the particles are physically indistinguishable their motion
doesn’t expose to us which particle is on which trajectory. It’s true that in the case
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of distinguishable particles, there can be a fact that particle P1 is on trajectory
Q1(t), but this is a physical fact, and it’s not due to haecceity.
Because of mass the Newtonian laws aren’t permutation invariant under a change
of particle position. In this theory, mass is the physical feature that distinguishes
among the particles. In the case of identical classical particles, that is, in the case
of m = mi for all i œ {1, . . . , n}, the permutation of particles doesn’t change the
trajectories, although the n-tuple has changed. Is this a case of haecceity? No,
it’s a case of superfluous mathematical structure. The formalism of n-tuples is
familiar and simple because the n-tuples form the vector space Rn, which we know
from high school. But it bears too much mathematical structure, for it leads to a
di erent physical state whenever particles permute.
1.3.2. The Mathematics of Primitive Stu 
Indistinguishable particles have to be mathematically represented in a di erent way.
We have to replace the n-tuple (Q1, . . . ,Qn) by the set {Q1, . . . ,Qn} (see Goldstein
et al., 2005a,b). By definition, a set has no ordering of elements, as tuples have. So
{Q1, . . . ,Qn} only states that there is one particle at Q1, another at Q2, and so
on. This is exactly what we want. The set {Q1, . . . ,Qn} doesn’t tell us anything
about which particle is at which location. The mathematics now contains all the
information that is necessary, but no more. Therefore, the natural configuration
space for indistinguishable particles is nR3, which is the set of all sets {Q1, . . . ,Qn}
with Qi œ R3 for i œ {1, . . . , n}.
So far, we have argued that particles can be recognized as primitive stu , and
that they are the fundamental building blocks of matter. Since particles are in-
distinguishable, lacking a primitive identity, the mathematical formalism should
represent this, too, by replacing the ordinary configuration space R3n with the nat-
ural one nR3. If properties are part of the metaphysics at all (see Chapter 2), their
role is solely a dynamic-nomological one, that is, they constrain the temporal devel-
opment of the particles. The laws then express the role of properties in generating
the motion of particles.
If we interpret mass as an intrinsic property of Newtonian particles, it has two
di erent roles. On the one hand, it has a causal-nomological role in determining
the trajectories of the particles. On the other hand, it can individuate the particles
in addition to the spatial location in the case of di erent masses. We can say that
particle P1 is on Q1 because it is the particle with mass m1, and particle P2 is on
Q2 because it is the particle with mass m2. This second role of mass, however,
relies on the particles’ having all di erent masses. If there are two particles with
the same mass, we cannot distinguish between the particles except in terms of
their location. So this role of mass should be only used as an additional feature to
distinguish non-identical particles. Taking the idea of particles as primitive stu 
seriously, ontologically mass doesn’t equip the particles with an identity. The only
thing we can say is that there is one particle at Q1 and another at Q2 represented
by {Q1,Q2}. The way the two particles move shows us on which trajectory there
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is a particle with mass m1 and on which trajectory there is a particle with mass
m2.
Although particles as primitive stu  don’t have a primitive identity or properties
that allow us to distinguish among them, it’s still possible to label the particles.
It is sometimes said that identical particles don’t allow for labels (Ladyman and
Ross, 2007, p. 136), but this is wrong. Let’s say you have two identical soccer balls,
one in each hand. And we play the following game: close your eyes, kick both balls
onto the field, open your eyes, and tell me which ball was in which hand. That’s
impossible, isn’t it? One way for you to win the game is to label the balls before
you kick them. The label will tell you which ball was in your left hand and which
in your right. Easy.
But there is another tactic available to you. Kick the ball in your left hand, turn
around 180° and kick the other ball. You’ll recognize which one you kicked first just
from the distribution of the balls on the field. The second tactic shows that you
can identify the balls without labels. Why? Because you know their trajectories.
While your eyes are closed you know how the balls fly.
We can straightforwardly apply this example to particles. The location of n par-
ticles is represented by the configuration {Q1, . . . ,Qn}. Even if this configuration is
permutation-invariant we can label the particles: the particle at Q1 may be named
P1, the particle at Q2, P2, etc. The only feature that distinguishes the particles is
their position in space, and the labels are names of the di erent trajectories. This
is how we can label identical particles.
Newtonian and Bohmian Particles
In the previous section we compared Newtonian mechanics and Bohmian mechanics
with respect to their primitive ontologies. Now we can make the analog analysis.
Both theories have the very same primitive stu  ontology consisting of propertyless
particles. They only di er in how the particles move. In Newtonian mechanics, the
particles move according to Newton’s laws of motion, while the Bohmian particles
move according to the Bohmian guiding equation. There is nothing intrinsically
di erent between a Newtonian and a Bohmian particle; both “kinds” of particles
are point-size pieces of primitive stu .
1.4. Ontic Structural Realism
Particles are familiar and intuitive. Some philosophers, however, challenge the
atomistic picture, and they claim that their view is supported by our current phys-
ical theories. They want to replace objects with relations:
Ontic Structural Realism (OSR) is the view that the world has an objec-
tive modal structure that is ontologically fundamental, in the sense of not
supervening on the intrinsic properties of a set of individuals. According to
OSR, even the identity and individuality of objects depends on the relational
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structure of the world. Hence, a first approximation to our metaphysics is:
‘There are no things. Structure is all there is.’ We of course acknowledge
that special sciences are richly populated with individual objects. Thus, to
accommodate their elimination from metaphysics we will owe a non-ad hoc
account of the point and value of reference to and generalization over objects
in sciences other than fundamental physics. We will argue that objects are
pragmatic devices used by agents to orient themselves in regions of space-
time, and to construct approximate representations of the world. (Ladyman
and Ross, 2007, p. 130)
The motivation for the development of structural realism originally relied on
solving issues in general philosophy of science. John Worrall (1989), who was the
first to introduce this new idea based on writings of Poincaré and Duhem, wanted
to find a solution to the pessimistic meta-induction. According to this argument
we cannot be sure of the objects that are presupposed by our current best theories
because we have rejected most of the objects that were assumed to exist by former
best theories in the past. For example, physicists once believed that there had to
be a caloric fluid that moves from hot bodies to cool ones in order to account for
thermodynamic phenomena. But Ludwig Boltzmann showed that thermodynamics
can be reduced to statistical mechanics, which is founded on an atomistic picture
of particles in motion. So Worrall concluded that we should be agnostic about
the basic objects that exist in the world. Although objects don’t survive a theory
change, something else does: the structures of the theory.
What does he mean by structure? These are laws, mathematical equations, or
some other (mathematical) content of the theory. So what survives the transition
from one theory to another are certain distinguished parts of the old theory, which
can be retrieved in the successive theory. One famous example is Fresnel’s law,
which can be found in one form or the other in ether theories, Maxwell’s electro-
dynamics, or even electroweak theory. This kind of structural realism is called
epistemic structural realism (ESR). There may be objects. We don’t know whether
they exist. But we can gain knowledge of certain parts of the mathematical or
law-like relationships in scientific theories.
1.4.1. Ontic Structural Realism without Relata
Ladyman and Ross (2007) use these ideas in order to form an ontology for funda-
mental physics. They not only claim that all we should believe in about the world
are structures, but also that all that exists in the world are structures. The basic
entities that are the building blocks of our universe are structures, not objects.
For them these structures are not situated or distributed in space-time, and so we
cannot just build physical bodies out of structures, like building a table out of par-
ticles. Therefore, they have to o er a di erent story of how there can be objects.
They describe objects as “pragmatic devices used by agents to orient themselves in
regions of spacetime.”
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In the quote at the beginning of this section, Ladyman and Ross claimed that
structures introduce an objective modality into the world. Later they say that “[f]or
‘modal’ read ‘nomological’ if you like” (2007, p. 130), which clearly emphasizes
that their structures are parts of the laws of physics. But modal isn’t the same
as nomological. Nomological entities are modal, while not all modal entities are
nomological. Take mass, for example. You can interpret mass as a dispositional
property of particles. Then it is clearly modal in constraining or determining the
motion of particles. As a dispositional property mass isn’t nomological.
If ontic structures are modal, then what is their ontological status as modal?
This is the crucial question that Ladyman and Ross disregard. They are neither
Humeans nor dispositionalists because both accounts presuppose localized objects
in the world. It seems to me that they are primitivists with respect to the laws
of nature. But then the world would consist only of laws, without there being
any objects that instantiate these laws. It’s not at all clear to me how to extract
objects in space and time out of nomological entities alone. Furthermore, Ladyman
and Ross aren’t realists about laws per se but only about parts of them, namely
structures. But parts of laws cannot create physical objects, either.
Ladyman and Ross are well aware that structures alone cannot generate ob-
jects. Although these emergent objects are sometimes summarized as “nodes” of
structures or “intersections of relations” (French and Ladyman, 2011, p. 26), the
emergence of objects from structures is non-trivial and not straightforward, and
it requires some ingredients of Daniel Dennett’s theory of patterns (Ladyman and
Ross, 2007, Chap. 4). In this reconstruction of objects I can’t really grasp what
are instances of objects. It seems that Ladyman and Ross only want to show how
macroscopic objects emerge from structures, but there are physical objects on the
fundamental level as well, such as particles, forces, or fields. I don’t see how these
physical objects can be “pragmatic devices used by agents to orient themselves in
regions of spacetime.”
Besides, it isn’t clear what counts as the structures of the current physical theo-
ries. The structure of a theory can be only reconstructed after a theory-change as
the part of the theory that survives in the new theory with some modifications. We
can only show what has survived of previous theories; it’s not possible to identify
the structures that will survive in the future. Even if a theory inherits a structure
from a previous one, this doesn’t guarantee that the structure will be transmitted
to a successive theory. Moreover, there is too much room for the interpretation
of which structures actually have survived. It may be possible that we identify a
structure in a new theory that surprisingly resembles another structure in an old
theory, but their resemblance may just be due to notational similarities.
So OSR à la Ladyman seems to be trivial on the one hand and mysterious on
the other. It’s trivial because there have to be bits of a theory to be found in
a successor theory. A new theory doesn’t appear out of thin air. If a theory is
empirically successful, and it is replaced by another theory, then it’s not surprising
that the new theory contains some parts of the old one.
Mysterious is the claim that we should be realists with respect to the structure
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without any (primitive) relata instantiating this structure. Here is an example.
Ladyman and Ross (2007, p. 95) claim that there is a structural continuity between
classical mechanics and quantum mechanics. Newton’s second law is the famous
equation F = ma, which specifies how forces influence the acceleration of particles.
The Ehrenfest theorem in quantum mechanics is of a similar form to Newton’s law,
namely ÈÒV Í = m d2dt2 ÈxÍ. It states that the expectation value of the gradient of
the potential operator and the expectation value of the position operator fulfill a
mathematical equation that resembles Newton’s second law. So what should we be
realists about according to this example? Ladyman’s OSR doesn’t allow us to be
realists with respect to forces, potentials, or particles since these are all objects that
instantiate the structure. They aren’t realists with respect to expectation values.
Fortunately, they don’t allow us to be naive realists about operators, either.
But if relations as such exist, then it’s mysterious what these relations are sup-
posed to be from an ontological point of view. Ladyman and Ross claim a structure
is transferred from classical mechanics to quantum mechanics. But they actually
posit only a formal similarity between Newton’s second law and the Ehrenfest the-
orem. What is the structure? What is actually transferred? For sure, the potential
isn’t transferred; forces aren’t transferred; particles aren’t transferred.
What remains is the purely formal relation ¶ = m d2dt2¶, where the placeholder ¶
indicates the spots in which we can insert some mathematical objects. But if we
don’t know the mathematical objects the relation as such has no physical content.
Newton’s second law precisely describes the motion of a particle that is influenced
by forces. Ehrenfest’s theorem, on the other hand, describes the “trajectory” of the
position operator, and therefore this theorem is a statement about the statistical
behavior of many particles. So it’s the mathematical representation of physical
objects, like particles and forces, that give an equation its physical meaning. I
don’t see how a mathematical structure without relata can have physical meaning.
To recap, the version of OSR that I have discussed so far claims the following.
All there is to the world are structures. The structures are nomological as part of
the physical laws. The laws, as well as the structures, are primitive. But what do
the laws of physics refer to? What does the structures refer to? What is happening
in space and time? According to French, Ladyman, and Ross there is no primitive
ontology; there are no local beables. The world on a fundamental level only consists
of nomological entities, namely, structures that are defined as some mathematical
aspects of the laws of physics. This shows that OSR is only a partial realism,
because “it leaves open how the structure in question is implemented, instantiated
or realized” (Esfeld, 2013, p. 20). In short, we have laws but no entities that can
obey these laws.
Furthermore, French, Ladyman, and Ross also claim that their interpretation of
ontic structural realism is influenced and defended by textbook quantum mechan-
ics, in particular, by quantum statistics. Their ontology, however, doesn’t help to
understand what is situated in space-time according to textbook quantum mechan-
ics. We know the quantum laws and mathematical relationships of the quantum
objects, but apart from that we don’t know what kind of objects there are in space
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and time – in fact, there are no objects on the fundamental level. Nor does their
metaphysics help to solve the measurement problem or explain non-locality.
1.4.2. Ontic Structural Realism with Objects
Let’s look at an alternative version of OSR. citetEsfeld:2004aa,Esfeld:2009aa sug-
gests that OSR requires objects as the relata of structures, so that the objects
instantiate those relations. What Esfeld means by structure is fundamentally dif-
ferent from the meaning posited by Ladyman.1 In Esfeld’s view, there are objects
situated in three-dimensional space or four-dimensional space-time; they can be
particles, flashes, matter density, or anything else that is primitive stu . And these
local objects instantiate certain dynamical relations that constrain their temporal
development.
Esfeld criticizes Ladyman and Ross in not spelling out how their structures in-
troduce an objective modality. Though he also interprets structures as introducing
objective modality, his structures’ modality is well spelled out: the structures are
modal by constraining the temporal development of the objects instantiating these
structures. And the physical theory at hand determines what the objects and the
structures are supposed to be.
Applied to Newtonian mechanics, particles instantiate dynamical relations that
are represented by Newton’s second law (see Hubert, 2016, Sec. 3). In the end, these
relations coincide with plain Newtonian forces. The forces are taken as primitives,
and their role is to constrain the motion of particles. Newton’s laws then supervene
on this dynamical role of forces.
We can categorize the myriad of proposals for a fundamental ontology of the
world by di erentiating with respect to their commitment to the status of objects
and relations (see also Stachel, 2006; Esfeld and Lam, 2011):
1. Certain objects are ontological primitives. All other objects and all relations
are determined by these primitive objects.
2. Certain objects and certain relations among these objects are ontological
primitives.
3. Certain relations are primitive. All objects are determined by these relations.
4. There are only relations and no objects.
The first point isn’t a version of OSR. In this ontology, there are only localized
objects, and the objects usually have intrinsic properties, which have two roles. On
the one hand, the properties determine the behavior of the objects. On the other
1Ladyman and Ross (2007) are indeed ambiguous on what they mean by structures. On the
one hand, parts of mathematical equations represent structures as already discussed. On the
other hand, they accept space-time relations as ontic structures, too (p. 144), which is more
in Esfeld’s spirit.
22
1.4. Ontic Structural Realism
hand, the properties equip every object with an intrinsic identity. The objects
di er through having di erent intrinsic properties. Leibniz adheres to this view in
his theory of monads. For him, the world is composed of non-extended thinking
entities (monads) that perceive the world from their unique point of view or mirror
the entire universe under their own aspect. Monads are the substances of the world,
and everything else, including all relations, supervenes on them.
The second option allows non-supervenient relations in the ontology. For exam-
ple, spatiotemporal relations among particles are candidates for non-supervenient
relations. David Lewis (1986) famously supported this position in his version of
Humeanism by presupposing a network of spatiotemporal relations that hold the
world together. And at points of this network are objects instantiating local qual-
ities. The spatiotemporal relations aren’t responsible for the identity of objects,
which is instead established by the intrinsic properties every object possesses.
The third position does grant the relation primary status and lets the objects
emerge from them. This is in accordance with the view of Ladyman and Ross.
The most radical version of OSR states that the ontology of physics consists
only of structures. This eliminative position gets rid of all the objects as part of
the ontology; famously, French (2010, 2014) defends this view. He argues that
quantum mechanics underdetermines whether quantum particles are individuated
objects. On the one hand, he tries to show that quantum statistics prohibits us
from recognizing quantum particles as individuals (French and Redhead, 1988).
On the other hand, Muller and Saunders (2008) claim that quantum mechanics
is committed to individuated objects by means of the principle of the identity of
indiscernibles. In conclusion, there is no physical fact regarding whether quantum
particles are individuated objects. And as there is no fact, French goes on, there
are no objects.
Furthermore, French considers the symmetries of quantum mechanics represented
by group theory to be the basic structures of the world. He is explicit in doing so:
[T]he structure of the world is presented to us in the theoretical context under
consideration by means of the relevant laws and symmetries, as informed
group-theoretically. (French, 2014, p. vii)
‘[W]hat is structure?’ It is the laws and symmetries of our theories of con-
temporary physics, appropriately metaphysically understood via notions of
dependence and taken as appropriately modally informed. (French, 2014, p.
ix)
But what is the meaning of symmetries in quantum mechanics without reference to
something in space-time? Aren’t there objects in space and time whose behavior
is captured by whatever fancy mathematical formalism humankind can invent?
Symmetries in (non-relativistic) quantum mechanics are mathematical relations
of operators—think of the rotation groups SO(3) and SU(2). But operators aren’t
fundamental objects, because they and their symmetries are ultimately derived
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from the wave-function and Schrödinger’s equation. Operators are used to sum-
marize measurement outcomes in a concise way. Therefore, they are not suitable
foundations for an ontology of physics.2
I prefer Esfeld’s proposal for OSR. There are objects, and there are non-supervenient
relations among the objects. Objects are the stu  of which all physical objects are
composed. Relations are modal by constraining the behavior of objects. Applying
this to an atomist’s ontology, particles are objects that stand in certain dynamical
relations. Every particle is related to the other particles in the universe, and rela-
tions constrain the temporal development of the particles such that they trace out
certain trajectories fixed by the physical theory.
1.4.3. Ontic Structural Realism of Space-Time
So far we have used OSR to ground the laws of motion in the dynamical relations
among particles. But we can go one step further in applying OSR to space itself
(Esfeld et al., 2015a,b). Then we have two kinds of structures among the particles:
there is a non-modal spatiotemporal structure and a modal dynamical one.3 This
is as far as OSR can ultimately get.
Esfeld and his co-authors o er three arguments for why we should prefer rela-
tional space over absolute space:
1. The problem of the Leibniz shifts is solved;
2. Absolute space exists where there are no particles; and
3. A metaphysical distinction between points of space and points of matter is
unclear.
In the famous Leibniz-Clarke debate (Leibniz and Clarke, 2000), Leibniz argues
that absolute space allows for states of a airs that make no observable di erence.
The center of mass of the universe might be at a di erent location in absolute space,
and we wouldn’t be able to distinguish the two cases by physical experiments. We
can even imagine that all objects in the universe have an additional velocity v,
and still there is no observational di erence. According to the principle of the
identity of indiscernibles, Leibniz concludes that universes that di er from ours by
a translational or a kinematic shift are actually the same.
A second reason to abandon absolute space is that absolute space exists even
in locations where there is no matter. The primary role of absolute space is to
provide an arena for the motion of particles. But in doing so it presupposes too
much mathematical and physical structure that is supposed to exist even in areas
where there has never been a particle.
2In fact, French includes in his OSR the symmetries of QFT, which are di erent from the symme-
tries in non-relativistic quantum mechanics. Nevertheless, I don’t regard them as fundamental
either.
3In general relativity, you could argue that the spatiotemporal relations are modal, too.
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Third, if there is absolute space, it’s not clear what the di erence is between a
point of space and a point of matter, namely, a particle. Neither kind of point
has any features by which to distinguish it, since they are both taken to be primi-
tive. A particle can occupy a point in space, and, whenever there is empty space,
space-time points are empty. But this manner of speaking doesn’t clarify what is
metaphysically di erent between a space-time point and a particle. Therefore, we
should get rid of absolute space.
So here are the ingredients of Esfeld’s ultimate version of OSR. First and fore-
most, there are objects. On the fundamental level, objects are interpreted as primi-
tive stu  with no intrinsic properties at all. In addition to the primitive stu , there
are two non-supervenient structures instantiated by objects. There is a non-modal
spatiotemporal structure that constitute space or space-time, and there is a modal
dynamical structure that constrains the temporal development of objects. A phys-
ical theory then fills in the gaps by providing the details for both structures, since
at this stage the structures are mere placeholders for physics. In fact, only Bar-
bour’s Machian theory of Newtonian mechanics poses a relational space-time from
the outset (Barbour and Bertotti, 1982; Barbour, 2000); all other physical theo-
ries, including general relativity, have up to now needed some objective space-time
structure independent of physical objects.4
Therefore, Esfeld has two possibilities. One is to interpret existing theories as
presupposing a relational space-time, their standard interpretation as substantival-
ist theories notwithstanding. For instance, Huggett (2006) does this for Newtonian
mechanics. He argues that a Humean can get rid of absolute space and time; what
remains then are particles standing in spatiotemporal relations. Another strategy
for Esfeld is to rewrite substantivalist theories as relational theories. He does ex-
actly that in Esfeld et al. (2015a) for classical mechanics and Bohmian mechanics.
The situation is di erent for dynamical structures because all theories formulate
laws to account for the temporal behavior of objects and laws can be interpreted
to introduce an objective dynamical structure among objects. The task of laws is
hence to describe the influence of the structure on the temporal development of
objects.
Physics doesn’t postulate a dynamical structure per se. Relations may come in
the guise of forces, fields, or wave-functions. These are the modal entities that
constrain the motion of particles. In a second step, one can analyze the ontological
status of forces, fields, or wave-functions. So when we speak of dynamical relations
we mean that there is some influence or connection between the objects, and the
physical theory gives us the entities that make up these relations. Normally, physi-
cists don’t speak of dynamical relations; they speak of interactions. The notion
of interaction, however, seems to be more restrictive than the notion of relation.
Forces and fields are interactions between particles. Forces without fields are di-
4As always, everything is debatable. Although Barbour was inspired by Leibniz and Mach he
is a substantivalist with respect to shape space, which he calls Platonia. Similarly, there are
relationalist interpretations of general relativity, triggered by the hole argument.
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rect interactions or actions at a distance, while forces in conjunction with fields are
usually seen as mediated interaction. The wave-function, however, isn’t interpreted
as an interaction between particles, but can be construed as a dynamical structure
(see Esfeld et al., 2015b).
Summary
I’ve argued against Ladyman’s version of OSR because it’s metaphysically myste-
rious and physically ill spelled out. He and Ross introduced OSR as “the view that
the world has an objective modal structure that is ontologically fundamental, in
the sense of not supervening on the intrinsic properties of a set of individuals.” This
coincides with Esfeld’s proposal of a dynamical structure. They go on to say that
“[a]ccording to OSR, even the identity and individuality of objects depends on the
relational structure of the world.” This is again true for Esfeld’s version. But now
they introduce a twist: “Hence, a first approximation to our metaphysics is: ‘There
are no things. Structure is all there is.’ ” This doesn’t follow from the previous two
statements. Their first approximation turns out to be the entire ontology: all that
exists are relations without relata.
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2.1. Humean Supervenience
Humean supervenience can be traced to David Hume’s theory of causation. His
Treatise of Human Nature from 1740 is the locus classicus:
[W]hen we talk of any being [. . . ] as endowed with a power or force, propor-
tioned to any e ect; when we speak of a necessary connection betwixt objects,
and suppose, that this connection depends upon an e cacy or energy, with
which any of these objects are endowed; in all these expressions, so applied,
we have really no distinct meaning, and make use only of common words,
without any clear and determinate ideas. But as it is more probable, that
these expressions do here lose their true meaning by being wrong applied,
than that they never have any meaning; it will be proper to bestow another
consideration on this subject, to see if possible we can discover the nature
and origin of those ideas, we annex to them.
Suppose two objects to be presented to us, of which the one is the cause
and the other the e ect; it is plain, that from the simple consideration of
one, or both these objects we never shall perceive the tie, by which they are
united, or be able certainly to pronounce, that there is a connection betwixt
them. It is not, therefore, from any one instance, that we arrive at the idea
of cause and e ect, of a necessary connection of power, of force, of energy,
and of e cacy. Did we never see any but particular conjunctions of objects,
entirely di erent from each other, we should never be able to form any such
ideas.
But again; suppose we observe several instances, in which the same objects
are always conjoined together, we immediately conceive a connection betwixt
them, and begin to draw an inference from one to another. This multiplicity
of resembling instances, therefore, constitutes the very essence of power or
connection, and is the source, from which the idea of it arises. The appear-
ance of a cause always conveys the mind, by a customary transition, to the
idea of the e ect. (Hume, 1960, pp. 162–163, modernized spelling)
Let’s use an example to illustrate what Hume means. When you flip the light switch
in your bathroom the light turns on (provided that there are no defects). Then,
of course, flipping the light switch is the cause of the light bulb on the ceiling’s
turning on. There is no doubt about the cause and the e ect. But why is there no
doubt? Can we observe the causal connection between the switch and the light?
Hume denies this. What we observe are constant conjunctions of flipping the
switch and the burning of light. And because we have seen this happen many
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times as the same conjunction of events, our mind expects the e ect after seeing
the cause. But Hume goes even one step further. Not only can we not observe
any causal connection, there isn’t any such thing in the first place. For him, it’s
metaphysically possible for the light bulb to remain o  when we flip the switch
even if it bears no physical defect.
Later, in An Enquiry of Human Understanding, David Hume elaborates on his
notion of causation:
[W]e may define a cause to be an object, followed by another, and where all
the objects, similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to the second.
Or in other words, where, if the first object had not been, the second never had
existed. The appearance of a cause always conveys the mind, by a customary
transition to the idea of the e ect. Of this also we have experience. We may,
therefore, suitably to this experience, form another definition of cause; and
call it, an object followed by another, and whose appearance always conveys
the thought to that other. (Hume, 2007, p. 56)
In fact, Hume mixes up two di erent conceptions of causation. The first charac-
terization of causation is very similar to that in the Treatise, which is known as
the regulatory theory of causation: causation is nothing but constant conjunction of
events such that similar causes precede similar e ects. So flipping the light switch is
the cause of the light’s turning o . But there are other regularities, other constant
conjunctions, that don’t instantiate causal relations. For example, many vending
machines have problems recognizing coins. Sometimes you need throw the coin in
several times before it is accepted. But people often rub their coin on the surface
of the vending machine. Voila, the coin is swallowed. But in fact, the rubbing
itself doesn’t have any e ect. Another drawback of the regularity account is that
it cannot be applied to events that aren’t repeatable, like the Big Bang, although
we would say that the Big Bang is the cause of the existence of our universe.
The second definition o ered by Hume describes causation with the help of coun-
terfactuals: if C had not occurred, E would not have occurred—when both C and E
actually did occur. It seems that Hume confused this description of causation with
the regularity account. In fact, he didn’t analyze causation in terms of counterfac-
tuals. Since counterfactuals were regarded as obscure by empiricists after Hume,
a detailed analysis of causation in terms of counterfactuals was avoided until the
20th century (for instance Lyon, 1967; Mackie, 1980). In the end, it turned out that
causation understood with the help of counterfactuals is much more satisfying than
the regularity account.
But finding a more satisfactory understanding of causation with the help of coun-
terfactuals wasn’t easy. For the truth of Hume’s counterfactual is neither necessary
nor su cient for causation (see Maudlin, 2007a, Ch. 5). It’s not necessary because
a di erent cause might have occurred, leading to the same e ect. It’s not su cient
because there are examples that show that counterfactuals go both ways, while
causation only goes one way.
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Certainly, the assassination of J.F. Kennedy on November 22, 1963 was the cause
of his no longer being president in December 1963. So the counterfactual “if J.F.
Kennedy had not been assassinated on November 22, 1963, he would have still been
president in December 196” is true, too. But if we turn this sentence around, it’s
still true: if J.F. Kennedy had still been president in December 1963, he would not
have been assassinated in November 1963. And clearly we don’t associate causation
with the latter counterfactual.
2.1.1. Modern Humean Metaphysics
Taking up Hume’s idea that there are no modal connections in our world, David
Lewis then developed an entire metaphysics:
Humean supervenience is named in honor of the greater denier of necessary
connections. It is the doctrine that all there is to the world is a vast mosaic
of local matters of fact, just one little thing and then another. (But it is no
part of the thesis that local matters of fact are mental.) We have geometry:
a system of external relations of spatio-temporal distance between points.
Maybe points of spacetime itself, maybe point-sized bits of matter or aether
fields, maybe both. And at those points we have local qualities: perfectly
natural intrinsic properties which need nothing bigger than a point at which
to be instantiated. For short: we have an arrangement of qualities. And that
is all. All else supervenes on that. (1986, pp. ix–x)
Lewis’ ontology consists in the contingent distribution of local matters of partic-
ular facts: the Humean mosaic. There is a net of spatiotemporal points that are
only connected by external metrical relations, and, at those points, certain qual-
ities can be instantiated that make up all physical objects, such as particles and
fields. Given some initial distribution of these qualities, there is nothing in the on-
tology that constrains the future development of the mosaic. Obviously our world
contains regularities, but this is just a contingent fact in this framework, because
Lewis’s ontology lacks objective modality. If our world were Humean, it would be
metaphysically possible that the regularities we have seen so far could change from
one moment to the next.
Everything else with which we are familiar from the practice of science, like the
laws of nature or chance, just supervenes on the behavior of the Humean mosaic:
The question turns on an underlying metaphysical issue. A broadly Humean
doctrine (something I would very much like to believe if at all possible) holds
that all the facts there are about the world are particular, or combinations
thereof. This need not be taken as a doctrine of analyzability, since some
combinations of particular facts cannot be captured in any finite way. It
might better be taken as a doctrine of supervenience: if two worlds match
perfectly in all matters of particular fact, they match in all other ways too—
in modal properties, laws, causal connections, chances, . . . (Lewis, 1986, p.
111)
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In order to avoid giving an enormously long list of particular facts describing the
regularities of our world, Lewis puts forward his Humean best-system account of
laws of nature:
Take all deductive systems whose theorems are true. Some are simpler, bet-
ter systematized than others. Some are stronger, more informative, than
others. These virtues compete: an uninformative system can be very simple,
an unsystematized compendium of miscellaneous information can be very in-
formative. The best system is the one that strikes as good a balance as truth
will allow between simplicity and strength. How good a balance that is will
depend on how kind nature is. A regularity is a law i  it is a theorem of the
best system. (1994, p. 478)
According to this proposal, the laws of nature are the theorems of the best deductive
system that combines or balances simplicity and strength in describing the temporal
development of local matters of particular facts throughout space and time. A long
list of these facts would be highly informative but very complex, whereas a single
law of nature would be very simple but probably not contain enough information.
So the best system comprises a certain finite number of laws of nature as theorems,
which o er the perfect compromise between being simple and being informative
(Loewer, 1996).
A problem for the Humean is that the laws of nature can only be written down
at the end of the universe when the whole pattern of its history is on the table. For
the behavior of the mosaic so far doesn’t tell us anything about its behavior in the
future. So the laws that we infer right now probably aren’t the true laws of nature
because we have no idea how the mosaic will behave in the future. We might find
the best system for our world at this moment in time, but due to changes in the
regularities we will probably have to revise our best system. And this is also against
scientific practice. Physicists presuppose that there are necessary connections out
there, and they discover the related laws. If the laws have to be revised then this is
surely not because the behavior of the world has changed. Physicists rather change
their laws because they have found new phenomena that can’t be explained by their
old theories.
One could argue that once the Humean laws are found they will no be longer
unique, since they rely on some kind of equilibrium between simplicity and strength,
which seem to be anthropocentric notions. Some people may agree that X is
simple; others would say that X is highly complicated. Some people may agree
that statement Y bears a great deal of information; others would say that Y is
informationally weak. David Lewis was aware of this line of reasoning and attacked
it:
The worst problem about the best-system analysis is that when we ask where
the standards of simplicity and strength and balance come from, the answer
may seem to be that they come from us. Now, some ratbag idealist might
say that if we don’t like the misfortunes that the laws of nature visit upon
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us, we can change the laws—in fact, we can make them always have been
di erent—just by change the way we think! [. . . ] It would be very bad if
my analysis endorsed such lunacy. I used to think rigidification came to the
rescue: in talking about what the laws would be if we changed our thinking,
we use not our hypothetical new standards of simplicity and strength and
balance, but rather our actual and present standards. But now I think that
is cosmetic remedy only. It doesn’t make the problem go away, it only makes
it harder to state.
The real answer lies elsewhere: if nature is kind to us, the problem needn’t
arise. I suppose our standards of simplicity and strength and balance are
only partly a matter of psychology. It’s not because of how we happen
to think that a linear function is simpler than a quartic or step function;
it’s not because of how we happen to think that a shorter alternation of
prenex quantifiers is simpler than a longer one; and so on. Maybe some of
the exchange rates between aspects of simplicity, etc., are a psychological
matter, but not just anything goes. If nature is kind, the best system will be
robustly best—so far ahead of its rivals that it will come out first under any
standards of simplicity and strength and balance. We have no guarantee that
nature is kind in this way, but no evidence that it isn’t. It’s a reasonable
hope. Perhaps we presuppose it in our thinking about law. I can admit
that if nature were unkind, and if disagreeing rival systems were running
neck-and-neck, than lawhood might be a psychologial matter, and that would
be very peculiar. I can even concede that in that case the theorems of the
barley-best system would not very well deserve the name laws. But I’d balme
the trouble on unkind nature, not on the analysis; and I suggest we not cross
these bridges unless we come to them. (1994, p. 479)
So why does Lewis think that the Humean laws are unique? Why are simplicity and
strength objective features? For Lewis the final answer lies in the “kindness of na-
ture.” Our world is built in such a way that the standards of simplicity and strength
are objective and not merely a matter of human psychology such that everyone
would agree on the laws of nature once the best system were found. But Lewis also
considers how scientists find and discuss laws. Once proposition X is declared to be
a law, all scientists agree that X is a law, and there is no debate about changing the
law to make it more simple or more informative. Actually, one argument against
Bohmian mechanics put forward by physicists is that the Bohmian laws are much
more complicated but no more informative than the laws of textbook quantum
mechanics. However, this argument is o -target, since Bohmian mechanics solves
the measurement problem. Furthermore, there is no simpler physical theory than
Bohmian mechanics that introduces particles on continuous trajectories due to the
mathematical structure of the guidance equation.
So David Lewis rather hopes that simplicity and strength are objective features of
the Humean laws, which render laws of nature unique. Everything has to supervene
on the Humean mosaic such that the fact that simplicity and strength are objective
has to supervene on the mosaic, too. Does this mean that the pattern of local
matters of particular facts in our world is such that the laws are unique? Why not?
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From a Humean perspective, we live in a very special world in which we find the
same regularities over and over again, although there are no modal connections that
constrain the behavior of the mosaic. So it’s possible that because of the pattern
of our world we can agree on what is simple and what is informative in a unique
way.
2.1.2. Quiddity and Humility
Let’s move forward. Qualities, which are instantiated in the Humean mosaic, are
by definition independent of their causal–nomological role. So a quality q1 in one
Humean world can be the very same quality q1 in another possible world, with a
completely di erent causal–nomological role. In other words, qualities are born with
a primitive identity, dubbed quiddity. And we don’t have epistemic access to this
quiddity because all that we can find out about a quality is its causal–nomological
role in our world, which is neither su cient nor necessary to identify this quality.
This epistemic limit is called humility, and is used as one of the main arguments
against Humean metaphysics (Black, 2000, Sec. III). Lewis (2009) bites the bullet of
quidditism and humility and tries to show that humility applies to at least some—if
not all—fundamental properties. This is a peculiar move as Humeanism aims to
establish a metaphysics that is close to science and, in particular, close to physics.
2.1.3. Quantum Mechanics against Humeanism
There aren’t only purely philosophical arguments against Humeanism, like the prob-
lem of quiddity; there are also arguments from physics that aim to show that
Humean supervenience cannot be right. For this purpose, Tim Maudlin (2007a,
Ch. 2) uses quantum mechanics (see also Maudlin, 1998). He summarizes that
Lewis’s Humeanism relies on two doctrines:
Doctrine 1 (Separability): The complete physical state of the world is deter-
mined by (supervenes on) the intrinsic physical state of each spacetime point
(or each pointlike object) and the spatio-temporal relations between those
points.
Doctrine 2 (Physical Statism): All facts about a world, including modal and
nomological facts, are determined by its total physical state. (2007a, p. 51)
Separability states that all fundamental physical properties are intrinsic prop-
erties, and the only non-supervenient relations among objects are spatiotemporal
relations. The world is then composed like a digital screen that is built out of a
myriad of small pixels, one next to the other, where the state of one pixel can be
changed without disturbing the states of other pixels.
Physical Statism says that all non-physical entities, like laws of nature, supervene
on the physical state of the universe. This doctrine emphasizes that even the modal
facts of the world are determined by the distribution of the local matters of partic-
ular facts. If two worlds fully agree in terms of the history of the Humean mosaic,
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then these worlds agree on all other facts, too: the two worlds are indistinguishable
in all respects. Humeanism contains another doctrine: laws don’t determine the
behavior of the mosaic.
Non-circularity condition: The intrinsic physical state of the world can be
specified without mentioning the laws (or chances, or possibilities) that ob-
tain in the world. (Maudlin, 2007a, p. 52)
This condition is the basis for the problem of quiddity, since physical properties,
like mass and charge, can be distributed throughout the world without obeying the
laws of classical physics. They aren’t defined by the causal-nomological role they
play in the world.
According to Maudlin, entangled quantum systems pose a threat for Humeanism.
The most prominent such state is the singlet state of two spin-12 particles:
|0, 0Í = 1Ô
2
1
|øzÍ1 |¿zÍ2 ≠ |¿zÍ1 |øzÍ2
2
, (2.1)
where |øzÍ represents spin up in the z-direction, and |¿zÍ, spin down in the z-
direction. This state is the superposition of two states, namely, |øzÍ |¿zÍ and
|¿zÍ |øzÍ. The former state assigns particle 1 spin up and particle 2 spin down,
while the latter assigns particle 1 spin down and particle 2 spin up.
So if the two-particle system were in the state |øzÍ |¿zÍ, we could assign each
particle its own state independently of the other one. But you can read directly
from (2.1) that particle 1 isn’t in a state that is independent of the other particle. It
says that if we measure spin up for particle 1, then particle 2 is in a spin down state,
and if we measure spin down for particle 1, then particle 2 is in a spin up state—
and analogously, if we first measure particle 2. The singlet state doesn’t assign
any particle a local state; it’s a global state that doesn’t supervene on the local
properties of the individual parts. Therefore, quantum mechanics refutes Humean
supervenience.
Maudlin extends this example to strengthen his conclusion that there are quan-
tum mechanical states that don’t supervene on the local properties of the individual
system. We can prepare the two spin-12 particles not only in the singlet state but
also in the m=0 triplet state: 1
|1, 0Í = 1Ô
2
1
|øzÍ1 |¿zÍ2 + |¿zÍ1 |øzÍ2
2
,
Let’s compare the two states |0, 0Í and |1, 0Í. Both states lead to the same
experimental results for a measurement in the z-direction: if one particle is spin up
the other is spin down, and vice versa. Furthermore, if the system is in the singlet
1The total spin of a system consisting of two spin- 12 particles can be either 0 or 1. The singlet
state is the unique state of the spin-0 case, while there are three states for the spin-1 case. The
other spin-1 states are the m = 1 state |1, 1Í = |øzÍ |øzÍ and m = ≠1 state |1,≠1Í = |¿zÍ |¿zÍ.
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state and we repeatedly measure the spin of particle 1, in fifty percent of cases we
get spin up and in fifty percent spin down—the same for the spin-measurement of
the other particle. And if the system is in the m = 0 triplet state, we get the very
same result for the repeated spin-measurement in the z-direction of either particle:
fifty percent up and fifty percent down.
Quantum mechanics lets us ascribe a density matrix to either particle, which
gives us the correct experimental result if we measure the spin of one particle many
times. So all the particles in the singlet and in the m = 0 triplet state have the
very same density matrix. Can’t the density matrix be the right intrinsic state on
which the entangled state supervenes? This would mean that the two entangled
states are identical, that is, |0, 0Í = |1, 0Í.
The innocent “+”-sign makes the di erence. We can rewrite both states in
another basis corresponding to the spin in x-direction. We then get:
|0, 0Í = 1Ô
2
1
|øxÍ1 |¿xÍ2 ≠ |øxÍ1 |¿xÍ2
2
,
|1, 0Í = 1Ô
2
1
|øxÍ1 |øxÍ2 ≠ |¿xÍ1 |¿xÍ2
2
.
In the singlet state the spins in the x-direction are also anti-parallel, while the
x-spins in the triplet state are parallel. The measurement of spin in x-direction
shows us the di erence between |0, 0Í and |1, 0Í. But these correlations get lost in
the density matrix formalism. Since quantum mechanics doesn’t allow us to reduce
the entangled states to the states of individual particles, entangled states don’t
supervene on the local properties of their constituents. Consequently, the Humean
mosaic is not su cient for an ontology of quantum physics.
2.1.4. Super–Humeanism to the Rescue
What can we say about Maudlin’s argument? Does quantum mechanics refute
Humeanism? I think that if we interpret quantum mechanics as a complete theory
Maudlin’s argument is waterproof, and we have to give up Humeanism. In this case,
physics doesn’t allow us to reduce the wave function to local qualities because there
are no local features in the physics in the first place. But Miller (2014) shows that
we can avoid Maudlin’s radical conclusion by sticking to Bohmian mechanics instead
of textbook quantum mechanics (see also Esfeld et al., 2014, 2015b). She not only
considers a di erent quantum theory to Maudlin, but also needs a di erent version
of Humanism too. While Maudlin sticks to traditional Humean supervenience à la
David Lewis, Miller bases her argument on a Humean theory posited by Ned Hall
(2009, Sec. 5.2).
Although he bites the bullet, the biggest problem for Lewis is quiddity. Therefore,
Hall proposes that we should interpret properties similarly to chance and probabil-
ities. For a Humean, chance enters the mosaic via the best system. Consequently,
the world is non-deterministic if the best system says so, and the laws are such that
they allow for probabilistic predictions.
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Now, we can interpret properties in the very same way as Humeans interpret
probabilities. Properties are introduced by the best system. They aren’t part
of the mosaic as entities in space and time. Rather, they are used for the best
description of what’s going on in the world:
What would make it the case that there are masses and charges is just that
there is a candidate system that says so, and that, partly by saying so,
manages to achieve an optimal combination of simplicity and informativeness
(informativeness, remember, only with respect to particle positions). So in
our particle world, all they really are are facts about positions of particles at
all times; but if we pretend that in addition, each particle is characterized by
an unchanging value of two magnitudes (one with real values, the other with
nonnegative real values), then we can write down very simple equations that
encapsulate quite a lot of information about the particle motions. The final
step is to let the facts about particle motions that make it the case that these
equations achieve such an optimal balance of simplicity and informativeness
constitute the truth-makers for claims about particle mass and charge, so that
those claims can now be understood as literally correct. What results, again,
is a philosophical position about mass and charge that is exactly analogous
to the position the BSA already takes about objective chance. Mass, charge,
and chance are all, in a certain specific sense, manufactured magnitudes.
(Hall, 2009, pp. 27–8)
What does remain in the Humean ontology if we remove all the local qualities?
Not much, as Lewis builds his entire metaphysics on the distribution of local prop-
erties. Hall replaces Lewis’s qualities with particles, regarded as primitive stu . No
quiddity, no humility. Consequences that had to be swallowed by Humeans. All
properties, like mass and charge, are part of the laws of motion and so are deter-
mined by the motion of the particles. Let’s call Hall’s version Super-Humeanism.
An electron, for example, no longer carries categorical properties. It has no
properties; it just moves. If the Super-Humean then still says that the electron
has a mass of 9.1 · 10≠31 kg and a charge of 1.6 · 10≠19 C, she just means that in
the description of the motion of the electron the laws of motion mention quantities
assigned to the particle so that the laws match the correct behavior.
Miller uses Super-Humeanism to counter Tim Maudlin (for further details see
Chapter 6). She applies her ideas to to Bohmian mechanics and therefore gives an
example of a quantum theory that is compatible with a certain version of Humean-
ism. Miller can do so because Bohmian mechanics introduces particles, which con-
stitute the Super-Humean mosaic. And she interprets the wave function as part of
the best system. The purpose of the wave function is solely to provide for a simple
and informative description for the motion of the particles. And the ontological
status of the wave function doesn’t di er from the status of proper ties and prob-
abilities. Everything still supervenes on the positions of the particles throughout
history.
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Too Parsimonious?
One can in fact criticize Humeanism on a point that Humeans regard as one of
its greatest virtues: parsimony. This metaphysics is unsatisfactory because there
are no facts of the matter as to why we see all the regularities in our world. Even
the laws of nature as part of the best system cannot explain why the particles
follow a Newtonian trajectory, for example; the particles just move as they do as
a contingent fact. All a Humean can do is to give a good description or summary
of the regularities. This is the price for not having modal connections. So why
not have them in the ontology? The alternatives are primitivism about laws and
dispositionalism.
2.2. Primitivism about Laws
2.2.1. What is Primitivism?
Primitivism about laws introduces laws into the ontology as independent non-
supervenient entities. One famous adherent to this interpretation is Tim Maudlin:
To the ontological question of what makes a regularity into a law of nature I
answer that lawhood is a primitive status. Nothing further, neither relations
among universals nor role in a theory, promotes a regularity into a law. [. . . ]
My analysis of laws is no analysis at all. Rather I suggest we accept laws as
fundamental entities in our ontology. Or, speaking at the conceptual level,
the notion of a law cannot be reduced to other more primitive notions. The
only hope of justifying this approach is to show that having accepted laws
as building blocks we can explain how our beliefs about laws determine our
beliefs in other domains. Such results come in profusion. (2007a, pp. 17–8)
Maudlin starts with the central question, “What makes a regularity into a law of
nature?” Let’s say you have bought stocks of Apple. You are very proud of having
invested in this corporation, but you are cautious, too. So you check your account
every month. And you realize that the value of your portfolio has increased every
time. After 36 months of increase you are pretty confident that Apple’s stocks will
keep growing. But you would never say that it’s a law of nature that Apple’s value
must grow. For whatever reason, the stock price may fall in the future.
Yet you would reason completely di erently when it comes to the behavior of
baseballs. When you throw a baseball it falls to the ground. You throw it a
hundred times, and still the ball finally falls on the ground. You have seen people
throwing baseballs, and there too they fall back on the ground. You don’t have a
trace of doubt that the next time you throw the ball it will trace out a parabola
and land on the ground as you have seen it do many times before.
Now what’s the di erence between the motion of baseballs and the behavior
of stocks? Why do baseballs always behave the same way, while stocks might
change their habitual pattern? A primitivist about laws replies that baseballs obey
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Newton’s laws. Newton’s laws are part of the fundamental ontology of our world.
They aren’t determined by the motion of the objects; they aren’t part of the best
system. We can imagine a world that contains baseballs, but they move on di erent
trajectories because there are di erent laws of motion.
Physicists and philosophers sometimes say that laws “govern” or “guide” physical
objects. Though this may reflect their intuition, this manner of speaking has to be
taken metaphorically (see also Loewer, 1996, p. 119):
My own proposal is simple: laws of nature ought to be accepted as onto-
logically primitive. We may use metaphors to fire the imagination: among
the regularities of temporal evolution, some, such as perhaps that described
by Schrödinger’s equation, govern or determine or generate the evolution.
But these metaphors are not o ered as analyses. In fact it is relatively clear
what is asserted when a functional relation is said to be a law. Laws are
the patterns that nature respects; to say what is physically possible is to say
what the constraint of those patterns allows.
Taking laws as primitive may appear to be simple surrender in the face of
a philosophical puzzle. But every account must have primitives. The account
must be judged on the clarity of the inferences that the primitives warrant
and on the degree of systematization they reveal among our pre-analytic
inferences. Laws are preferable in point of familiarity to such primitives as
necessitation relations among universals. And if we begin by postulating
that at each time and place the temporal evolution of the world is governed
by certain principles our convictions about possibilities, counterfactuals, and
explanations can be regimented and explained. (Maudlin, 2007a, p. 15)
Physical objects behave according to laws. But laws don’t reach out to objects and
direct them in a certain way. This is all that Maudlin says in the first paragraph. If
we say that laws govern or generate motion, this doesn’t explain anything:“These
metaphors are not o ered as analyses.”
In the second paragraph we can find the advantages of taking laws as primitive:
laws are familiar from the sciences; primitivism is parsimonious; we don’t need to
introduce further questionable philosophical concepts like necessitation relations
among universals. Furthermore, Maudlin (Ch. 5 2007a) shows how to give an
account of counterfactuals and causality in terms of primitive laws.
2.2.2. Primary and Secondary Ontology
Similar to Ladyman and Ross (2007), Maudlin introduces laws as primitive entities,
but in contrast to their view his laws refer to objects in space and time. Maudlin
(2013) describes his entire ontology of physics in the following way. First, every
physical theory starts with a set of data that it intends to explain. The data maybe
the positions of certain objects, the observable behavior of light, or some change in
temperature of a liquid. Maudlin calls this data Primary Observables.
In a second step, a physical theory tries to explain Primary Observables. It does
so by introducing some basic objects whose behavior accounts for the data. Dürr,
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Goldstein, and Zanghì call these objects the primitive ontology, while Maudlin calls
them the Primary Ontology.
Primary Observables may be the phenomena involved in a quantum double slit
experiment. After many runs of the experiment, we see an interference pattern on
the screen. The Primary Ontologies of Bohmian mechanics, GRWm, and GRWf
account for this phenomenon: in Bohmian mechanics, the particles move in non-
classical trajectories; the matter density goes through both slits and contracts to one
point on the screen; and in GRWf the distribution of flashes matches the pattern on
the screen although nothing goes through the slits. So in all cases, the interference
pattern is determined by the behavior of the Primary Ontology.
The Primary Ontology is necessary but not su cient to explain the Primary
Observables. We need more. Our Primary Observables may be apples falling to the
ground. For the description of these phenomena, Newtonian mechanics postulates
a Primary Ontology of particles. The apple is composed of particles, and what we
observe is explained by the motion of these particles. But the explanation doesn’t
end here – the theory introduces further entities that are supposed to explain why an
apple moves the way it does. The apple is in the gravitational field of the earth, and
because the apple has a certain mass the field at the location of the apple produces
a force directed towards the center of the earth. Therefore, it accelerates until it
reaches the ground. Forces, fields, and mass influence the Primary Ontology and
provide for a complete explanation of the motion of the apple. So these entities are
part of the ontology of Newtonian mechanics as well: they constitute the Secondary
Ontology.2
Epistemic reasons also play a role in the definition of the Primary and Secondary
Ontology. The Primary Ontology explains Primary Observables, and the Secondary
Ontology explains the behavior of the Primary Ontology. There is some freedom
in finding a proper Secondary Ontology. Once we have a Primary Ontology of
particles, there can be several Secondary Ontologies. For example, the fall of the
apple can also be explained without forces or fields. General relativity accounts
for the correct motion of the apple in this manner: it moves on a geodesic until it
reaches the ground. Instead of forces and fields, space-time itself constitutes the
Secondary Ontology, and its curvature determines the trajectories.
The Primary Ontology of Bohmian mechanics are particles, too, while the Sec-
ondary Ontology consists of the quantum state represented by the wave-function.
The wave function guides the particles in such a way that they trace out the ap-
propriate trajectories to account for all non-relativistic quantum phenomena.
Now we can put together Maudlin’s ontology with his idea of laws of nature. His
fundamental ontology consists of two distinguished subclasses: the Primary and
Secondary Ontology. The behavior of the elements of both sets is governed by the
laws of nature. The laws supervene neither on the Primary nor on the Secondary
2Forces, fields, and masses at least are primitive variables in Newtonian mechanics. Whether
they are real, and therefore part of the (secondary) ontology, is another issue. For Maudlin they
all exist. Furthermore, the distinction between Primary Ontology and Secondary Ontology
coincides with the standard distinction between a primitive ontology and its dynamics.
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Ontology, so that it is metaphysically possible to keep both ontologies unchanged
while introducing di erent laws of nature. In sum, Maudlin’s fundamental ontology
consists of the Primary Ontology, the Secondary Ontology, the laws of nature, and
space-time.
Making it more Parsimonious
Maudlin doesn’t explicitly introduce properties into his ontology. So his Primary
Ontology can be interpreted as consisting of propertyless entities. His Secondary
Ontology comprises all the dynamical entities that constrain the behavior of the
Primary Ontology. It’s possible to make Maudlin’s fundamental ontology even more
parsimonious. Though the elements of the Secondary Ontology are postulated by
physics, we can be anti-realists with respect to them: we can interpret forces, fields,
and wave functions as purely nomological (see Chapters 3, 4, and 6). Having done so
the most parsimonious fundamental ontology for a primitivist consists of primitive
stu , laws, and space-time.
2.3. Dispositionalism
This strategy keeps necessary connections while reducing laws of nature. It does so
by adding properties to the primitive stu  ontology. These properties are di erent
from the Humean ones because they are defined by their e ects on objects; they are
called dispositions or powers (for instance, Bird, 2007). Laws of nature then express
how dispositions constrain the behavior of objects. They aren’t further entities in
the ontology, as in Maudlin’s case, and nor do they supervene on the temporal
development of objects. Rather, laws supervene on dispositions by expressing their
e ects.
Applied to a particle ontology, the particles have certain intrinsic properties
that constrain their motion. The standard example of a physical disposition is
Newtonian mass. The mass of a particle not only constrains its own motion but
also the motion of all the other particles. And the e ects of mass are expressed in
detail by Newton’s laws of motion.
2.3.1. The Problem of Action-at-a-Distance
If we want to predict the motion of a classical particle P1, it does not su ce to
know the initial position and velocity of this particle. Its motion also depends on
the distribution of all the other particles in the universe. So the mass m1 cannot
“on its own” generate the motion of P1; instead, there has to be a “connection” with
all the other particles. Saying that laws establish this connection doesn’t help since
they supervene on dispositions. It doesn’t follow from the definition of intrinsic
properties that they can influence each other over spatial distances.
A primitivist about laws has no such problem since the laws of nature constitute
modal connections. And in order to mediate between particles and laws, Maudlin
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(2013) introduces a Secondary Ontology, which contains forces, fields, and wave
functions. The Humean has also an answer: there are no modal connections be-
tween particles. All regularities are contingent.
The dispositionalist can bite the bullet: it’s simply a primitive fact that masses
influence each other over arbitrary distances. But then properties are no longer
important for the motion of the particles because the law determines the e ects of
the distant action. What is the purpose of properties when they don’t explain how
they can influence one another?
2.3.2. Fields
Fields may help the dispositionalist because, in virtue of its mass, a particle gen-
erates a field. And all particles are a ected by this field. So even if there is a
particle that is very far away from all the other particles in the universe, it can be
influenced by them through the net field at its position.
Fields in the Primary Ontology
The ontological status of fields is debatable. They can be part of the Primary
Ontology or Secondary Ontology. In the former case, fields are primitive stu  in
addition to the particles. This dualism might be bothering because there doesn’t
seem to be an ontological di erence between a point particle and a point of the
field, “A point is a point.” And it might not be parsimonious to have two kinds of
stu  in the ontology.
I don’t see any problems with this dualism since you can stipulate that there is a
primitive di erence between point particles and points of fields. If that’s an instance
of haecceitism, so be it. And the physical theories easily distinguish between fields
and particles. Therefore, there is neither a metaphysical nor a methodological
ambiguity if we have fields be part of the primitive stu  ontology.
Fields in the Secondary Ontology
If fields are part of the Secondary Ontology they are construed as dynamical entities
that constrain the motion of particles. This is a better interpretation since the
e ects of fields are accounted for by the behavior of matter. For example, we can
detect the earth’s magnetic field by means of a compass. But what we actually
see is the behavior of the needle always pointing in the same direction; we never
observe the field itself. Tim Maudlin also regards the electromagnetic field as part
of the Secondary Ontology. And he denies that there is a suitable philosophical
category for fields:
Yet in the end, the question of the nature of the lines of force was settled (at
least temporarily) by inventing a whole new species of physical entity: the
field. A field is not a collection of particles, does not depend on the presence
of polarized molecules, and does not require a mechanical ether. But what,
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we might hear a nineteenth-century philosopher or physicist ask, is it? What
category of being does it belong in?
By now, we have become so accustomed to the notion of a field that we
are likely to be frustrated and answer roughly. There is no necessity that
an electromagnetic field should fit neatly into any preexisting ontological
scheme: there are more things in heaven and Earth, Horatio, than are dreamt
of in your philosophy. One should stop trying to assimilate the field to some
familiar concept, and rather admit it as a fundamental new sort of physical
entity. (Maudlin, 2013, pp. 127–8)
Physics tells us that fields can exist in empty space; no medium has to carry a
field. So fields could be interpreted as properties of space-time points. Imagine
two particles P1 and P2 with masses m1 and m2 respectively. Because of its mass,
P1 generates a field, that is to say, the particle changes the intrinsic properties of
space-time points. The second particle moves according to the field value at its
position; for example, the field could be directed in the x-direction and is 10Nkg in
strength. If m2 = 1kg then P2 would experience an acceleration of 10ms2 in the x-
direction. This acceleration is generated by the intrinsic properties of the particles
and of space.
But we instantly recognize that interpreting the field as a distribution of local
properties in space leads to another dualism. There are dispositions of particles,
and there are dispositions of space-time. Mass as an intrinsic property of particles
a ects their motion, while the field-value of a point in space doesn’t a ect space
itself. Instead, the field only acts on particles.
Lawrence Sklar (1977) criticized this application of properties to space-time.
Some philosophers wanted to get rid of objects by “replacing objects by the region
of space-time they occupy” and claiming that space-time has some ominous “ob-
jectifying” feature (p. 166). Sklar calls this reduction of objects to properties of
space-time a “linguistic trick”, and I consider it a linguistic trick, too, to say that
fields can be reduced to properties of space-time that have no e ect on space-time
itself. The situation would be di erent if fields changed the structure of space-
time, as in general relativity. In that case, the property has some e ect both on
space-time and the motion of objects.
It’s also a linguistic trick when fields spread triggering conditions for the mani-
festation of mass all over space-time. We might speak this way in describing the
motion of particles: given the value of fields at the position of the particle, the
particle moves in a certain manner. But this way of speaking doesn’t elucidate the
metaphysical status of fields. At least, this leaves obscure what fields are if they ex-
ist as triggering conditions on space-time. I think fields as distributions of triggering
conditions have to be interpreted nomologically. They appear in the formulation
of the laws to account for the motion of particles. But then action-at-a-distance
remains, for the dispositionalist.
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2.3.3. Ontic Structural Realism as Relational Dispositionalism
What else can we do to avoid action-at-a-distance? The problem is that intrinsic
dispositions entail a metaphysical action-at-a-distance. And since dispositionalism
holds to necessary connections, this position falls back to primitivism about laws.
Fields may help to mediate the action between particles. But there is another
viable option. Instead of intrinsic disposition, we can assign relational dispositions
to particles, as Esfeld (2009) proposed in his suggestion regarding ontic structural
realism. Then by definition there is a dynamical non-reducible connection between
particles that reach over space. This would get rid of action-at-a-distance. As
Esfeld points out,
there is no action at a distance [. . . ], simply because a modal structure instan-
tiated by the configuration of matter is another conception of the determina-
tion of the temporal development of physical objects than direct interaction
among the parts of that configuration. (2014, p. 10)
In fact, there are two versions of action-at-a-distance: there is metaphysical
action-at-a-distance, and there is physical action-at-a-distance. A primitive ontol-
ogy of particles with intrinsic properties leads to metaphysical action-at-a-distance
if intrinsic properties influence each other over spatial distances. A metaphysical
solution would be dynamical relations instead of intrinsic properties.
Yet OSR doesn’t rule out physical action-at-a-distance. In Newtonian mechan-
ics, we can interpret forces as instantiating a dynamical structure (see details in
Chapter 3). Newton’s laws then represent the e ects of this structure. Because this
structure is by definition relational there is no longer a problem of metaphysical
action-at-a-distance.
But Newton’s gravitational theory continues to be a physical action-at-a-distance
theory because no physical entity in space and time mediates the action. It seems
that only fields or the exchange of other particles would count as a physical non-
action-at-a-distance mechanism. The action would be still mediated instanta-
neously, since no philosophical interpretation can make Newton’s gravitation re-
tarded. To have a finite propagation in time we need a new physics, like general
relativity.
2.3.4. ‘Ways Substances Are’ and Powerful Qualities
Now let’s delve into another version of dispositionalism:
Substances are property bearers; properties are ways substances are. If there
are substances, there are properties; if there are properties, there are sub-
stances. Every substance is some way or other, every property is a way some
substance is. Substance and property are complementary categories of being.
(Heil, 2012, p. 12)
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Heil introduces a substance-property ontology. All material objects are composed
of substances. And the substances aren’t primitive stu : they have by definition
a certain way of being. His description of properties as “ways substances are” is
non-standard, and I don’t clearly understand what he means by it. It seems that
he wants to reduce the notion of property to the substances. Usually we introduce
substances and properties as primitive notions and say that substances have certain
properties. But this is not Heil’s aim. He tries instead to derive what properties
are from the substances themselves. We see this move in the next quote, where he
applies his ideas to physics.
Substances are not bare, featureless entities to which properties attach them-
selves as limpets attach themselves to rocks at the seashore. Every substance
is itself some way or other, indeed many ways. These ways are its proper-
ties. For a substance to possess a property is for it, the substance, to be a
particular way. Properties—ways—do not make up a substance, they are not
parts of substances. The charge, spin, and mass of an electron are not parts
or constituents of the electron. As far as we know, electrons have no parts.
Electrons might have spatial or temporal parts, but that is another matter,
one I shall take up in due course. An electron’s charge, spin, and mass are
ways the electron is. (2012, p. 15)
Heil dissociates himself from a bundle theory of properties. This theory is a
monistic theory, where there are only properties on the basic level and objects are
derived from the properties. A certain bundle of properties constitutes an object.
For example, an electron is interpreted as a bundle of mass and charge. To my mind,
the bundle theory of properties rests on a misuse of language because properties
are by definition properties of something. It’s implausible that mass and charge
exist in the void and that they can form particles.
Neither does it help to say that mass and charge are properties instantiated by
a point in space. First, mass and charge don’t a ect space itself. Second, this
would lead to super-substantivalism: all objects are properties of space. I see no
good reason to reduce objects, like electrons or tables, to space itself—there may
be reasons in general relativity, but that is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Heil dissociates himself from a dualistic ontology too, in that both substances and
properties are primitives. For him “[s]ubstances are not bare, featureless entities to
which properties attach themselves.” But there seems to be only a linguistic di er-
ence in his description of properties as the ways substances are from the standard
one as being intrinsic to the substance, since in the end Heil needs to introduce
both substances and properties as primitives into his ontology.
Nevertheless, he somehow wants to derive properties from substances. But I see
neither a motivation nor an advantage to this. I think everything is already included
when substance X is said to have intrinsic property Y . Why should we try to
reduce the properties to “ways substances are?” I would regard intrinsic properties
as ways substances are that determine the ways substances behave without using
Heil’s purported reduction.
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What does Heil say about the causal role of properties? Are they categorical or
dispositional?
The moment you divorce qualities and powers, you have little use for quali-
ties (at least until you start worrying about consciousness). I have suggested
that there are good reasons to think that qualities are required for the indi-
viduation of powers by reference to what those powers are powers for. Given
the reciprocity of manifestations this, perhaps surprisingly, encourages the
view that powers and qualities are not merely contingently associated. But
if powers and qualities are associated of necessity, what is the nature of this
necessity, what is its basis? Is it simply a ‘brute’ necessary correlation? That
would be hard to swallow. It would, in addition, keep qualities out of the
causal picture. Qualities would be necessary, but epiphenomenal, accompani-
ments of powers. This, I have suggested, is a source of unwelcome di culties
and, indeed, implausibilities. You can accommodate the necessity and re-
solve the di culties by identifying powers and qualities, turning properties
into powerful qualities.
Philosophers are apt to regard such a view as contentious in the extreme,
but I would wager that non-philosophers accept it as too obvious to bear
mention. Things do what they do because they are as they are, and ways
things are are qualities. When you cite qualities in causal explanations, when
you say that the bull charged because the matador’s cape was red, you are
not citing features of objects you take to be correlated with their powers.
The cape’s redness, you think, sparked the bull’s anger: in virtue of being
red, the cape has the power to attract the attention of aggressive bulls. (Heil,
2012, p. 80)
According to Heil, properties are both qualities and powers. Because an object
has a certain quality it exerts a certain power. As well as the bull example, Heil
also mentions a tomato to illustrate his idea. A tomato is round, and therefore it
can roll down a slope. In other words, one quality of a tomato is its roundness, and
because of its roundness it can roll: “it is in virtue of possessing this quality that
the tomato would roll” (2012, p. 61). The redness of the cape has certain e ects on
the bull, and the roundness of the tomato has some e ects on itself. But these are
e ects either due to geometrical features or the atomic constellation of the physical
body. The quality of redness or the quality of roundness can be reduced to the
geometry of the tomato or the way the molecules of the cape are arranged. They
are not fundamental non-reducible qualities of the objects.
This is di erent for mass. If it is a property of particles it cannot be reduced
to their geometric or atomic features. So what is the qualitative nature of mass
supposed to be? Physics doesn’t tell us. Physics only describes the e ects of mass.
Heil simply declares that the qualitative part of any property exists; he insists that
mass has a qualitative aspect without explaining what it is. Furthermore, the qual-
itative basis of properties inherits the problem of humility, which we encountered
in Lewis’s Humeanism.
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Summary
The primitive stu  ontology evolved from the primitive ontology of quantum me-
chanics. The advantage is its lack of properties; it only introduces bare objects.
It emphasizes that what we actually measure in experiments are the positions of
objects. We don’t measure properties. The primitive ontology also emphasizes that
the positions of objects play the primary role in measurements, but it doesn’t take
this idea to its purest form.
Furthermore, with the introduction of a primitive stu  ontology we can dissect
and compare the fundamental ontologies of the current metaphysical theories:
- Lewis’s Humeanism:
fundamental ontology = local qualities + spatiotemporal relations.
- Neo-Humeanism:
fundamental ontology = primitive stu  + spatiotemporal relations.
- Primitivism about laws:
fundamental ontology = primitive stu  + laws of nature + space-time.
- Dispositionalism:
fundamental ontology = primitive stu  + intrinsic properties + space-time.
- Ontic structural realism:
fundamental ontology = primitive stu  + dynamical relations + space-time.
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Part II.
The Classical Universe
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3. Newtonian Mechanics
3.1. What Is Matter?
Newton was committed to absolute space. In his seminal work Philosophiae Nat-
uralis Principia Mathematica (English: The Mathematical Principles of Natural
Philosophy; first edition published 1687, third edition published 1726), he explains
what he means by this:
Absolute space, of its own nature without reference to anything external,
always remains homogeneous and immovable. Relative space is any movable
measure or dimension of this absolute space; such a measure or dimension
is determined by our senses from the situation of the space with respect to
bodies and is popularly used for immovable space, [. . . ]. (Newton, 1999, pp.
408–9)
We can imagine absolute space as the container in which physics takes place. If
we were to eliminate all material objects from the universe absolute space would
still remain as a genuine entity. When Newton described it as “immovable” he
might have been referring to two separate characteristics. First, absolute space
is indi erent to the motion of objects; that is, space doesn’t a ect the motion of
particles, nor do particles have any influence on space itself. Second, every point
in space has an intrinsic primitive identity that persists through time. Hence, for
every object there is an absolute fact about where it is located.
Newtonian Particles For Newton, the fundamental constituents of matter are
particles:
[I]t seems probable to me, that God in the Beginning form’d Matter in solid,
massy, hard, impenetrable, moveable Particles, of such Sizes and Figures, and with
such other Properties, and in such Proportion to Space, as most conduced
Newtonian Particles
For Newton, the fundamental constituents of matter are particles:
[I]t seems probable to me, that God in the Beginning form’d Matter in solid,
massy, hard, impenetrable, moveable Particles, of such Sizes and Figures, and
with such other Properties, and in such Proportion to Space, as most con-
duced to the End for which he form’d them; and that these primitive Particles
being Solids, are incomparably harder than any porous Bodies compounded
of them; even so very hard, as never to wear or break in pieces; no ordinary
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Power being able to divide what God himself made one in the first Creation.
While the Particles continue entire, they may compose Bodies of one and the
same Nature and Texture in all Ages: But should they wear away, or break
in pieces, the Nature of Things depending on them, would be changed. Wa-
ter and Earth, composed of old worn Particles and Fragments of Particles,
wouldn’t be of the same Nature and Texture now, with Water and Earth
composed of entire Particles in the Beginning. And therefore, that Nature
may be lasting, the Changes of corporeal Things are to be placed only in the
various Separations and new Associations and Motions of these permanent
Particles; compound Bodies being apt to break, not in the midst of solid
Particles, but where those Particles are laid together, and only touch in a
few Points. (1952, p. 400)
In this passage from the Opticks (published in 1704), Newton clearly describes
an ontology that coincides with the primitive ontology of particles. He considers
particles to be the fundamental entities that form all the physical objects in the
world, where the behavior of macroscopic bodies can be reduced to the motion of
these particles. This shows that Newton wanted a physical theory that didn’t only
explain and predict the observable behavior of physical objects but that would give
us a picture of how the world is from the ground up. Newtonian mechanics was not
built to be merely an e ective theory; it was supposed to be a fundamental theory
of nature.
The way Newton defines particles is slightly di erent from how I have done so,
because he assigns intrinsic properties to them, such as solidness, hardness, or
impenetrability. In fact, these are dynamical features, which can be deduced from
the motion of particles. You don’t need to introduce them by definition. Instead,
I defined particles as primitive stu . And it’s a primitive fact of space that one
point can be either occupied or empty, so that two di erent particles cannot share
the same location. The laws of motion must necessarily respect this constraint.
It’s historically interesting to note that Newton really took his particles very se-
riously. In the composition of macroscopic objects, they can form “bigger” particles
that are held together by some unknown “attractions”:
Now the smallest Particles of Matter may cohere by the strongest Attractions,
and compose bigger Particles of weaker Virtue; and many of these may cohere
and compose bigger Particles whose Virtue is still weaker, and so on for divers
Successions, until the Progression end in the biggest Particles on which the
Operations in Chymistry, and the Colours of natural Bodies depend, and
which by cohering compose Bodies of a sensible Magnitude. (1952, p. 394)
In essence, “bigger” particles are composed of basic particles like molecules, which
are composed of atoms. Newton even gave some concrete example of bigger parti-
cles:
And so if any one should suppose that Aether (like our Air) may contain
Particles which endeavour to recede from one another (for I don’t know what
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this Aether is) and that its Particles are exceedingly smaller than those of
Air, or even than those of Light [. . . ]. (1952, p. 352)
So that a Particle of Salt may be compared to a Chaos; being dense, hard,
dry, and earthy in the Center; and rare, soft, moist, and watry in the Cir-
cumference. (1952, p. 386)
These quotes show that for Newton, all physical objects are indeed made of par-
ticles; even light is a conglomeration of corpuscles. They also show that Newton
thought physics to be the most basic scientific theory, and that there was a continu-
ity between physics and chemistry such that physical processes underlie all chemical
processes.
Mass and Quantity of Matter
I have so far ignored one crucial feature of particles that Newton mentions in
the quote from the Opticks: particles have mass. Mass is so central a notion to
Newtonian physics that the very first definition in the Principia is devoted to it:
Definition 1
Quantity of matter is a measure of matter that arises from its density and
volume jointly.
If the density of air is doubled in a space that is also doubled, there is
four times as much air, and there is six times as much if the space is tripled.
The case is the same for snow and powders condensed by compression or
liquefaction, and also for all bodies that are condensed in various ways by
any causes whatsoever. [. . . ] Furthermore, I mean this quantity whenever
I use the term “body” or “mass” in the following pages. It can always be
known from a body’s weight, for—by making very accurate experiments with
pendulum—I have found it to be proportional to the weight, as will be shown
below. (Newton, 1999, pp. 403–4)
In the beginning, Newton isn’t concerned about mass. He wants to define what
is meant by “quantity of matter.” As he defines it, the quantity of matter of a
physical object is composed of the density of the object and its total volume. Then
in the explanation to definition 1, we notice that the quantity of matter is the
product of density and volume. So there are two ways to increase the amount of
matter contained in a certain spatial region. Either one enlarges the volume, and
because there is more space there can be more matter located in that space, or, by
“squeezing” matter together and increasing its density, one manages to have more
matter in a given volume, too.
A definition usually explains one notion with the help of other notions and con-
cepts that have been previously defined or that are so clear to the reader that they
can be taken for granted. As this is the first definition of the Principia, Newton
should use notions to define the “quantity of matter” whose meaning is univer-
sally agreed upon. Volume of space poses no problems. But what about density?
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Newton doesn’t explain the meaning of density. Clearly, this notion depends on
what matter is. Newton thought that matter consisted of particles, but he doesn’t
explain the density of particles. It seems that Newton presupposed that the reader
would know what density is.
The situation becomes more puzzling when Newton introduces “mass” in the
explanation to definition 1. First, mass coincides with quantity of matter; it’s just
a di erent word. Second, mass is also used in the laws of motion of the particles,and
so it is a dynamical property. A priori, it isn’t at all clear how the dynamics of
particles is connected to the quantity of matter. Third, as physics evolves, density
is standardly defined as mass over volume, and therefore it seems that definition 1
is circular. This bothered Ernst Mach, who repeatedly criticized Newton in his
Science of Mechanics:
With regard to the concept of “mass,” it’s to be observed that the formulation
of Newton, which defines mass to be the quantity of matter of a body as
measured by the product of its volume and density, is unfortunate. As we
can only define density as the mass of unit of volume, the circle is manifest.
(1919, p. 194)
Mach emphasizes that the identification of quantity of matter with the dynamical
property mass is inconsistent:
Definition 1 is, as has already been set forth a pseudo-definition. The concept
of mass isn’t made clearer by describing mass as the product of the volume
into density as density itself denotes simply the mass of unit volume. The
true definition of mass can be deduced only from the dynamical relations of
bodies. (1919, p. 241)
Newton grants that we have epistemic access to the mass of an object by, for
example, weighing that object. But he seems to regard the essence of mass to lie in
the amount of stu  contained in a certain region. Mach correctly points out that
mass can only be consistently defined as a dynamical property.
What is the true meaning of the quantity of matter, then? Having a primitive-
stu  ontology of particles, the quantity of matter can be defined as the number
of particles in a certain volume. So, given two macroscopic bodies B1 and B2, B1
contains more matter than B2 if and only if B1 is composed of more particles than
B2. Obviously, mass is then no longer a measure of the quantity of matter because
the total mass doesn’t give us a hint of the number of particles. The mass of a
single particle m can exceed the joint mass of two other particles m1 +m2.
Can we also make sense of the quantity of matter of a single particle? Can particle
P1 contain more matter than particle P2? Doing so would mean that particles are no
longer primitive entities. Matter—whatever it may be—would be the fundamental
stu  in the ontology. And having di erences of stu  at single points is very hard to
make comprehensible. I defined particles as occupied points of space-time; either
the point is occupied or it’s not. It doesn’t make sense to say that there is “more”
particle here and “less” particle there.
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The density is the number of particles per volume; hence, the density is a measure
of how far apart the particles are on average. Density, as it’s usually defined—as
mass per volume—, doesn’t say anything about the quantity of matter; rather, it’s
a measure of the dynamical properties of macroscopic objects, for which it’s more
convenient to give the density instead of the entire mass. For example, the mathe-
matical treatment of fluids uses mass densities, since fluids change their shape.
Restating Mach, “The true definition of mass can be deduced only from the
dynamical relations of bodies.” Before examining the true dynamical role of mass
in detail, we first have to prepare the field by discussing the laws of motion for
classical particles.
3.2. The Laws of Motion
3.2.1. The First Law
Three laws of motion are at the center of Newton’s physics. Let us start with the
first one.
Law 1
Every body perseveres in its state of being at rest or of moving uniformly
straight forward, except insofar as it’s compelled to change its state by forces
impressed. (Newton, 1999, p. 416)
This law singles out a distinguished kind of motion, namely inertial motion. A
body is in inertial motion either if it rests or if it moves in a straight line at constant
speed. “Rest”, “moving”, and “uniform” are uniquely defined relative to absolute
space and time.
The first law states that under certain circumstances a body deviates from inertial
motion. Whenever a body isn’t in inertial motion there have to be forces acting
on this body, and if there are no forces the body will continue to move in inertial
motion. This is in accordance with the way Newton defines the role of impressed
forces:
Definition 4
Impressed force is the action exerted on a body to change its state either of
resting or of moving uniformly straight forward.
This force consists solely in the action and doesn’t remain in a body after
the action has ceased. For a body perseveres in any new state solely by the
force of inertia. (Newton, 1999, p. 405)
Newton’s first law, as well as his fourth definition, has been the subject of much
discussion and misunderstanding. Physics textbooks introduce the first law—if it’s
introduced in the first place—without a definition of what is meant by impressed
forces. Therefore, they take the first law to be a definition of forces as anything that
prevents the body from inertial motion. Although this is a consistent definition or
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interpretation of forces, it isn’t the content of Newton’s first law. It’s a definition
and not a law. Newton’s first law is a law about the motion of particles, and it
shows how every body will behave if there are no forces acting on it. The notion
of force in the first law begs for an explanation, and this explanation is provided
by definition 4. This definition confirms that there is nothing more to forces than
one would expect from the first law, that is to say that they are those entities that
change inertial motion. And there are no other entities that can do this.
Is the First Law a Tautology?
One might now claim that given definition 4 the first law turns out to be a tautology.
Why? Because if a force is defined as that entity that changes inertial motion, it
follows that whenever there are no forces on the body it has to stay in inertial
motion. And therefore Newton’s first law has no physical content at all, given
definition 4. It was none other than Mach who pointed this out.
We readily perceive that Law I [. . . is] contained in the definitions of force
that precede. According to the latter, without force there is no acceleration,
consequently only rest or uniform motion in a straight line. [. . . ] It would
have been enough to say that the definitions premised were not arbitrary
mathematical ones, but correspond to properties of bodies experimentally
given. (Mach, 1919, p. 242)
Nevertheless, Mach is mistaken: we cannot deduce physical behavior or laws from
definitions. Given definition 4, it seems that a force-free body must rest or move in a
straight line, but a physical body might in fact behave in a completely di erent way.
The laws could be di erent. Just observing things in our daily life we would rather
come up with a law that says that ordinary motion is deceleration, and there has
to be something that keeps a body in inertial motion. We could keep definition 4,
but it would be inconsistent with our laws of motion. So the alleged tautology
confirms that the definition of forces is consistent with the dynamical laws. And
Mach somehow anticipates this interpretation when he says that “the definitions
premised were not arbitrary mathematical ones, but correspond to properties of
bodies experimentally given.”
Inertia and Inherent Forces
Newton defines impressed forces in contrast to what he calls inherent forces:
Definition 3
Inherent force of matter is the power of resisting by which every body, so far
as it’s able, perseveres in its state either of resting or of moving uniformly
straight forward.
This force is always proportional to the body and doesn’t di er in any way
from the inertia of the mass except in the manner in which it’s conceived.
Because of the inertia of matter, every body is only with di culty put out
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of its state either of resting or of moving. Consequently, inherent force may
also be called by the very significant name of force of inertia. Moreover, a
body exerts this force only during a change of its sate, caused by another
force impressed upon it, [. . . ]. (Newton, 1999, p. 404)
For Newton inherent force is another name for the inertia of matter, whose e ects
are described in his first law. The choice to call it a force may result from the
following scenario: when body B1 accelerates another body B2 (by pushing or
pulling, for example), then B1 feels a force that is exerted upon it by B2, and the
more mass B2 has the more di cult it is to change its state of motion. In other
words, every body strives to stay in inertial motion, and mass is a measure of how
strongly it endeavors to be in this state. Not only is it a measure for staying in
inertial motion, but it’s the cause of remaining in inertial motion when there are
no external forces. Nowadays inertia is no longer understood as a force. Rather,
it’s seen as a property, whose e ect is described by the first law.
3.2.2. The Second Law
Newton’s second law supplements the first law and shows how forces quantitatively
act on bodies:
Law 2
A change in motion is proportional to the motive force impressed and takes
place along the straight line in which that force is impressed. (Newton, 1999,
p. 416)
The second law needs the first one, since the first speaks of the state of inertial
motion, while the second describes the change of inertial motion, which is parallel
and proportional to the impressed force. With the help of this law we can apply
Newton’s physics to real-world cases and explain the temporal behavior of matter.
Three Quantities of Forces
Newton talks about motive force in his law because he introduces three quantities of
force (see AppendixA): absolute quantity, accelerative quantity, and motive quan-
tity. The absolute quantity of a force is the strength of its source. For example, the
absolute quantity of the gravitational force is gravitational mass. The accelerative
quantity of force is a measure of the force for producing a certain acceleration.
Newton seems to refer here to a field spread in space that accelerates an object
due to its mass. The acceleration of an object, though, is independent of its mass.
The motive force, however, depends on the mass, and it’s what we nowadays just
call the force exerted on the object. Therefore, Newton refers to the motive force.
We could perfectly understand the second law by leaving out the attribute motiv
(Stein, 1970, p. 266).
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Mach’s Critique of the Second Law
The second law wasn’t saved from Mach’s critical eye, either. Here is the entire
quote, without ellipses, that I have already presented:
We readily perceive that Laws I and II are contained in the definitions of force
that precede. According to the latter, without force there is no acceleration,
consequently only rest or uniform motion in a straight line. Furthermore,
it’s wholly unnecessary tautology, after having established acceleration as
the measure of force, to say again that change of motion is proportional to
the force. It would have been enough to say that the definitions premised
were not arbitrary mathematical ones, but correspond to properties of bodies
experimentally given. (Mach, 1919, p. 242)
So according to Mach, definitions 3 and 4 don’t only contain the first law, but
also comprise the content (of the first part) of the second law. But still there
is a di erence between a tautology and consistency between laws and definitions.
And even if the laws of motion restate parts of definitions, this doesn’t make them
wrong.
Modern Formulation
In order to make precise calculations, modern physics formulates the second law as
a di erential equation. Consider N -particles with positions q1, . . . , qN œ R3 that
lie on the trajectories q1(t), . . . , qN(t), where t œ R is the parameter of time. The
equation of motion for the i-th particle then is
F i (q1(t), . . . , qN(t), q˙1(t), . . . , q˙N(t), t) = miq¨i(t) (3.1)
with the i-th particle F i, the velocity q˙i and acceleration q¨i of the i-th particle,
and N constants of proportionality m1, . . . ,mN , which happen to be the masses of
the particles, respectively.
The apparent mathematical role of mass in (3.1) is to be a constant of proportion-
ality when connecting the force on a body with its acceleration. But why is mass
the correct or appropriate constant of proportionality? It isn’t explicitly mentioned
in Newton’s original formulation of the second law. It’s hidden in what Newton
meant by motion. Nowadays physicists associate motion only with velocity, but
for Newton motion is what we now call momentum, as one can see in his second
definition.
Definition 2
Quantity of motion is a measure of motion that arises from the velocity and
the quantity of matter jointly.
The motion of a whole is the sum of the motions of the individual parts,
and thus if a body is twice as large as another and has equal velocity there
is twice as much motion, and if it has twice the velocity there is four times
as much motion. (Newton, 1999, p. 404)
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Clearly, the above di erential equation shows precisely how Newton formulated
his second law. And it includes the information of his first law, too: the absence of
forces results in inertial motion. So both the first and the second law are summa-
rized in one law of motion, namely, the above di erential equation (3.1).
Superposition of Forces
In application you often find several component forces acting on a body such that
the left hand-sight of (3.1) is the net force on that body which results in the
acceleration. To cope with these cases Newton deduced a corollary from his laws:
Corollary 1
A body acted on by [two] forces acting jointly describes the diagonal of a
parallelogram in the same time in which it would describe the sides if the
forces were acting separately. (Newton, 1999, p. 417)
It strikes us as a little peculiar how one can prove the additivity of forces from the
three axioms of motion; therefore we cite Newton’s original proof.
Let a body in a given time, by forceM alone impressed in A, be carried with
uniform motion from A to B, and, by force N alone impressed in the same
place, be carried from A to C; then complete the parallelogram ABDC, and
by both forces the body will be carried in the same time along the diagonal
from A to D. For, since force N acts along the line AC parallel to BD, this
force, by law 2, will make no change at all in the velocity toward the line BD
in the same time whether force N is impressed or not, and so at the end of
that time will be found somewhere on the line BD. By the same argument,
at the end of the same time it will be found somewhere on the line CD, and
accordingly it’s necessarily found at the intersection D of both lines. And,
by law 1, it will go with [uniform] rectilinear motion from A to D. (Newton,
1999, pp. 471–8)
A B
C D
Figure 3.1.: Parrallelogram of forces
First, we notice that the forces in this proof act during a very short period of
time. The body is accelerated and then moves uniformly in a straight line. Newton
57
3. Newtonian Mechanics
introduces two forces: M acts along AB, and N along AC. So if only one force
were impressed on the body would it move either from A to B during  t, or from
A to C during  t. Now comes the crucial case. If both forces act on the body, they
won’t influence the motion induced by the other force. This is due to the second
law: a change in motion only takes place along the straight line in which that force
is impressed. The second law is to be understood such that a force doesn’t influence
any acceleration in any other direction. So by adding up the paths that the body
would follow if it were accelerated by either force, it has to move along the diagonal
of a parallelogram. This proof is a nice example of how Newton uses both laws
in his reasoning, the first for the description of inertial motion and the second for
acceleration.
As the modern formulation of Newton’s laws of motion show, forces are math-
ematically described as vectors. And the superposition of forces is part of the
formulation of (3.1). So if forces F 1, . . . ,F r act on a body at the same time the
net or resulting force is F net =
qr
k=1 F k, and the second law in full generalization
is
F net = ma. (3.2)
Newton did not have the mathematics of vector calculus; therefore he had to prove
the superpositions of forces as a corollary to his first and second laws. But from a
modern point of view the superposition of forces is included in the mathematics of
vectors. Newton didn’t know about vector calculus, and the proof of this corollary
shows that he thought net forces to be non-existent. He considers the two forces
acting on the body as two di erent entities that cause two di erent motions of the
body. And since one force doesn’t a ect the influence of the other force, there will
be a resulting motion on the diagonal of the parallelogram. It was important for
Newton that there has to be a source for all the forces acting on a body. But for the
net force there is no source; it’s the sum of the component forces. Only component
forces exist.1
3.2.3. The Third Law
From our own experiences, we know that when we push a body we feel a force from
this body as well. Newton generalized this phenomenon in his third law.
Law 3
To any action there is always an opposite and equal reaction; in other words
the actions of two bodies upon each other are always equal and always opposite
in direction.
What ever presses or draws something else is pressed or drawn just as
much by it. [. . . ] If some body impinging upon another body changes the
motion of that body in any way by its own force, then, by the force of the
1For a modern debate on the reality of component forces see Lange (2009); Massin (2009, 2016);
Wilson (2009).
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other body [. . . ], it also will in turn undergo the same change in its own
motion in the opposite direction. By means of these actions, equal changes
occur in the motions, not in the velocities—that is, of course, if the bodies
aren’t impeded by anything else. (Newton, 1999, p. 417)
The third law is one of Newton’s original discoveries (preliminary versions of
the first and second law has already been discussed before Newton, for instance, by
Descartes), and Mach (1919, p. 198) appreciated it as “[p]erhaps the most important
achievement of Newton with respect to the principles.”.
Is the Third Law Independent of the First Law?
As Newton discusses in the Scholium following the laws of motion (1999, pp. 427–8),
there would be spontaneous acceleration in case the third law were not valid:
I demonstrate the third law of motion for attractions briefly as follows. Sup-
pose that between any two bodies A and B that attract each other any ob-
stacle is interposed so as to impede their coming together. If one body A is
more attracted toward the other body B than that other body B is attracted
toward the first body A, then the obstacle will be more strongly pressed by
body A than by body B and accordingly won’t remain in equilibrium. The
stronger pressure will prevail and will make the system of the two bodies and
the obstacle move straight forward in the direction from A toward B and,
in empty space, go on indefinitely with a motion that is always accelerated,
which is absurd and contrary to the first law of motion. For according to
the first law, the system will have to persevere in its state of resting or of
moving uniformly straight forward, and accordingly the bodies will urge the
obstacle equally and on that account will be equally attracted to each other.
(Newton, 1999, pp. 427–8)
So if the third law doesn’t hold then the two bodies A and B don’t attract each
other by the same forces. Then there would be a net force accelerating the whole
system. According to Newton, the acceleration of the system violates the first law.
I think Newton is mistaken here. The first law says that forces and acceleration
come in pairs: whenever there is acceleration there are forces acting on the body
and vice versa. And this is the case here.
Newton’s thought experiment would indeed contradict the first law only if im-
pressed forces are external forces. The net force from A to B doesn’t originate from
outside the system, but it leads to accelerations. Newton’s definition of impressed
forces doesn’t explicitly identify impressed forces with external ones. Literally, he
wrote (see page 53), “[i]mpressed force is the action exerted on a body to change
its state either of resting or of moving uniformly straight forward.” It isn’t clear
what “exerted on a body” is supposed to mean here. It can mean “exerted from
outside”, which would identify impressed forces with external forces, or it refer to
the net force. It seems, though, that the way Newton applies his laws presupposes
that impressed forces are external forces.
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The modern mathematical formulation of the first and second laws (3.2) clearly
considers the force resulting in acceleration as the net force acting on the body. Ap-
plying this law to the system consisting of the bodies A, B, and the opposing body,
there is no contradiction. As long as the system accelerates in the direction of the
net force and fulfills the equation there isn’t anything wrong with it. Spontaneous
acceleration is then acceleration when the net force is zero; this would contradict
(3.2).
Conservation of Energy and Momentum
Newton’s third law is needed for the conservation of momentum and energy. We
could have a mechanics that violates the third law while keeping the first two, but
then the system wouldn’t obey the conservation of momentum and energy. What
happens in the above thought experiment is the acceleration of the center of mass
of the system. If the third law were valid the motion of the bodies wouldn’t change
the motion of the center of mass, which would remain in inertial motion as long as
there was no intervention from outside.
3.2.4. The Law of Gravitation
Although Newton knew about electric and magnetic forces, he only gave a quanti-
tative description of gravitation:
Proposition 7
Gravity exists in all bodies universally and is proportional to the quantity of
matter in each.
We have already proved that all planets are heavy [or gravitate] toward one
another and also that the gravity toward any one planet, taken by itself, is
inversely as the square of the distance of places from the center of the planet.
And it follows [. . . ] that the gravity toward all the planets is proportional to
the matter in them. (Newton, 1999, p. 810)
What he put in words in this proposition is nothing but the universal law of grav-
itation:
F i (q1, . . . , qN) =
ÿ
j ”=i
Gmimj
qi ≠ qj...qi ≠ qj...3 (3.3)
with the gravitational constant G. The law is time-independent, only depending
only on the positions of the particles. The magnitude of gravity is directly pro-
portional to the masses of particles and inversely proportional to the square of the
distance between them.
Hence, merely taking gravitation into account Newton’s second law (3.2) changes
to
F i (q1(t), . . . , qN(t)) = miq¨i(t),
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where F i is the gravitational force (3.3). F i no longer depends on the velocities of
the particles.
The gravitational force (3.3) doesn’t appear out of thin air. Indeed, (3.3) is a
solution of the Poisson equation
Ò · F i = ≠4ﬁGmiﬂ, (3.4)
where ﬂ is the mass density at one point of physical space (see, for instance, An-
derson, 1967, p. 118). Therefore, Newton’s theory of gravity consists of two sets of
laws for the description of particles, which interact only through gravity, namely,
(3.1) and (3.4).
3.3. Do Forces Exist?
Newtonian mechanics is a theory of forces. Forces determine the motion of objects.
All three laws of motion mention di erent aspects of forces. The first law says
what an object does without forces acting on it: it keeps moving in a straight line
with constant velocity. The second law says how forces change motion: the object
will accelerate in the direction of the force. The third law says how forces on two
interacting bodies are related: to every force there is a force on another body that
is parallel but in the opposite direction.
If forces play this prominent role in the basic laws, they must exist, mustn’t
they? Doesn’t the first law say that forces cause acceleration? How can they do
so if they don’t exist? In fact, force is a theoretical term since we cannot directly
observe forces as we can directly observe tables, chairs, and trees. And as with
all theoretical terms, it needs arguments and close scrutiny before we can decide
whether it corresponds to something that exists.
It doesn’t su ce to say that forces exist. We need to clarify their ontological
status. Even if we conclude that forces don’t exist, notwithstanding their usefulness,
we still need to explain what they are.
3.3.1. Why Forces Don’t Exist
There are three standard arguments against the existence of forces:
1. The e ects of forces are causally overdetermined,
2. The existence of forces lead to a vicious regress, and
3. Forces are redundant when it comes to changes in motion.
Let’s treat them one after the other.
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Causal Overdetermination
This argument against the reality of forces is based on three assumptions (Wilson,
2007, p. 198):
1. Changes in motion are caused by forces.
2. Every such change in motion is caused by an entity necessitating the force.
3. Forces and their necessitating entities are distinct.
It’s then concluded that every change in motion is causally overdetermined by forces
and their necessitating entities.
Figure 3.2 visualizes the above argument. Double arrows represent causal re-
lations, and the normal arrow, a necessitating relation (which might be causal).
Assumption 1 then justifies the double arrow from force to acceleration. The sec-
ond proposition gives rise to the other arrows. X is an arbitrary necessitating entity
for forces, which at the same time causes acceleration—I’ll say in a minute what X
may stand for. The third proposition then just emphasizes that X ”= force.
force acceleration
X
Figure 3.2.: Causal overdetermination
In order to rescue acceleration from being causally overdetermined, at least one of
the three propositions needs to be rejected. Wilson argues that we can reject either
the first or the third proposition. Both strategies result in abandoning forces. And
so she presents her own idea that aims at keeping all three propositions without
this leading to causal overdetermination. I’ll present the details of Wilson’s idea
later in this section.
I agree with Wilson that the negation of the first proposition will deny the ex-
istence of forces—which is a viable option. Rejecting the third proposition is im-
possible because forces are always distinct from their necessitating entities. But
we may deny the second proposition and keep the other two. Then forces exist
and cause acceleration; the necessitating entities, however, lose their causal power.
Let’s delve into the details.
Imagine you are about to hit a golf ball with a golf club. When hitting the ball,
the golf club causes the acceleration. And according to the argument of causal
overdetermination the golf club necessitates a force on the ball, which causes the
acceleration as well.
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In my opinion, causation is a complex notion that bears heavy baggage from its
use in our daily lives. It’s a concept emphasizing that if one event, called the cause,
hadn’t occurred, then another event, called the e ect, wouldn’t have occurred.
Furthermore, we’re often not only interested in direct causes but in discovering a
causal chain. For instance, a hooligan in court cannot insist that it wasn’t him
swinging the baseball bat that caused the basal skull fracture; instead it was the
force induced on the skull that caused it. I plead not guilty. But there is a causal
chain starting from the swinging of the baseball bat to the skull fracture. And
that is what the judges are eager to uncover. Convicted on all charges. Similarly,
there is a causal chain from the hitting of the golf club to the force and then to the
acceleration of the ball.
In my opinion, causation is a complex notion that bears all its heavy baggage from
the use in our daily life. It’s a concept emphasizing that if the event, called cause,
hadn’t occurred the event, called e ect, wouldn’t have occurred. Furthermore,
we’re often not only interested in direct causes but in discovering a causal chain.
For instance, a hooligan in court cannot insist that it wasn’t him swinging the
baseball bat, which caused the basal skull fracture; it was instead the force induced
on the skull. I plead not guilty. But there is a causal chain starting from the
swinging of the baseball bat to the skull fracture. And that is what the judges are
eager to uncover. Convicted on all charges. Similarly, there is a causal chain from
the hit of the golf club to the force and then to the acceleration of the ball.
On the fundamental level, there are other entities than golf clubs and baseball
bats that necessitate forces. In Newtonian mechanics there is position, mass, and
the gravitational field—in electrodynamics we have in addition charge, velocity, and
the electromagnetic field.
A B
FBA
Figure 3.3.: Gravitational force on B
Here is an example. Let’s have two balls, A and B, which interact at a distance
via gravitational or electromagnetic forces (see Fig. 3.3). A exerts a force FBA on
B so that it accelerates to the right. According to proposition 2 of the argument
for causal overdetermination, mass mA causes a change in motion of B and ne-
cessitates the force FBA. But what is this necessitating relation? Is it a causal
relation? If it were, then by denying the second proposition we can solve the causal
overdetermination: mass causes forces, and forces cause acceleration. We just have
to deny that mass itself can directly cause a change in motion (see Fig. 3.4).
In fact, we cannot read o  causal relations from Newton’s second law by just
looking at the equation itself. The goal of classical physics is to explain and predict
changes in motion. Newton’s second law tells us that we can do so by specifying
63
3. Newtonian Mechanics
force acceleration
mass
Figure 3.4.: Causal chain from mass to acceleration
forces. Newton’s law then postulates a functional relationship between forces and
acceleration: given the forces, it yields the acceleration. But the acceleration de-
pends on the (inertial) mass: increasing the mass while keeping the same force will
result in a smaller acceleration.2 The mathematical structure doesn’t force a causal
reading on us. This has to be introduced by hand or by an interpretation.
As soon as mass causes acceleration we’re in deep metaphysical water, because we
tacitly regard mass as a dispositional property. Only if a property is dispositional
does it have the causal power to generate an e ect. And then acceleration would
be causally overdetermined because mass, as well as the forces, cause the change
in motion. There are now two ways out. Either mass is not a disposition or forces
don’t cause acceleration—this will eliminate either of the double arrows in Fig. 3.2.
If we stick to mass as a disposition, forces can be construed as an epistemic tool for
calculating the e ects of masses. Gravity, for example, only depends on the masses
and positions.
But there is still a gap between the mass mA of A and the force FBA on B (see
Fig. 3.3). If mA is an intrinsic dispositional property of A, how can it a ect the
motion of B over arbitrary distances? Being intrinsic to A, it’s mysterious how the
mass can reach out to B. The theory of dispositions just takes this for granted.
There is no gap in the explanation of the phenomena since it’s the law that explains
how A a ects B. Still the ontology doesn’t contain all ingredients to reflect the
explanatory power of the law.
Therefore, dispositionalism must introduce further entities that mediate the ac-
tion from A to B. If it doesn’t, dispositionalism will grant too much power to
the laws, and so will fall back to primitivism about laws. It will rest in a state of
primitivism in disguise: allowing for causal powers that don’t have enough power
to induce changes in the ontology (see page 78 for an elaboration of this argument).
Newtonian mechanics o ers such a mediating entity, namely the gravitational
field.3 Then the mass of A changes the gravitational field in its vicinity, and these
2This is not possible if we consider the above system consisting of the balls A and B as if they
interact via gravitation. For an increase in the inertial mass mB yields an increase in the
gravitational force FBA in such a way that the acceleration of B won’t change. But this
doesn’t change my argument on causation.
3The gravitational field, like the electromagnetic field, contains mathematical singularities that
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changes propagate throughout space (with infinite speed). Since B has mass mB
the field at its position generates a force, which then causes an acceleration. So
masses cause changes in the field, which causes a force, which causes acceleration
(see Fig. 3.5). This is a complete causal change that avoids causal overdetermina-
tion and respects mass as a causal power. The same story can be carried over to
electrodynamics. In this case it’s the charge that causes changes in the field, which
propagate with the speed of light.4
force acceleration
field
mass
Figure 3.5.: How mass causes acceleration
Wilson doesn’t go this way. She suggests that we can avoid the conclusion of
causal overdetermination by rejecting either proposition 1 or proposition 3. If we
reject proposition 1, that is, if forces don’t cause acceleration, then either forces
exist and aren’t causally e cacious or forces don’t exist in the first place. But
being real without having a causal role doesn’t make sense for forces, according to
Wilson (2007, p. 198). Hence, a rejection of the first proposition leads to a rejection
of the existence of forces.
Rejecting proposition 3 means that forces are no longer regarded as distinct
from their necessitating entities. Then a force doesn’t cause acceleration as a force
proper but as a necessitating entity. In other words, forces are eliminated by being
ontologically reduced to the necessitating entities. And if forces don’t exist, there
is no longer causal overdetermination (Wilson, 2007, p. 198). I think this move is
doomed to fail. Forces are neither objects, nor properties, nor events. By definition
forces di er from necessitating entities. Therefore, we cannot reject proposition 3.
Wilson doesn’t question the validity of the second proposition. But its rejection
would easily rescue us from causal overdetermination. For the direct cause of
acceleration would be forces and no longer an entity necessitating the force. And
would prevent it from being part of the ontology. But fields are the only entities that physics
o ers as mediators. It’s still a matter of debate whether there can be a well-defined field theory
(see Ch. 4).
4 Another option for the dispositionalist is to dismiss intrinsic properties by introducing an ontic
structure. By definition the structure is relational; so there is no longer the problem of how
particles can influence each other at a distance. I’ll elaborate on this idea in section 3.4.4
65
3. Newtonian Mechanics
this is surprisingly close to how physicists think: the distribution of masses produce
a certain field, which generates forces, and forces cause acceleration. But Wilson
has even another solution to the problem of causal overdetermination. She wants to
keep all three propositions and avoid the conclusion. How this is done I’ll present
in Sec. 3.3.2.
The Vicious Regress
Another argument using causation shows that the standard interpretation of forces
leads to a vicious regress (Bigelow et al., 1988, p. 621). As we have said, forces
F are usually interpreted as mediators between causes C and e ects E, that is,
C ∆ F ∆ E. But what is supposed to mediate between C and F and between F
and E? So instead of closing the gap between the cause and e ect, the forces open
another one, ad infinitum.
This vicious regress strikes me as a pseudo-problem. Look at Fig. 3.5. There are
no causal gaps: mass causes a field, which causes a force, which causes acceleration.
This is all that physics gives us. It’s only by writing this causal chain in an abstract
way, like C ∆ F ∆ E, that you might wonder what mediates between C and F
and between F and E. But once you know what these placeholders stand for, the
vicious regress disappears into infinity.
The Redundancy Argument
From Newton’s formulation of the first and second laws, as well as from the math-
ematical equation F = ma, we see that forces explain acceleration. Once we know
the forces we can calculate the acceleration. But once we know the forces they seem
to disappear. Plugging in the forces in Hooke’s law
mq¨ = ≠kq,
where k is a constant characterizing the strength of the spring, or in the law of
gravitation
q¨i =
ÿ
j ”=i
Gmj
qj ≠ qi...qj ≠ qi...3
forces are nowhere to be found in the mathematics. Therefore, it’s argued that
forces are just middle terms, and since they drop out in the final formulation of the
second law, they don’t exist.
Here is Max Jammer, who seems to have been the first to formulate the redun-
dancy argument:
[T]o show or to predict that a certain body A moves on a certain trajectory
B, when surrounded by a given constellation of bodies C, D,. . . which may
be gravitating, electrically charged, magnetized, and so forth, we introduce
the middle term “force” and state the two “premises”: (1) The constellation
C, D,. . . gives rise to a force F ; (2) The force F (according to the laws of
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motion) makes the body A move in the trajectory B. In our final conclusion,
“Body A, surrounded by C, D,. . . under the given circumstances, moves along
trajectory B,” the middle term “force” again drops out. (Jammer, 1957, p.
244)
I don’t think that forces don’t exist just because they drop out as middle terms.
The force needs to be specified as something that is not a force. So Newton’s
gravitational force is a function of position and masses. We can apply the same
argument to electrodynamics, and we’ll never conclude that the electromagnetic
field doesn’t exist. The electromagnetic field is a function of position and time. In
the final step when plugging in the Lorentz force law the field vanishes. And in
the static case, the Coulomb force and Coulomb field are almost identical to the
gravitational force and the gravitational field. Still, we’ll never conclude that the
electric field doesn’t exist.
Pace Wilson (2007, p. 192), Jammer doesn’t give this argument in order to
show that forces are redundant in the sense of not existing. In fact, he wants to
point to the methodological role of forces: they are needed to abstract from the
specific circumstances from which they evolve from. He clarifies his intention in the
paragraph just before the above quote:
The main advantage, however, of the concept of force—and this brings us
to the status of our concept in present-day physics—is that it enables us
to discuss the general laws of motion irrespective of the particular physical
situation with which these motions are associated. The concept of force in
contemporary physics plays the role of a methodological intermediate com-
parable to the so-called middle term in the traditional syllogism. In order
to show that “Socrates is mortal,” we introduce the middle term “man” and
state the two premises: (1) All men are mortal; (2) Socrates is a man. In
our final conclusion, “Socrates is mortal,” the middle term “man” drops out.
(Jammer, 1957, pp. 243–4)
As Jammer doesn’t and cannot infer that men don’t exist because “man” is a middle
term, he doesn’t and cannot infer that forces don’t exist just because “forces” are
middle terms. It’s like saying that velocity and time don’t exist because they are
middle terms in s = vt. Once we have specified v and t, only the distance s remains.
In fact, Jammer is explicit about his intention: he argues that forces play the role of
middle terms, thereby unifying di erent phenomena. He doesn’t use his argument
to show that forces are redundant and don’t exist.
3.3.2. Why Forces Exist
Forces as Primitives
For Mach (1919, p. 243) Newton’s second law (3.1) is a definition not a law of
nature. Forces don’t exist because we cannot observe them and because they are
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nothing but mass times acceleration. For Maudlin (2013), however, forces are real
and primitive.
According to his interpretation, there are forces and fields in the ontology of clas-
sical physics. And they cannot be reduced. Therefore, they have found their own
ontological categories: fields form the category field, and forces form the category
force. Then forces would mediate the action from fields to the physical body. If
there were no fields, a force would directly mediate the action from one body to an-
other at a distance. But as long as there is no physical theory that postulates forces
or fields as part of the dynamics we cannot just interpret them as non-existent, he
argues. Maudlin (2007c, p. 129) argues that Newton’s second law (3.1) is a law
proper. Let us assume that equation (3.1) is a definition, and image two bodies
B1 and B2 with unknown masses m1 and m2 and two springs S1 and S2. The two
bodies move frictionlessly on some surface.
First, we attach body B1 to spring S1, and measure the acceleration a11 of B1
induced by the first spring. Since we don’t know m1 we just declare it to be 1.
From (3.1) we can define the force F11 := m1a11. From the acceleration a12 of B2
by S1 we can calculate the mass m2 from F11 = F12 := m2a12. Now we can use the
second spring. Having measured the acceleration induced by the second spring on
B1, we get the following force: F21 := m1a21.
So far we have used the second law just for the calibration of physical quantities.
We defined forces and the mass m2 with the help of this equation. We are now in a
position to make a genuine empirical prediction that can be tested: the acceleration
of B2 induced by S2 should fulfill m1a21 = m2a22. This doesn’t have to be the case.
By definition F22 := m2a22. Since we assume that the springs induce the same forces
on all bodies F21 = F22 := m2a22. We can measure a22, and we have already fixed
m2 and F21 in previous experiments. What can now happen and is not logically
excluded is that our definition F22 := m2a22 is inconsistent with the experiment.
It’s an empirical question whether F21 = m2a22 or F21 ”= m2a22. But it finally turns
out that in fact F21 = m2a22.
The Aspect View
Wilson responds to causal overdetermination by using an argumentative scheme
from the philosophy of mind in order to interpret forces as real entities while keep-
ing all three premises (see page 62) and avoiding concluding that forces are causally
overdetermined. In brief, the goal of the non-reductive physicalist approach to men-
tal causation is to keep the mental and physical states ontologically distinct without
causal overdetermination. The solution is said to be the proper subset condition:
the causal powers of a mental state are a proper subset of the causal powers of the
corresponding mental state. Thus, the mental state is distinct from the brain state
because they have di erent causal powers (for this we need the “proper”), and the
existence of the mental state doesn’t lead to causal overdetermination because the
causal powers of the mental state are contained in the causal powers of the brain
state (for this we need just a subset of causal powers).
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Wilson (2007, Sec. 5.1) applies this scheme to forces by adjusting the proper
subset condition in the following way: the causal powers of any given force are a
proper subset of the causal powers of the entity necessitating the force. Then “forces
are aspects of the non-force entities necessitating them, whose causal powers satisfy
the proper subset condition” (2007, p. 200).
I don’t think that Wilson’s interpretation of forces is tenable. In philosophy of
mind, the proper subset condition doesn’t clarify the ontological status of the men-
tal state. It just says that the brain has more causal power than its corresponding
brain state. Similarly, if we interpret forces as aspects of non-force entities, we
still don’t know the ontological status of forces, either. Nothing is said about the
ontology.
But granting her interpretation, should we consider forces to be aspects of mass?
Or aspects of particles? Or aspects of fields?
Forces as Causal Relations
Bigelow et al. (1988)respond to the vicious regress argument. Their way out is to
grant forces a di erent ontological category to cause or e ect: forces are a special
kind of causal relation. On the fundamental level, a force relates the field, for
instance, the gravitational or electromagnetic field, to the change of motion of a
particle. The change of motion of a particle is the e ect caused by a field at the
particle’s position. The role of forces is to mediate the action of a field to the
particle by means of a causal relation. Therefore, forces are ontologically di erent
from fields and the change of motion of particles.
Interpreting forces in this way doesn’t lead to a vicious regress. And it emphasizes
the unifying role of forces. A change of motion of particles can be caused under
various circumstances: gravitation, electromagnetic interaction, direct contact, etc.
The great merit of the existence of forces is that they unify all these phenomena,
for we can describe all situation with forces alone without going into the details of
how forces are generated.
Forces as Symmetrical Relations
Olivier Massin (2009) interprets forces as symmetrical relations. It’s all about
Newton’s third laws, which states that forces always come in pairs. Consider two
bodies A and B. Whenever body A exerts a force FBA on B, then there is a force
F AB on A exerted by B, and vice versa. Because F AB = ≠FBA according to the
third law, the forces are generally conceived as asymmetric relations.
Nonetheless, Massin argues that forces are symmetric entities:
The only thing that distinguishes the two forces of an action reaction pair is
their arrow, that is, their sense. They share all their other properties: they
always come together, they are determinates which fall under the same deter-
minable, they relate the same entities, they have the same line of action (or
orientation), the same magnitude and the same spatial location. Therefore,
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to ask whether we should read the Third Law literally amounts to asking:
ontologically, should we take the sense of forces seriously? (2009, p. 575)
Massin is right that the forces in an action reaction pair point in opposite directions,
but this isn’t the only thing that distinguishes the forces as he claims. The two
forces act on two di erent bodies (see Fig. 3.6). The force FBA acts on B and F AB
acts on A.
A B
FAB FBA
Figure 3.6.: Anti-symmetric forces
In order to defend his claim, Massin presents three arguments claiming that forces
are symmetrical relations. First, there is no way we can distinguish between action
and reaction. In Fig. 3.6, there is no way to declare F AB the action and FBA the
reaction. Thas is right.
Second, Fig. 3.6 requires four entities: the two bodies, A and B, and two forces,
F AB and FBA. Massin argues, that there are only three entities with symmetrical
forces, namely the two bodies and the (symmetrical) force between them. By
Ockham’s razor the latter should be preferred to the former. The physical situation
described by Newton’s third law is rather depicted in Fig. 3.7: a symmetric force
between A and B. It isn’t clear, however, why there is a reduction of entities when
calling the forces symmetrical. I think this is just a di erent description of the
same physical situation that there are two bodies and two forces.
A B
Figure 3.7.: Symmetric forces
F AB is a vector representing the force exerted by B on A. If we ignore fields, F AB
is a relation between the bodies A and B, which shows how B a ects A. Either the
vector faces towards B or in the opposite direction as in Fig. 3.6. Let’s say that
this vector is (≠1, 0) then by the third law FBA = (1, 0). Strictly speaking, this is
not correct. The two vectors have di erent locations: (≠1, 0) is located at A, and
(1, 0) is located at B. And this needs to be represented by the mathematics. Hence,
F AB = (≠1, 0)A and FBA = (1, 0)B, where the index represents the origin of the
vector. And then F AB ”= FBA. What the third law says is that the orientation of
the vectors is parallel and the sense of the vectors is opposite.
What Massin wants to do is to combine F AB and FBA into a symmetric super-
relation. This relation would be F˜ (A,B) := {F AB,FBA}. By definition it is
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symmetric, that is, F˜ (A,B) = F˜ (B,A). But I don’t see how this will help us
in reducing the number of objects in the ontology. F˜ (A,B) still depends on the
forces. Furthermore, this super-relation is by no means depicted by Fig. 3.7, since
the vectors remain in di erent locations.
The third argument given by Massin uses an analogy with distance. It’s possible
to introduce a distance vector between two bodies A and B, so that the distance
between A and B is represented by DAB, and the distance between B and A
is represented by DBA, such that they fulfill the same equation as the forces in
Newton’s third law DAB = ≠DBA. This is too much of a mathematical structure
to describe the distance between A and B, because all that is really necessary for
the distance is captured in the magnitude of the distance vectors. Massin concludes:
If true, given the strong analogy between the distance’s law and Newton’s
Third Law, there is no reason to consider the asymmetry of force-vectors,
but not the asymmetry of distance vectors, to be of ontological importance.
Likewise, the asymmetry of forces is only a feature of their vectorial repre-
sentations, but not of forces themselves. Forces are symmetrical relations,
which may be referred to through asymmetrical representations, namely vec-
tors. (Massin, 2009, p. 576)
A comparison of forces with distance doesn’t show the similarities between these
entities but rather points to their crucial di erences. Representing distance with
a vector does indeed introduce more mathematical structure than necessary. But
forces aren’t distances. The orientation and sense of a force are crucial features
that cannot be argued away because they determine the direction of acceleration.
They are by no means epiphenomena originating from a vectorial representation. In
the case of distance, we could represent it as a metric d(·, ·) that covers everything
that we expect from a distance relation but no more, and this d(·, ·) isn’t a vector:
concretely, d(X,Y ) is a scalar, characterized by a single positive number
I agree that a vector representation for the distance between two objects bears
more mathematical structure than needed to capture what is meant by a distance. I
disagree with Massin that this is the case with forces. The sense of a force is not an
epiphenomenon of its vectorial representation, for it has a dynamical consequence
due to Newton’s second law: the acceleration is in the direction of the force. The
accelerations induced by forces (1, 0) and (≠1, 0) on an object with mass m are of
the same magnitude; they are parallel, but lead to motion in opposite directions.
Later, Massin identifies why the forces are generally considered to be asymmet-
rical entities instead of symmetrical.
If Newtonian component forces are symmetrical relations, how is it that New-
ton and many of his followers appear to conceive them as asymmetrical? One
first reason may be that they tend to confuse the property of the representa-
tions of forces (vectors) with the property of forces themselves. The second
possible reason for the common belief that forces are asymmetrical relations
is that Newton, like many of his followers, conceived of forces in terms of
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muscular e ort. But e ort implies an asymmetric relation between the ac-
tive term (the voluntary subject) and the passive one (the resisting object).
That is, the presence of some conation (intention, volition, trying . . . ) in-
troduces an asymmetry between the exerter and the exerted upon. (Massin,
2009, p. 578)
I don’t agree that Newton confused properties of mathematical representations of
forces and properties of forces themselves. First, Newton didn’t know about vector
calculus. Second, he was careful in explaining the role of forces and how to apply
them. All that we can know about forces is their impact in the world, and for their
mathematical description we need a magnitude, direction, and a sense. And there
is nothing superfluous to be found in his exposition of forces, since all features of
forces (magnitude, orientation, and sense) are reflected by the acceleration. Third,
Newton was aware of the distinction between representation and ontology in general
since he clearly states even in the title of the Principia that he is concerned with
the mathematical principles of natural philosophy. And throughout his work he
emphasizes this intention—most famously in his hypotheses non fingo. It’s true
that Newton may have speculated about di erent mechanisms for forces, but these
are ideas that he shared in private conversations without building a physical theory
of them.
What is really a problem for Massin’s interpretation of symmetry is that the
third law isn’t universally fulfilled: in electrodynamics the third law is no longer
valid. There are two standard examples that illustrate this phenomenon. First,
consider two charged particles that are moving along two rectangular lines. Be-
cause of the cross-product in the Lorentz-force law the two forces exerted on each
other aren’t collinear, and the Lorentz forces result in the acceleration of the center
of mass of the two bodies without the presence of external forces. Second, because
the electromagnetic interaction is retarded the motion of one particle doesn’t in-
stantaneously a ect the motion of the other particle. In this case, Newton’s third
law breaks down, too (see Chapter 4). Although Massin (2009, p. 581) is aware of
this counterargument, he doesn’t really o er us a clear way out.
3.4. The Metaphysics of Mass and Forces
We have seen that the authors I have presented on the existence of forces follow a
top- down approach: they start with Newtonian mechanics and try to elucidate the
ontology of forces. Instead, I want to follow a bottom-up approach. I start with
the metaphysical theories of Chapter 2 and embed Newtonian mechanics in each
theory. This will clarify not only the ontological status of forces but also of mass.
3.4.1. Humeanism
There are two versions of Humean supervenience (see Section 2.1): Lewis’s version,
and there is Hall’s Super-Humean version. They agree on the status of forces in
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Newtonian mechanics but disagree on the status of mass.
Standard Humeanism
Lewis’s mosaic consists of a distribution of pure qualities. And it’s straightforward
to identify these qualities with Newtonian mass. Then all there is to the Humean
world is the distribution of masses as pure qualities standing in spatiotemporal
relations. Of course, mass as a categorical property inherits all the disadvantages
of quidditism: there is, for example, a possible world in which mass behaves as what
we would call charge, although it’s the very same mass. The mass in the other world
just has a di erent causal-nomological role. Masses (in our world) evolve according
to Newton’s laws, which are interpreted as the most e cient description of the
motion of particles, balancing simplicity and strength.
Forces have a di erent ontological status to masses. Forces aren’t—and cannot
be—part of the ontology of a Humean world. Instead, forces supervene on the spa-
tiotemporal distribution of masses over all history. They are part of the formulation
of laws, and, therefore, they are nomological. Nevertheless, a proposition like “the
strength of the gravitational force on a table is 100N” can be true in a Humean
world. The truthmaker for this proposition is the motion of the masses given the
laws of nature – this doesn’t commit the Humean to letting forces be part of the
mosaic.
We can introduce the gravitational or electromagnetic field into Humean ontol-
ogy. The mosaic would gain further intrinsic qualities that instantiate the values of
the field. As I discussed in section 3.3.2, I prefer to regard forces as causal relations
between values of fields and the acceleration of masses. Pace Massin (2009, p. 560),
forces can be reduced to the spatiotemporal relations of masses because they are
part of the best system. Forces aren’t primitive relations like entanglement is a
primitive relation in orthodox quantum mechanics. Therefore, orthodox quantum
mechanics isn’t compatible with Humeanism (sec. 2.1), while forces pose no threat.
Super-Humeansim
Ned Hall (2009, Sec. 5.2) updated Lewis’s version of Humean supervenience by
changing the basic entities in the Humean mosaic. He proposes that the mosaic
should consist of point-sized, propertyless particles, instead of pure qualities. The
particles are primitive stu , and all the non-modal facts of the world are the posi-
tions of these particles. Everything else, including the laws of nature, supervenes
on the spatiotemporal distribution of particles. So even mass has to supervene on
the contingent motion of particles. It’s therefore a nomological entity by being part
of the best system; it’s no longer an intrinsic property. Yet while we can assign a
mass m1 to a particle P1, this doesn’t mean that masses exist as further entities
that influence the motion of particles.
In this super-Humean ontology, forces keep their nomological status as in Lewis’s
version. Forces are now on a par with mass; they are only part of the Humean laws.
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A proposition that “this table is attracted by the earth with 10N” is true in virtue
of the temporal development of the primitive particles composing this table. The
particles behave as if they had mass and as if there were forces acting on them.
3.4.2. Primitivism about Laws
Primitivism about laws presupposes that laws are primitive and non-reducible.
The central question is whether the primitive stu  and laws of nature exhaust the
complete fundamental ontology. I will distinguish between di erent versions of
primitivism. They will all agree on the primitive stu  ontology and the status of
laws, but they will disagree on the status of forces and mass.
Version 1: Mass and Forces Exist
Following Maudlin (2013), Newtonian mechanics introduces particles as the Pri-
mary Ontology and mass and forces as the Secondary Ontology (see Section 2.2).
The elements of the Primary Ontology are postulated to exist in space and time,
and the role of the Secondary Ontology is to constrain the behavior of the Primary
Ontology without making further ontological commitments. So one may interpret
the elements of the Secondary Ontology as existing in addition to the Primary
Ontology. Now, forces and mass may be regarded as real entities on a par with
particles. Forces found their own metaphysical category, the category force, be-
cause, according to Maudlin, forces are novel entities of modern physics. Particles,
then, are the carrier of mass such that in virtue of having mass the particles exert
certain forces upon each other.
Is mass a categorical or a dispositional property if laws are primitive? Having
mass as a disposition would prevent laws from being primitive, since dispositions
possess all causal powers. If laws are primitive they cause the acceleration of
particles, and they don’t supervene on the properties that particles have. So mass
must be categorical, if we want to retain intrinsic properties with primitive laws.
And as in Humeanism, categorical properties are doomed to have quiddity. Like
David Lewis, we may wish to bite this bullet.
Version 2: Mass and Forces Don’t Exist
You may dismiss mass as a categorical property and regard it as a parameter in the
law of motion. Then particles really remain primitive stu . Since we have only one
universe and a constant number of particles, according to Newtonian mechanics,
interpreting mass as a parameter seems to be slightly inappropriate. Rather, masses
are better construed as constants of nature. Supposing that the universe consists
of N particles, Newton’s laws of motion contain N constants m1, . . . ,mN . These
constants no longer represent intrinsic properties; instead, the status of mass is
nomological.
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The interpretation of the masses as constants of nature is more feasible if all
masses coincide. Consider a Newtonian universe containing N identical particles,
that is, particles with identical mass m. Then Newton’s laws would contain only
two constants: the mass m and the gravitational constant G. It’s common to call
the gravitational constant a constant of nature. But having a universe of identical
particles and primitive laws, there isn’t anything special about m with respect to
G. Saying that m is the mass of the particles would just be a manner of speaking.
When applying Newtonian mechanics to subsystems it may be reasonable to call
mass a parameter. A subsystem of the universe that containsM particles (M < N)
is described by M parameters mi1 , . . . ,miM . Here the masses are often said to be
parameters that have to be adjusted to the underlying subsystem. What is really
meant is that we consider a subset of particles of all the particles in the universe,
and the laws of motion for the subsystem include mi1 , . . . ,miM as constants fitting
the correct motion of the particles. Actually, we don’t fine-tune the masses to fit
the subsystem as if they were arbitrary parameters. What we really do is to extract
M appropriate constants out of the entire set of N constants of nature m1, . . . ,mN .
It’s possible to reduce the fundamental ontology even further so that forces,
too, are no longer part of the fundamental ontology. So both forces and mass
are interpreted as nomological entities. Particles move as they do because there are
Newton’s laws. In particular, they do not move because they carry mass or because
there are forces.
If mass ceases to be an intrinsic property of particles, then how can particles
“know” how to move? If particle P1 has mass m1 it moves in a certain way because
of its mass m1. Once we change its mass to m˜1 it changes its motion accordingly.
But if P1 doesn’t carry mass then it seems mysterious why a change in m1 changes
its motion.
We can introduce mass as a constant of nature, but still this constant is di erent
from the gravitational constant G or Planck’s constant ~. If we change G or ~ we
change the dynamics of all the particles. But if we change just m1 (and keep the
forces fixed), it’s the particle with mass m1 and only this particle that changes its
motion. Or if we have a system of particles that interact just by gravitation, and
again we change the mass m1 of particle P1, the motion of all the particles except
for P1 will change – remember that m1 cancels out in Newton’s second law. In both
cases, you can identify the particle by changing m1. Therefore, it seems that mass
is somehow attached to particles.
There is another di erence between mass and constants, like G, ~, or Boltzmann’s
constant kB. The gravitational constant, Planck’s constant, and Boltzmann’s con-
stant are dimensional scale factors that relate two di erent theories (Dürr and
Teufel, 2009, Sec. 4.1.3 and 8.1). They appear once a theory is reduced to an-
other theory. G relates the units of classical mechanics with general relativity;
~, the units of classical mechanics with quantum mechanics; and kB, the units of
thermodynamics with statistical mechanics.
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Primitive Laws Have to be Permutation-Invariant
The mathematical representation of a configuration as an n-tuple allows us to make
two kinds of permutations: we can permute masses, or we can permute particles.
When permuting particles, we permute the masses as well, but we can permute
the masses without permuting the particles. So if the laws aren’t permutation-
invariant, both a permutation of particles and a mere permutation of mass yield
a new physical situation. The mathematical structure suggests that the mass is
somehow attached to the particles.
With permutation-invariant laws and configurations represented as sets instead
of n-tuples, a permutation doesn’t result in a new physical state. A permutation
of particles doesn’t change the motion of any particle. And a permutation of the
masses is no longer possible. What we can do, however, is increase or decrease
the value of mass, say of m1. Then, as above, we distinguish one particle or one
trajectory that “carries” this mass. But this mass isn’t attached to the particles
because every particle in the same position will behave the same way. So an on-
tologically parsimonious account of primitivism about laws must be committed to
permutation-invariant laws. Otherwise, the mathematics suggests that particles
carry categorical properties.
3.4.3. Dispositionalism
Dispositionalism introduces modal connections into the ontology. In contrast to
primitivism, the laws of nature don’t have this capacity qua laws; instead, the
elements of the primitive-stu  ontology have certain dispositional properties or
powers, and the laws express the action of dispositions. In Newtonian mechanics,
mass can be interpreted as a disposition.
But mass doesn’t give an intrinsic identity to the particles. As I pointed out
in section 1.3, every particle is discernible due to its location in space or, more
generally, by its metrical relations relative to the other particles. The role of mass
is solely a dynamical one.
Moreover, it’s essential for mass (as a disposition) to have the same causal- nomo-
logical role in all possible worlds; it’s not a categorical property, and consequently it
doesn’t bear the problems of quiddity. This causal-nomological role is represented
by the laws. Metaphorically, Newton’s laws are grounded or anchored in the ontol-
ogy by the intrinsic mass of particles interpreted as a causal power. Our epistemic
access to mass as a disposition is through observation of what it does in the world,
namely, enacting change in motion.
A crucial feature of dispositions is their need for certain triggering conditions
in order to be manifested. Zooming into Newton’s second law (3.2), we see the
following: the manifestation of the massmj of particle Pj at time t is its acceleration
aj(t) given the positions and velocities of all the particles (including Pj) at time
t. So the positions and velocities of all the particles are the triggering conditions
for the manifestation of mass. In the case of gravitation, the mass mj cancels out
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on both sides of (3.2), and we deduce that the acceleration aj(t) doesn’t depend
on mj. Yet, aj(t) is the manifestation of mass of the j-th particle, although it’s
independent of the precise value of mj.
Having mass as a disposition, it seems that there is no room in the ontology for
further entities that may influence motion. So Newtonian forces must be interpreted
as non-existent. Rather, they are nomological in the formulation of the laws of
motion; they only express the influence of the masses on particles.
The Mathematical Structure of Causal Relations
Blondeau and Ghins (2012) o er a general scheme for all laws of motion in physics
from quantum mechanics to classical mechanics, to thermodynamics. They postu-
late that all the relevant di erential equations are of the following form:
ˆx
ˆt
= C1(t) + . . .+ Cn(t). (3.5)
On the left side of the equation are the e ects, and on the right side one finds all the
causes. The variable x stands for the quantity in whose temporal development one
is interested: position, momentum, forces, wave functions, entropy, temperature,
etc. What is important is the structure of the right side: C1(t), . . . , Cn(t) are the
causes, and they are summed up. By setting Ci = F i this scheme reflects the
standard view that (component) forces are the cause of acceleration (Blondeau and
Ghins, 2012, p. 385).
I don’t think that scheme (3.5) is universal. Causes and e ects must be part of
the ontology—an exception is Humeanism, where causation is introduced by means
of counterfactuals. For our dispositionalist, who grants only particles and mass in
the primitive ontology, forces don’t exist and the scheme (3.5) cannot be applied.
Instead, the distribution of dispositions is the causes of the change in motion, and
a general causal scheme for the laws of motion of classical mechanics rather has to
look like this:
d–x
dt– (t) = f
A
t,
d–≠1x(t)
dt–≠1 , . . . ,
dx(t)
dt ,x(t);D1(x(t), t), . . . , Dr(x(t), t)
B
,
where Di(x(t), t) is the disposition of the ith particle, which can a priori depend
on time and position, and f is a function that expresses the functional relationship
among the disposition, position, velocity, and higher-order derivatives. The func-
tion f can also depend on time. Applying this to Newtonian gravity in the case of
N particles, we get, by setting Di(x(t), t) = mi and x = Q = (q1, . . . , qN),
d2Q
dt2 (t) = f (Q;m1, . . . ,mN) =
Nÿ
j ”=i
Gmj
qj ≠ qi...qj ≠ qi...3 .
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What Is Wrong with Intrinsic Dispositions?
If the ontology of a dispositionalist only consists of particles and intrinsic properties,
there is a problem regarding how particles can influence each other over spatial
distances. If we want to predict the motion of particle P1, it doesn’t su ce to know
the initial position and velocity of this particle; its motion also depends on the
distribution of all the other particles in the universe. So the mass m1 cannot “on
its own” generate the motion of P1; instead, there has to be a “connection” with
the other particles.
How is this “connection” established? In a dispositionalist ontology there is noth-
ing but particles and intrinsic properties. It doesn’t follow from the definition of
intrinsic properties that they can influence each other over spatial distances. If
particle P1 has a certain intrinsic property, then this property can only change the
behavior of P1. One might say that the laws tell us how the intrinsic properties
influence one another. That’s right, but this explanation grants laws too much
power. The laws supervene on the dispositions, and if we say that intrinsic disposi-
tions can influence each other over spatial distances, then we commit ourselves to
laws as further entities in our ontology—something that a dispositionalist is eager
to avoid.
The Humean doesn’t face this problem. For her intrinsic properties are categor-
ical, and laws summarize the motion of the particles throughout history. Humean
laws don’t add anything to the ontology that isn’t already found in the mosaic.
One option for the dispositionalist is to bite the bullet: it’s simply a primitive fact
that masses influence each other over arbitrary distances—some kind of metaphys-
ical action-at-a-distance. But then I fear that properties are no longer important
because the law determines the e ects of the distant action. Hence dispositionalism
only di ers from primitivism about laws in terms of the language it uses. I therefore
think that a dispositionalism which maintains an ontology solely of particles and
intrinsic properties, fails to metaphysically ground Newtonian mechanics.
A solution for the dispositionalist may be to introduce fields and forces. These
may help the dispositionalist because, in virtue of its mass, a particle generates a
field, which generates a force. So even if there is a particle that is far away from
other particles, it can still be influenced by them through the net force generated
by the net field.
Another potential escape for the dispositionalist would be to introduce physical
modal relations (that is, an ontic structure) instead or on top of the intrinsic prop-
erties. I see two problems with this idea: either these relations reduce to forces
or fields, or they coincide with the laws of nature themselves. Let’s analyze this
option in more detail.
3.4.4. Ontic Structural Realism
OSR as introduced and defended by Esfeld (2004, 2009) is a general scheme that
is well suited to providing for the dynamics in a primitive-stu  ontology. In this
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scheme, di erent physical theories agree on the primitive stu , whereas they di er
in the ontic structure. I will show that in Newtonian mechanics the dynamical
structure isn’t unique; it depends on whether fields exist. The ontology of fields
will also make a di erence to how we should interpret mass.
OSR without Fields
The most parsimonious ontology for Newtonian mechanics consists of particles in
motion: no mass, no forces, no fields. In a non-Humean metaphysics, however,
there have to be modal connections. Apart from laws and intrinsic properties, we
can impose dynamical relations on particles that generate change in motion.
Here we could stop insisting that the relations are primitive metaphysical rela-
tions that account for the correct motion of particles irrespective of the laws. And
we don’t spell out what the relations are or what instantiates the relations. This
would turn OSR into a purely metaphysical idea, something akin to humility but
with respect to the structure.
But we can go beyond this. Newtonian mechanics gives us a candidate for on
ontic dynamical structure: component forces. For gravity they look like
F ij = Gmimj
qj ≠ qi...qj ≠ qi...3 ,
which is the force that particle Pj exerts on particle Pi.
The component forces are dynamical bipartite particle–particle relations; that
is, they dynamically relate the change of motion of particle Pi to the change of
motion of Pj. We can even summarize all the forces into one “universal” force
F = (F 1, . . . ,FN), where F i are net forces. This is a concise way of writing down
the entire structure. The net forces aren’t anything in addition to the component
forces; they are just a name for the resulting action.
Let me briefly mention the features of this ontic structure. First, it instantiates
a dynamical non-locality: the acceleration of one particle is determined by the
position of all the other particles on a simultaneity slice irrespective of the spatial
distances. But the structure F is itself regarded as a local object, because it’s
determined by the values it takes in 3-dimensional physical space.
Second, the influence of the gravitational structure decreases with distance. The
more the particles move apart, the less they contribute to the acceleration of the
other particle.
Third, the gravitational structure always consists of bipartite particle–particle
relations. The whole structure can be decomposed into relations of two particles,
which physicists would call direct interactions. Although this is action-at-a-distance
because there are no entities continuously transmitting the action, these direct in-
teractions respect the structure of Galilean space-time since they relate only par-
ticles on a simultaneity slice. Furthermore, the action-at-a-distance of OSR is not
as problematic as that accepted by the standard dispositionalist. The latter only
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allows the intrinsic properties to be dynamically e cacious, and so masses must
influences each other at a distance. It’s a problem for the dispositionalist to justify
how intrinsic masses can do this; it’s not enough to refer to the laws of motion
because they only express the e ects of the disposition. OSR, on the other hand,
introduces a net of dynamical relations as part of the fundamental ontology. So the
change in motion of one particle still influences the motion of all the other particles
at the same time, but there is no longer a metaphysical action-at-a-distance.
Mass as a Coupling Constant
Interpreting the component forces as a dynamical structure, mass cannot be an
intrinsic property of particles. Mass would either be categorical or dispositional.
Categorical properties are to be avoided. Whether mass can be a disposition de-
pends on the ontology; more precisely, it depends on the status of fields. Let’s first
say that there are no fields. If mass were a disposition it would be a disposition
that generates force or acceleration. In neither case is this needed, as the structure
is su cient to ground the dynamics in the ontology. So like a primitivist about
laws, it’s better to regard mass as a parameter or constant. The role of mass is
rather to “tune the intensity” of the structure: the higher the masses the more the
particles attract each other or the more they resist the impact of forces. In order to
emphasize these two roles, namely, being a parameter and regulating the strength
of the structure, mass is more suitably called a coupling constant.
OSR with Fields
Forces instantiate an ontic structure. Since the role of forces depends on the exis-
tence of fields (see Sec. 3.3) we need to slightly adjust the structure. With fields
in our ontology, forces relate the value of the field to the acceleration of particles.
The ontic structure ceases to be a bipartite particle–particle relation; it becomes a
bipartite field–acceleration relation.
This application of OSR to classical mechanics is close to the interpretation of
forces as causal relations given by Bigelow et al. (1988). They interpret forces as
relations between the particle and the (gravitational) field. As they respond to the
vicious regress argument, they want to elucidate the status of force as the mediator
between causes and e ects: C ∆ F ∆ E. Bigelow et al. associate C with the
change in the field and with E the acceleration. They interpret the force F as a
causal relation between C and E.
Mass as a Dispostion
If fields exist then mass is rather to be interpreted as a disposition: a disposition to
generate fields. Physics doesn’t introduce any abstract relations, like forces between
fields and acceleration, that mediate between the mass and the generation of fields.
Therefore, we need to presuppose that it’s a primitive capacity of mass to produce a
field. But this doesn’t exhaust the role of mass. It also influences how big the force
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is in generating acceleration. So it’s still a coupling constant in the ontic structure
between fields and acceleration, a coupling constant that has a dispositional aspect.
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Well, it seemed to me quite evident that the idea that a particle acts on itself, that the
electrical force acts on the same particle that generates it, is not a necessary one—it is
a sort of a silly one, as a matter of fact. And so I suggested to myself that electrons
cannot act on themselves, they can only act on other electrons. That means there is
no field at all. You see, if all charges contribute to making a single common field, and
if that common field acts back on all the charges, then each charge must act back on
itself. Well, that was where the mistake was, there was no field. It was just that when
you shook one charge, another would shake later.
— Richard Feynman (1966, p. 699)
4.1. Particles and Fields
The Maxwell–Lorentz theory of electromagnetism has a wide scope of application.
It can be used for phenomena on the macroscopic level, like the behavior of elec-
tromagnetic waves in di erent media or even the heating of a frying pan through
induction. This theory may be also applied to the behavior of single charged par-
ticles. The latter situation allows us to analyze this theory as a candidate for a
fundamental theory of the world, as we have done with Newtonian mechanics, and
we can work out what the world would be like if this theory were to introduce the
true laws of physics governing all matter in our universe.
The Maxwell–Lorentz theory introduces two kinds of fundamental entities sit-
uated in space-time. First, there are particles. And these have two properties,
namely, mass and charge. Charge comes in two varieties: positive and negative.
And in virtue of having charge the particles generate an electromagnetic field, the
second kind of basic entity.
Since there are two fundamental kinds of entities, namely fields and particles, the
laws should show us how the motion of particles influences the behavior of fields,
and how the behavior of fields changes the motion of particles. The former case is
accounted for by the Maxwell equations:
1
c
ˆE
ˆt
= Ò◊B ≠ 4ﬁ
c
j,
1
c
ˆB
ˆt
= ≠Ò◊E; (4.1)
Ò ·E = 4ﬁÍ, Ò ·B = 0. (4.2)
The Maxwell equations tell us that there are two species of fields, namely, the
electric field E and the magnetic field B. According to equations (4.2), also known
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as the constraint equations, the sources of the electric field lie in the charge density
Í, while the magnetic field has no sources or sinks. Instead, magnetic fields are
only generated by the motion of charges resulting from a current density j, and
therefore there is no magnetic field produced by static charges. Equations (4.1),
conventionally dubbed the evolution equations, point to a correlation between the
change of the electric field and the change of the magnetic field and vice versa.
They are the origin of the wave behavior of fields and, in particular, of radiation
e ects, which will play a central role in my philosophical analysis.
The Maxwell equations are non-homogeneous linear equations; so they can be
globally solved given certain initial conditions (Spohn, 2004, section 2.1). It turns
out that the values of the fields on a Cauchy hypersurface are su cient to deliver
enough data for a solution. Given the field values on a space-like hypersurface at a
time t = t0, namely,
E(t0,x), B(t0,x)
together with the boundary conditions
Ò ·E(t0,x) = Í, Ò ·B(t0,x) = 0,
the Maxwell equations can be thus solved for all times t. And they instantly lead
to a law of conservation. Since the charge density Í and the current density j fulfill
the continuity equation
ˆtÍ(t,x) +Ò · j(t,x) = 0, (4.3)
the change of the charge density in a given volume is only due to charges moving
out of or into the volume. In other words, charges are locally conserved so that they
cannot appear or disappear without following a continuous path. This leads to a
global law of conservation: the number of charges in the universe remains constant.
One basic ingredient is still missing. Given fields, the theory must state how
particles are moving. The Lorentz force law takes care of this:
dP (t)
dt = e
1
E(t, q(t)) + q˙ ◊B(t, q(t))
2
. (4.4)
This is a relativistic generalization of Newton’s second law (3.2). The change of
the relativistic momentum of a particle with elementary charge e is caused by the
electromagnetic forces acting upon it. The Lorentz force law has two important
features. First, magnetic fields aren’t only generated by moving charges, but only
moving charges can be influenced by the magnetic force because of the velocity of
the particle in the cross-product on the right side of (4.4). Second, experiments
confirm that charges are quantized by appearing only in certain “packets”. The
smallest such packet is the elementary charge e carried by an electron.
So far, this has been a standard exposition of the Maxwell–Lorentz theory that
you can find in every physics textbooks. Some philosophy is still missing. The
primitive-stu  ontology of electrodynamics consists of point-size particles and the
electric and magnetic fields. These are the basic objects or substances of which
84
4.1. Particles and Fields
our world is composed. The Maxwell equations and the Lorentz force law contain
mass and charge. Whereas the notion of mass is taken from Newtonian mechanics,
charge is newly introduced. And depending on the metaphysics of laws of nature,
the status of mass and charge changes: they may be intrinsic properties of the
particles or just mathematical parameters (see Chapters 2 and 3). The Maxwell
equations and the Lorentz force law show that all these primitive entities influence
each other: the fields change the motion of particles, and the motion of particles
changes the fields. According to the equations (4.1), the fields don’t only influence
the motion of particles; they mutually influence their temporal development as well.
The Covariant Formulation
The idea is to dispense with the electric and magnetic fields as two independent
fields in space-time and unite them into a single electromagnetic field F . This field
manifests itself in a certain combination of electric and magnetic fields in every
inertial reference frame.
The field F is mathematically a tensor field on space-time. Given the components
of the electric and magnetic field in a reference frame, the field tensor F has the
following component representation:
F µ‹ =
Qccca
0 ≠E1 ≠E2 ≠E3
E1 0 ≠B3 B2
E2 B3 0 ≠B1
E3 ≠B2 B1 0
Rdddb .
The crucial property of the tensor field F is its Lorentz-invariance in contrast to
the E and B fields. This makes it suitable to be the real entity on space-time as it
doesn’t change relative to the Lorentz frames, in the same way that the relativistic
interval doesn’t change under Lorentz transformation.
In covariant notation, the Maxwell equations (4.1) and (4.2) are written as
ˆµF
µ‹ = ≠4ﬁ
c
jµ (4.5)
ˆÍF‹‡ + ˆ‹F‡Í + ˆ‡FÍ‹ = 0, (4.6)
with j = (cÍ, j) and all tensors depending on x = (ct,x).
Sometimes it’s more convenient to use potentials instead of fields in calculations.
There are infinitely many scalar fields „ and vector fields A that generate the same
electric and magnetic fields if they fulfill the following relations:
E = ≠Ò„≠ 1
c
ˆ
ˆt
A, B = Ò◊A
In covariant form the above equations are subsumed into one equation for the
field tensor:
F µ‹ = ˆµA‹ ≠ ˆ‹Aµ
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with Aµ = („,A). With the help of potentials, the first Maxwell equation (4.5) can
be written as
⇤A‹ = ≠4ﬁ
c
j‹
with the d’Alembert operator ⇤ = ˆ‹ˆ‹ .
4.2. Infinity: The Threat of a Moving Particle
Maxwell–Lorentz electrodynamics is an extremely successful physical theory. It’s
thus surprising that this theory isn’t able to deal with the most basic scenario:
the motion of a single charged particle. The equations of motion don’t deliver any
exact solution for this. Let’s see how this can be and what we can do about it
The charge density of a single charge is Í(t,x) = e”(x ≠ q(t))—the ”-function
indicates that the charge is only concentrated on its trajectory q(t). The corre-
sponding density current is the charge density multiplied by the velocity of the
charge, namely, j(t,x) = Í(t,x)v(t) = e”(x ≠ q(t))v(t). Therefore, the Maxwell
equations are as follows:
1
c
ˆE
ˆt
= Ò◊B ≠ 4ﬁ
c
e”(x≠ q(t))v(t), 1
c
ˆB
ˆt
= ≠Ò◊E; (4.7)
Ò ·E = 4ﬁe”(x≠ q(t)), Ò ·B = 0. (4.8)
Calculating the fields is standard (Spohn, 2004, section 2.1). The electric field is
given by
E(t,x) = e4ﬁ
A
(1≠ v2)(nˆ≠ v)
(1≠ v · nˆ)3|x≠ q|2 +
nˆ◊ ((nˆ≠ v)◊ v˙)
(1≠ v · nˆ)3 |x≠ q|
B
, (4.9)
and the magnetic field can be calculated as
B(t,x) = nˆ◊E(t,x). (4.10)
The right side of (4.9) has to be evaluated at the retarded time tret, which is
implicitly defined by
tret = t≠ |x≠ q(tret)|.
It is the time at which the backwards light-cone with apex at x crosses the world-
line of the particle (see Figure 4.1). Equation (4.9) states that the value of the
electric field at position x at time t only depends on the position and the velocity
of the moving particle at the retarded time tret, as q, v˙, and nˆ has to be evaluated
at tret. The vector nˆ is a unit vector derived from the position of the particle,
namely,
nˆ := x≠ q(tret)|x≠ q(tret)| .
86
4.2. Infinity: The Threat of a Moving Particle
So the vector nˆ at x is parallel to the backwards light-cone pointing away from the
trajectory q(t).
The retarded fields (4.9) and (4.10) aren’t the only solutions to the Maxwell
equations. In particular, they allow for advanced solutions as well. The advanced
fields di er from the retarded ones only in the time at which they are evaluated;
instead of the retarded time tret, they are evaluated at the advanced time tadv given
by
tadv = t+ |x≠ q(tadv)|.
The advanced time lies on the forward light-cone with apex x intersecting the
world-line of the particle (see Figure 4.1). This is the reason why the advanced
solutions are abandoned in the application of the Lorentz-Maxwell electrodynamics.
It suggests that the field value at x at time t depends on the future location of the
particle as if the electromagnetic fields travelled from the future to the past. This
phenomenon isn’t confirmed by experiments, so that only the retarded fields have
physical significance.
q(t)
q(tret)
q(tadv)
x
n
Figure 4.1.: Retarded and advanced times
In order to calculate the Liénard–Wiechert fields (4.9) and (4.10) we have to
presuppose the trajectory of the particle, which must be derived from the Lorentz
force law (4.4). So if we want to get the exact trajectory of the particle we have
to couple the Maxwell equations with the Lorentz force law by inserting the self-
fields in the law of motion. This poses huge di culties. For the fields have to be
evaluated at the particle’s position, and this leads to infinities as the denominators
of (4.9) become zero. Briefly, the Maxwell–Lorentz theory breaks down in the most
basic case of a moving charged particle.
How can it be that the theory is still successfully applied? In physics textbooks, it
seems that one can easily calculate the motion of a particle. But the motion is only
under the influence of external fields generated by other particles; the self-fields are
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always ignored. So what physicists are doing in these cases is using test charges to
avoid the infinities. A test charge is a hypothetical particle whose features don’t
perturb the physical system. If physicists claim to have calculated the motion of a
particle P they treat this particle as a test particle without explicitly mentioning
so. Though P has mass and charge, its own field is simply neglected. So it moves
in the field of the other particles without disturbing their fields. In this case, the
mathematics is perfectly fine. But once you treat the whole story by considering
the self-field, the theory is of no use.
Because we need the equations later on, I’ll summarize the physics of a single
charge in covariant notation. The four-current of a moving single charge is then
given by
j‹(x) = ec
Œ⁄
≠Œ
”(x≠ z(·))z˙‹(·) d·
with z(·) the four-position, z˙(·) the four-velocity of the particles parametrized by
its proper time · . The Maxwell equation (4.5) is solved by the Liénard-Wiechert
potentials
A‹ret(x) = e
z˙µ(·ret)
(x‡ ≠ z‡(·ret)) z˙‡(·ret) , (4.11)
which is the retarded potential corresponding to the retarded field of (4.9), and
A‹adv(x) = e
z˙µ(·adv)
(x‡ ≠ z‡(·adv)) z˙‡(·adv) , (4.12)
being the advanced potential.
In order to calculate the trajectory of the particle in its own field we need to
solve the Lorentz force law
dpµ(·)
d· = mz¨
µ(·) = e
c
F µ‹(z(·))z˙‹(·)
by using the Liénard-Wiecher potentials. So we need to couple the Maxwell equa-
tions with the equation of motion for the particle yielding the following system of
di erential equations:
ˆµF
µ‹(x) = ≠4ﬁe
Œ⁄
≠Œ
”(x≠ z(·))z˙‹(·) d·
mz¨µ(·) = e
c
F µ‹(z(·))z˙‹(·).
The Lorentz force law needs to be evaluated at the position of the particle, but in
plugging the particle’s position into the Liénard-Wiechert potentials, the potentials
become infinite. Consequently, the motion of the particle in its own field cannot be
calculated.
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4.2.1. How to Tame Infinity?
What can be done about this situation? Maxwell–Lorentz electrodynamics simply
breaks down for the motion of a single charged particle. And if a theory breaks
down one has to find another one, a successor without infinities. The self-interaction
problem has been known since Maxwell, and many physicists have worked on it.
Most physicists hoped that quantum mechanics would solve everything. But it did
not. The ultra-violet divergence in QFT notwithstanding, the infinite self-energies
in classical electrodynamics has been almost forgotten.
In physics textbooks, one can still find analogies between classical electrody-
namics and quantum mechanics that are, to put it mildly, question-begging. One
example can be found in the otherwise very meticulous book by Orhan Barut:
The field [. . . ] is infinite at the point x = z(s). Physically, we know that it
represents the e ect of the near field of the particle. In quantum mechanical
language the particle carries with itself a cloud of photons which are contin-
uously emitted and absorbed. It is, therefore, to be expected that this force
[i.e., the self-force] contributes to the inertia or mass of the particle. (Barut,
1980, p. 190)
First, it isn’t clear what “represents the e ect of the near field of the particle.” Is it
the field itself, the force, or the infinity? Second, as the equations of motions break
down there is no e ect of the near field; the theory doesn’t say how the particle
is a ected by its own field. Third, the “cloud of photons” of quantum mechanics
by no means lets us expect that the self-force, which is infinite, contributes to the
mass of the particle. Rather, we would expect an impact on the particles’ trajectory
from radiation and the associated loss of energy. Infinities and quantum mechanics
do not help. But some physicists and mathematicians have tried to develop new
classical theories that avoid the self-interaction problem.
The Wheeler–Feynman Theory
Wheeler and Feynman (1945, 1949) got rid of fields, and so there is no longer a
problem of interaction between fields and particles. And the equation of motion for
a single point particle is well defined. Apart from the metaphysical problems of an
action-at-a-distance theory (see, for example, Pietsch, 2010, sections 5 and 6), the
price, however, is that we have to take the advanced fields seriously. Some regard
this as indicating backwards causation. At least the advanced fields cannot be
dismissed as unphysical because they play a major role in the equations of motion.
Whether this is a case of backward causation is another issue.
Furthermore, the mathematics of the Wheeler–Feynman theory is extremely dif-
ficult, and many important problems are still open (Bauer, 1997; Deckert, 2009).
For now, physicists have not found a physical system that allows for an initial value
formulation, and it isn’t clear yet whether there could be an initial value problem
for certain systems in the first place (Bauer et al., 2013). Initial-value problems
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are the sort of problems physicists and mathematicians have grown up with, and
they have developed many e ective tools to solve such problems. But as long as
the di erential equations of the Wheeler–Feynman theory cannot be rearranged as
allowing certain system to be formulated as initial-value problems, the proper tools
have yet to be invented.
The Born–Infeld Theory
Another potential successor to Maxwell–Lorentz electrodynamics is the Born–Infeld
theory (Born and Infeld, 1934). This is a field theory proper. The idea is to change
the Maxwell equations to non-linear equations. Born and Infeld propose a non-
linear relation between the electric field E and the electric displacement field D
and between the magnetic field B and the magnetic induction field H—in the
Maxwell–Lorentz theory the relations between these fields in a vacuum are trivial,
that is, E =D and B =H .
The Born–Infeld self-field of a static particle is bounded
E = q
4ﬁ
Ò
r40 + r4
er,
with r20 = q4ﬁb (see Perlick, 2015, p. 530). The constant b, called Born’s field strength,
is a new constant of nature in the Born-Infeld theory. We immediately see that
|E| æ b if r æ 0; that is, the absolute value of the electric field is finite (see Fig.
4.2).
r
E
b
Figure 4.2.: Static Born–Infeld field compared to the (dashed) Coulomb field (pic-
ture taken Perlick, 2015, p. 531)
The dynamical case is very hard and poses many obstacles (Kiessling, 2012).
Since the Born–Infeld equations are non-linear there are no standard methods for
solving these equations. There are no solutions for the field of a moving particle
analogous to the Liénard–Wiechert fields. Even qualitative results are di cult to
deliver. No one knows whether the self-force and the self-energy are finite.
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The Bopp–Podolsky Theory
In the 1940s, Bopp (1940), Podolsky (1942), and Landé and Thomas (1941) inde-
pendently developed another field theory aimed at taming the infinities, which is
now called the Bopp–Podolsky theory. This theory is linear but of higher order
than the Maxwell equations. The Bopp–Podolsky analogue of the Coulomb field
reads
E = q4ﬁr2
3
1≠
3
r
l
+ 1
4
e≠ rl
4
er,
with l being a new constant of nature. The modulus of the electric field is depicted
in Fig. 4.3. When r æ 0 then |E| æ q8ﬁl2 .
r
E
q
8π 2
Figure 4.3.: Static Bopp–Podolsky field compared to the (dashed) Coulomb field
(picture taken from Perlick, 2015, p. 531)
Unlike the Born–Infeld theory, an analogue of the Liénard–Wiechert potential
has been calculated:
A(x) =
Qa ·⁄
≠Œ
J1( s(x,·
Õ)
l )
ls(x, · Õ)
z˙a(· Õ) d· Õ
Rb ÷ab dxb, (4.13)
with J1 as the Bessel function of the first kind. We don’t need to explain all the
details of this potential, but one feature is important. If x is in the future light
cone of z(·), the field value at x depends on the entire trajectory z(t) from t = ≠Œ
to t = · . We also encounter this in the Wheeler–Feynman theory, where there are
no fields.
Workarounds within the Maxwell–Lorentz Theory
The Maxwell–Lorentz theory needs to be replaced by another theory. Nevertheless,
there have been many attempts to derive or justify an equation of motion for single
charged particles within this theory. There are three major strategies. One is based
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on an energy-balance argument and leads to the Abraham–Lorentz equation (sec-
tions 4.3 and 4.4). Another is based on Dirac’s idea of mass renormalization and
leads to the Lorentz–Dirac equation (section 4.5). Both equations pose a dilemma:
either the particles accelerate infinitely (runaway behavior), or the particles acceler-
ate before the action of a force (pre-acceleration). Furthermore, the Lorentz–Dirac
equation introduces an electromagnetic mass in addition to the familiar mechanical
mass.
Inflating the Particles
But some diagnose the problem as lying in the size of the particles themselves.
As they are point particles, it isn’t surprising that there are singularities at their
position. The Abraham model and the Lorentz model introduce particles that have
a non-zero finite diameter. The Abraham model is a non-relativistic model of a
spherical charged particle (Abraham, 1908, p. 130). Abraham introduced a rigid
charge distribution „, which is independent of the motion of the particle, and the
particle is spherical in all inertial systems. The Lorentz model, on the other hand,
is relativistic (Lorentz, 1916). Here, Lorentz introduces a “flexible” charge distribu-
tion that undergoes a physical Lorentz–Fitzgerald contraction during acceleration.
As the names already suggest, neither attempt is a fully worked-out theory; they
are actually models for one electron derived from the Maxwell equations. And it
seems that extended particles are ruled out by experiments since electrons would
have to be too large.1
4.2.2. Worse than Inconsistency
The equations of motion for point-size particles that are derived from the Maxwell
equations are simply ill-defined. The Maxwell–Lorentz theory isn’t capable of solv-
ing the simplest physical system consisting of just one charged particle. That’s
a big problem that begs for a genuine solution. Frisch (2005, Ch. 2) purports to
show that there is another troublemaker lying at the heart of electrodynamics: an
inconsistency with the principle of energy conservation.
This inconsistency arises because physicists regard only the Lorentz forces that
act on a particle as generated solely by external fields. On the other hand, the
theory predicts that particles radiate, and there is only energy conservation if the
radiating energy is respected in the energy balance. The problem now is that if
we calculate the work done by the external Lorentz forces on the particle using
Newton’s second law, there are no terms representing the radiated energy. So the
standard way to derive a law for the conservation of energy fails to give the correct
relation between energies. Therefore, classical electrodynamics is inconsistent with
the principle of energy conservation.
These are the four assumptions that Frisch (2005, p. 33) puts forward to derive
the inconsistency:
1I thank Detlef Dürr for pointing this out to me.
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(i) There are discrete, finitely charged accelerating particles.
(ii) Charged particles function as sources of electromagnetic fields in accordance
with the Maxwell equations.
(iii) Charged particles obey Newton’s second law (and thus, in the absence of non-
electromagnetic forces, their motion is governed by the Lorentz force law);
(iv) Energy is conserved in particle-field interactions, where the energy of the
electromagnetic field and the energy flow are defined in the standard way.
Let’s look in more detail at how Frisch argues that these assumptions lead to
an inconsistency.Imagine one particle that feels the force F ext from external fields
so that it moves from its initial position A to its final position B within the time
interval [tA, tB]. According to point (iii), the force does the work
W =
⁄ B
A
F ext · dl =
⁄ tB
tA
dp
dt · v dt = Ekin(tB)≠ Ekin(tA). (4.14)
So it turns out that the work done by the force is the di erence between the initial
and final kinetic energy of the particle.
But if we consider that the particle radiates when it moves from A to B, the
work is partially transformed into radiation. So from (iv) we get
W = Ekin(tB) + Erad ≠ Ekin(tA). (4.15)
Since we get from (i) and (ii) that
Erad > 0,
the two equations (4.14) and (4.15) are inconsistent.
I think that Frisch’s argument is at best misleading.2 It appears to be well-
structured with a clear and concise conclusion, but as always the devil is in the
details. In the end, Frisch has put up a smokescreen because he obfuscates the real
problem. Let’s get rid of the smoke.
First, the justification that the radiation energy is bigger than zero doesn’t de-
pend, as Frisch suggests in (i), on the size of particles (Muller, 2007, p. 256).
Whether the particles are point-like or extended doesn’t make a di erence to the
Maxwell equations with respect to radiation. If a charged object, be it a point or
a ball, accelerates, it radiates.
Moreover, in equation (4.15), Frisch only considers the radiation energy, but for a
rigorous energy balance he would have to respect the entire self-field of the particle.
The radiating field is just part of the self-field; the near field, the field that is always
attached to the particle irrespective of its state of motion, is still ignored.
2In fact, Frisch’s inconsistency argument has attracted a series of critical replies, such as Belot
(2007), Muller (2007), Vickers (2008), and Zuchowski (2013).
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Following his general derivation of the inconsistency as I’ve just shown, Frisch
makes the calculation by inserting the actual electromagnetic fields in equations
(4.14) and (4.15). Equation (4.14) needs to be replaced by Poynting’s theorem,
the electromagnetic law of energy conservation—see equation (4.31) later in this
chapter. The inconsistency again arises when we look deeper into the system.
Poynting’s theorem ignores the self-field, and by inserting the self-field, Poynting’s
theorem is inconsistent with its adjusted cousin that respects the self-field. So
Frisch says that in this case there is an inconsistency because of the self-field, while
in the general case above there is an inconsistency because of the radiation field.
It seems that the way he applies his own argumentative scheme is inconsistent.
But more importantly, when Frisch talks of inconsistency, what does he really
mean? Is inconsistency the same as contradiction? At first sight, it seems so,
as equation (4.14) obviously contradicts (4.15). A physical theory that leads to
contradiction is doomed to death. If we require anything from a scientific theory,
it mustn’t be contradictory. Have physicists used classical electrodynamics while
remaining oblivious to a contradiction within its basic equations? The solution is
pretty easy: equations (4.14) and (4.15) are derived from di erent assumptions.
When deriving (4.14), we only count the external fields, while in (4.15) we respect
the radiation field as well. And it’s not surprising that di erent assumptions lead to
di erent consequences. Hence, the two equations don’t contradict each other; they
just model two di erent physical situations. Still, they are inconsistent according
to Frisch. But I don’t see how they can be inconsistent without being contradictory.
The true problem, the genuine root of Frisch’s argument, is the self-interaction
problem. And Frisch seems to be aware of this when he concludes:
As this discussion suggests, the inconsistency is most plausibly seen as arising
from the fact that the Lorentz force equation of motion ignores any e ect
that the self-field of a charge has on its motion. The standard scheme treats
charged particles as sources of fields and as being a ected by fields—yet
not by the total field, which includes a contribution from the charge itself,
but only by the field external to the charge. This treatment is inconsistent
with energy conservation. Intuitively, if the charge radiates energy, then this
should have an e ect on its motion, and thus a radiation term representing a
force due to the charge’s self-field should be part of the equation of motion.
(Frisch, 2005, p. 35)
But still Frisch regards the inconsistency with energy conservation as more impor-
tant than the self-interaction problem, since his subsequent discussions on how to
rescue the Maxwell–Lorentz theory are centered around the inconsistency. In his
reply to his critics (see Frisch, 2008), he goes back on his claim that the inconsis-
tency is a problem of the theory itself. Rather, his argument aims to show that
inconsistent theories can be empirically successful, and philosophers should think
about their idea of perfectly consistent theories.
But in order to claim that an empirically successful theory doesn’t need to match
the high standards of ideal theories imagined by philosophers, one can argue without
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the detour into Frisch’s inconsistency argument. Quantum mechanics is a good
example. One can see its empirical success by using a computer or an LED lamp.
Yet quantum mechanics is plagued by the measurement problem. And the Maxwell–
Lorentz theory is plagued by the self-interaction problem, its indisputable usefulness
for physicists and engineers notwithstanding.
What should physicists do? Throw away quantum mechanics? Throw away the
Maxwell–Lorentz theory? Physicists are pragmatic: postulate a collapse postulate
and ignore the self-fields in order to do physics. And this approach has its mer-
its. But it has its downsides, too. Physicists tend to forget the deep fundamental
problems with their own theories. The fundamental problem of classical electrody-
namics is not its inconsistency with the principle of energy conservation. Indeed,
there is no inconsistency. In application, physicists need to ignore the self-fields,
otherwise the theory will be silent about any empirical consequences. So the prob-
lem of electrodynamics is much more subtle and much more severe. The truth
is that the Maxwell–Lorentz theory is much more than inconsistent: it’s not well
defined.
4.3. Runaway Behavior
It’s possible to model the motion of a single point charge within the Maxwell–
Lorentz theory. We know from experiments that charged objects are more di cult
to accelerate than uncharged ones, that is to say that the same external force acting
on a charged object leads to a decreased acceleration compared to an uncharged
object (other things being equal). And from the Liénard-Wiechert potentials, as
well as from experiments, we know that accelerating charges radiate.
This inspired Abraham and Lorentz to search for an equation of motion for a
single charged particle (see Jackson, 1999, section 16.2; Barut, 1980, pp. 184–5).
In doing so, they introduced a new kind of force F rad, the radiation reaction force,
which is supposed to act on an accelerating charged particle apart from the external
forces F ext; it’s a kind of back-reaction from the radiating field to the particle.
Newton’s equation of motion for a particle with mass m changes to
mx¨ = F ext + F rad. (4.16)
In order to get a mathematical expression for F rad, Abraham and Lorentz argued
that the work done by F rad during a certain time interval [t1, t2] equals the radiated
energy Erad, that is,
t2⁄
t1
F rad · v dt = Erad.
Erad can be calculated with the help of the Larmor power formula
P (t) = 23
e2
c3
|v˙|2 .
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This formula represents the total instantaneous energy radiated by a slowly moving
particle, and it’s derived directly from the Liénard-Wiechert potentials. Now we
get
t2⁄
t1
A
F rad ≠ 23
e2
c3
v¨
B
· v dt = 0.
A possible solution for the radiation reaction force is the obvious
F rad =
2
3
e2
c3
v¨.
Having thus an expression for F rad, Newton’s equation (4.16) turns into theAbraham–
Lorentz equation
m (x¨≠ · ...x) = F ext, (4.17)
where · := 23
e2
mc3 has the dimension of time.3
The remarkable feature of this equation is the third derivative in the position
coordinate. In contrast to an ordinary Newtonian equation, the initial acceleration
a0 is now part of the initial conditions and can be freely chosen. The values
of the initial position and velocity are no longer su cient in for yielding unique
trajectories.
But this isn’t the most important consequence of the Abraham–Lorentz equation.
It gets much more exciting when we consider its solutions (Plass, 1961). The general
solution to (4.17) in one dimension is
a(t) = et/·
Qaa0 ≠ 1
·m
t⁄
0
e≠tÕ/·Fext(tÕ) dtÕ
Rb , (4.18)
if we choose the initial time as zero without any loss of generality (Plass, 1961, p.
40).
If we assume the external forces to be zero, there are two solutions to the
Abraham–Lorentz equation (4.17). One solutions is a1(t) = 0, which says that
the particle will remain in inertial motion. Another solution, the runaway solution,
is a2(t) = a0et/· (a0 ”= 0). Given the initial acceleration a0, the acceleration a2(t) is
unbounded when t increases. This is a non-Newtonian trajectory.
4.3.1. Infinite Energies and Singularities
You might reply, “Runaway solutions are physically possible because of the infinite
self-energy of charged particles.” The infinite self-energy is nothing but an inex-
haustible source of energy. And as long as the particle has access to this unlimited
source it can use this form of energy for its never-ending acceleration.
3Instead of the Larmor formula, we could have used a relativistic formula for the radiating
energy. This would then yield the Lorentz–Dirac equation (Barut, 1980, p. 185).
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Let’s see whether this line of reasoning is sound. First and foremost, we need to
distinguish between singularities and infinite energies. Singularities arise whenever
we plug a forbidden number into a mathematical term. Look at the function 1x . It’s
well-defined for all real numbers except 0 since 10 is mathematically meaningless.
This is analogous to the self-interaction problem. The Liénard-Wiecher potentials
(4.11) and (4.12), as well as the corresponding fields (4.9) and (4.10), are singular
on the particle’s trajectory. The fields and the potentials simply have no value on
the trajectory. And so the Maxwell–Lorentz theory renders no equation of motion
for a single particle in its own field.
Independently of the self-interaction problem, we can calculate the energy
W (R) =
⁄
KR
1
2E ·E d
3x (4.19)
of the self-field within a ball KR with radius R. In the Maxwell–Lorentz theory
this quantity is infinite for any R > 0, and the particle is said to have infinite
self-energy.
What is the relation between the infinite self-energy and the singularity of the
fields? There are four logical possibilities:
1. Infinite field energy and singularity,
2. Finite field energy and singularity,
3. Infinite field energy and no singularity,
4. Finite field energy and no singularity.
The Liénard–Wiechert fields have singularity at the position of the source, and the
integral (4.19) is infinite. Clearly, the infinite field energy is a result of the singu-
larity. But there may be “well behaved” singularities that yield a finite integral,
for example, if the potential goes like ≠ ln x. An infinite field energy without a
singularity can only arise if we take the integral (4.19) over the entire space, that
is, for R æ Œ. The field density can decrease very slowly so that the integral is
infinite.
The Born–Infeld theory and the Bopp–Podolsky theory have no singularities and
yield finite self–energies—remember that in the Born–Infeld theory we only have
results for the static case. The fields decrease so rapidly that the energy integral is
finite over the entire space. This is as well-behaved a field as one can get. But it’s
still an open issue whether the Bopp–Podolsky theory contains runaway solutions
(Perlick, 2015, p. 540).
It might sound paradoxical, but we can have runaway solutions even if the fields
have finite energies.Coleman (1961, pp. 33) also argues that it’s wrong to assume
that a runaway particle gets its kinetic energy from its self-energy. For there are
mathematical models of charged particles that allow runaway solutions to have
finite self-energy. Although Coleman’s models fall within quantum field theory
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(Norton and Watson, 1959), this doesn’t weaken the argument: runaway behavior
is possible with a finite self-energy.
4.3.2. The Meaning of Energy–Momentum Conservation
Another reaction to runaway solutions might be that these solutions should be
dismissed because they violate energy-momentum conservation. Since the particle
accelerates without upper bounds it conserves neither energy nor momentum. The
“violation” of conservation of momentum is obvious. Due to its change in veloc-
ity, the particle’s momentum changes. But this is nothing serious. A moving car
changes its momentum all the time. What about conservation of energy? The ki-
netic energy of the particle isn’t conserved for the simple reason that its momentum
isn’t either.
So which momentum and which energy are allegedly not conserved? That the
kinetic energy and the momentum of the particle isn’t conserved is trivial and
o ers no argument against the physical possibility of runaway behavior. Unless
there is a precise physical quantity to be identified with energy or momentum, the
argument of violation of energy-momentum conservation loses its power because
it’s too general.
Theorists often ignore the fact that all conservation laws are derived from the
equations of motions—as pointed out by Grünbaum (1976, pp. 174–5). Laws of
conservations are never axioms or independent claims supplementing the equations
of motion. They are theorems of the laws. Therefore, it’s impossible to derive a
law of conservation from the Abraham–Lorentz equation (4.17) that forbids its own
solutions. In particular, it’s impossible to have a law of conservation of energy and
momentum that would be violated by the runaway solutions.
Moreover, conservation laws aren’t universally valid; they are derived from the
laws of motion by fulfilling certain assumptions. Unless a physical system fulfills
the very same assumptions, it doesn’t have to obey these conservation laws. So
given certain laws of motion, only a subset of solutions under certain circumstances
can fulfill a law of conservation.
Energy-Momentum Conservation in Newtonian Mechanics
Let’s have a look at Newtonian mechanics to illustrate these two issues: laws of
conservation are derived from the laws of motion, and they aren’t universally ap-
plicable. The trivial case is a particle in inertial motion. Since the velocity is
constant for all times the kinetic energy, as well as the momentum, is constant.
Therefore, its kinetic energy and momentum are conserved. But if this particle
moves in a force field, its velocity will certainly change. So its kinetic energy and
its momentum aren’t conserved quantities because the initial energy and momen-
tum di er from the final energy and momentum, that is to say, 12mv(t1) ”= 12mv(t0)
and mv(t1) ”= mv(t0).
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If we take the forces into account we get for the di erence in kinetic energy
1
2mv
2(t1)≠ 12mv
2(t0) =
x1⁄
x0
F · dx.
So the di erence in kinetic energy is traced back to the work done by the force field.
And if we further assume that the force is conservative, that is, F = ÒU , then
1
2mv
2(t1) + U(x1) =
1
2mv
2(t0) + U(x0).
Now we have a conserved quantity: the total energy, being the sum of the kinetic
and the potential energy (Etot = Ekin + Epot), is constant for all trajectories.
This relation is derived from Newton’s second law; it isn’t a separate axiom in
addition to the laws of motion. And the forces have to be conservative so that the
total energy Etot is conserved. Furthermore, the total energy in the form Ekin+Epot
can only be defined if the forces are conservative. There is no potential for non-
conservative forces. This shows that this law of conservation is only valid after
putting further constraints on the physical system.
The momentum of a single particle isn’t a conserved quantity, as the kinetic
energy isn’t a conserved quantity either. In order to get a law of conservation for
the momentum, we have to enlarge the system of one particle to comprise all the
other particles generating the force F . I would like illustrate this using the two-
body problem. This is the only problem that can be solved from the ground up by
solving Newton’s second law; there are no exact solutions for systems consisting of
three or more particles. The equations of motion for a two-particle system are
F 12 = m1x¨1,
F 21 = m2x¨2.
F 12 is the force exerted on particle P1 by P2, and F 21 is the force exerted on P2 by
P1.
Because of Newton’s third law, the two particles are exerting forces against each
other that only di er in terms of their direction, namely, F 12 = ≠F 21. So we get
0 = F 12 + F 21 = m1x¨1 +m2x¨2 = (m1 +m2)R¨,
where R = m1x1+m2x2m1+m2 is the vector of the center of mass. The equation states that
the center of mass is in inertial motion, and it follows by integration that the sum
of the initial total momentum equals the sum of the final momenta:
m1v1(t) +m2v2(t) = m1v1(t0) +m2v2(t0).
While the momentum for each particle changes, the total momentum of the whole
system remains constant.
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Besides, conservation of total momentum depends on the validity of Newton’s
third law. If the forces did not obey this axiom, the integration would yield
m1v1(t) +m2v2(t) = m1v1(t0) +m2v2(t0) +
x(t1)⁄
x(t0)
(F 12 + F 21) dx,
and the total momentum would no longer be a conserved quantity.
How do we get conservation of energy for the system of two particles? The first
step is to subtract both equations of motion, yielding
m1m2
m1 +m2
(x¨1 ≠ x¨2) = F 12.
Now we are in a similar scenario to the one-particle case. If the force is conservative
we get conservation of energy; otherwise, there will be a term left indicating how
the system is losing or gaining energy from the outside.4
The Purpose of Energy-Momentum Conservation
We have finally seen that laws of conservation aren’t a priori true. They are the-
orems of the laws of motion. But what is their meaning, purpose, or significance?
Sometimes I have the impression that laws of conservations have to be fulfilled and
defended by any means, as if it were a law of nature that every system under every
circumstance has to conserve energy and momentum. If a system violates energy-
momentum conservation it’s often denounced either as bizarre or as unimportant.
Something must be strange about this system.
But nothing is strange if a system doesn’t conserve energy or momentum or any
other mathematical quantity. And nothing is special if a system does. Energy and
momentum conservation are consequences of the equations of motion. They don’t
add anything new that isn’t included in the laws. Of course, the same holds true for
all the other familiar candidates for conserved quantities, like angular momentum,
the local charge, or probability.
Nonetheless, kinetic energy, potential energy, linear momentum, and angular mo-
mentum seem to be distinguished from other conserved quantities since they appear
in all kinds of physical theories from quantum mechanics to cosmology. There seems
to be something ontological about the conservation of total energy, as if energy were
a kind of substance in or a property of a physical system. The language of physics
supports this view: “energy is radiating from the particle to the environment,” or
4One word on collisions of balls. To ensure the validity of energy conservation in a collision,
the balls have to be elastic, that is to say that they don’t convert energy into heat during a
collision. If this is fulfilled the sum of the initial kinetic energies equals the sum of the final
kinetic energies. That there is conservation of energy during collisions is, however, reasoning
from induction or an assumption we make on the behavior of the system. There is no exact
solution for this case. The conservation of momentum is induced from its validity in the
two-particle case.
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“an electron can only absorb certain energy quanta.” These ways of speaking may
be underpinned by historical reasons and support intuition, but they are misleading
when it comes to what happens in the ontology. The primitive-stu  ontology of
particles and fields comprises all the objects in the ontology. Adding the masses and
charges as properties of the particles completes the ontological picture of classical
electrodynamics if one is a dispositionalist—the analysis of Chapter 2 can easily be
applied to electrodynamics.
As the mathematical definitions of all kinds of energies and momenta show, they
ultimately depend on the position and motion of the particles. This is obvious for
the kinetic energy and linear and angular momentum. The same holds true also for
the potential energy. If we write the potential energy for a particle P as U(x), the
potential energy doesn’t only depend on the position x of P , but also on the other
particles in the universe that exert a force on P . Remember that the potential
energy can only be defined for conservative forces, and whether the forces are
conservative depends on the behavior of the other particles as well. Philosophically
speaking, energy and momenta supervene on the motion of the particles. Depending
on the particles’ behavior, energy and momentum may remain constant throughout
the trajectory.
There is another argument favoring the view that energy and momentum are
distinguished. The definitions change from physical theory to physical theory, and
only the notions remain. For instance, the kinetic energy of a quantum particle
is di erent from the kinetic energy of a classical particle. The kinetic energy in
classical mechanics has to be defined di erently to its quantum correlate because
the laws of motions are di erent. Therefore, it isn’t the case that the mathematical
formula of kinetic energy refers to some stu  or additional property of particles
or system of particles. And the search for laws of conservation doesn’t lie in the
description of a further property of a physical system or of additional stu  apart
from the particles and fields; the motivation for defining energy and momentum
and for the search for laws of conservation lie elsewhere.
Indeed, the laws of conservation are indispensable for many practical purposes.
One such purpose is that they are a means for checking consistency. Let’s assume
we have calculated a trajectory and we know that this trajectory has to fulfill
energy conservation. We can then plug it in our law of conservation in order to
check whether we have made a mistake in our calculations. Or given an arbitrary
trajectory, we can instantly dismiss it as false or unphysical if it does or does not
fulfill the laws of conservation. In these cases the conservation of a certain quantity
turns out to be very useful.
And by far the most important use of conservation laws is that they help us in
solving the equations of motion in the first place. In Newtonian mechanics, only
the two-body problem is solvable directly from Newton’s laws. But with the help
of conserved quantities the number of systems that can be solved greatly increases.
And physicists try to make calculations as simple as possible. Since solving the
equations of motion by hand is either extremely di cult or even impossible, they
have to discover further ways that lead to results. And many systems, like colliding
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particles, can be solved only with the help of energy and momentum conservation.
A Conserved Quantity in the Abraham–Lorentz Equation
Now we can go back to the runaway solutions of the Abraham–Lorentz equation.
The runaway solutions are genuine solutions of this equation, and they don’t violate
any energy-momentum conservation derived from this very equation. As we can
now appreciate, the laws of motion cannot contain solutions that violate a law
of conservation by fulfilling the very same assumptions that lead to the law of
conservation itself. Coleman (1970, p. 294) shows that the total (relativistic) energy
of runaway solutions to the Abraham–Lorentz equation is conserved once you take
the fields into account. It’s given by
E = 12
3
m0x˙
2 +
⁄ 1
E2 +B2
2
d3x
4
. (4.20)
The mass m0 is the bare mass instead of the physically measurable mass m, and it’s
negative. It’s derived from a mass renormalization procedure—which I introduces
in section 4.5. This means that the left side of the sum decreases, while the right
side increases, when the particle accelerates. The decrease of the kinetic energy
and the increase of the field energy is such that the total energy E doesn’t change.
Change in Energy without External Forces
Another argument against runaway solutions says that “[r]unaway solutions are
unphysical because a particle cannot gain energy without external forces.” For
example, Plass uses this line of argument:
[T]he solutions of the equations of motion with radiative reaction for a par-
ticular force always contains terms which require that the acceleration of the
particle must eventually increase exponentially with time. These solutions
have been called “self-accelerated,” “run-away,” and “nonphysical”. The par-
ticle doesn’t obtain its added energy from any physical force which acts upon
it. Clearly, these are absurd solutions when applied to our real physical world.
(1961, p. 38)
His description is ambiguous in the penultimate sentence. On the one hand, Plass
refers to energy, which has to be added from the outside. This reminds me of an a
priori validity of energy conservation, and as I have shown above a physical system
doesn’t have to obey energy conservation. On the other hand, he emphasizes that
external forces must provide the change in energy. But why are external forces
necessary? Couldn’t an infinite reservoir of self-energy in principle account for
runaway behavior without the use of external forces?
The possibility of the particle’s accessing an infinite amount of self-energy has
to be explicitly excluded. And it has to be excluded that a particle can change
its energy out of nowhere or that it can change its motion spontaneously, disre-
garding the motion of the other particles. The latter is an instance of the principle
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of su cient reason, which is an essential principle in physics.5 Only if all these
requirements are spelled out is Plass’s conclusion sound.
If we rephrase his central sentence and dispense with the word “energy”, then his
statement is that the particle changes its state of motion without the influence of
external forces. Doesn’t this remind us of Newton’s first law? So runaway solutions
do violate Newton’s law of inertia. And this may be a good reason to expel them
from physically possible solutions, if we stick to the irrevocable truth of Newton’s
axiom. But Newton’s axioms aren’t written in stone. Their validity depends on
theoretical arguments, as well as on experiments. Newton’s first law doesn’t only
define the (causal) role of forces, but presupposes their very existence. There are
other theories, like Bohmian mechanics, that don’t rely on Newton’s first axiom, or
on forces in general.
Empirical Adequacy
All the aforementioned arguments against the physical possibility of runaway be-
havior have been theoretical. They refer to energy-momentum conservation or
Newton’s laws. But runaway solutions may be dismissed because they don’t reflect
physical behavior: “Runaway solutions are unphysical because they aren’t observed
in nature.” Nothing can be said against empirical inadequacy. The solutions may
even fulfill all nice features, such as energy-momentum conservation, but if there
is no physical system that behaves accordingly, then these solutions are indeed
unphysical.
4.4. Pre-Acceleration and Backward Causation
How can we get rid of the runaway solutions? The general solution (4.18) to the
Abraham–Lorentz equation comprises more solutions than just the runaway ones.
We don’t want the acceleration of the particle to rise to infinity as time passes.
Mathematically, this asymptotic condition is written as
lim
tæŒ |a(t)| <Œ. (4.21)
Applying this to the general solution (4.18) yields that the term in brackets has
to go (su ciently fast) to zero; otherwise, the exponential function will take over
and lead to infinity again. This constrains the possible initial accelerations, so that
there is exactly one initial acceleration that doesn’t lead to runaway solutions:
a˜0 =
1
·m
Œ⁄
0
e≠tÕ/·Fext(tÕ) dtÕ.
5The principle of su cient reason should not be confused with determinism. Standard quantum
mechanics does obey the principle of su cient reason, but it’s an indeterministic theory. The
measurement of identical systems illustrates the di erence.
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Plugging this into the general solution (4.18), we get the non-runaway solutions6
a˜(t) = e
t/·
·m
Œ⁄
t
e≠ tÕ/·Fext(tÕ) dtÕ. (4.22)
What’s remarkable about this equation is that the acceleration at time t is deter-
mined by all future forces exerted on the particle. Earman (1976) claims that this
is a clear case of backward causation. In his discussion he refers to the relativistic
Lorentz–Dirac equation, but his line of reasoning applies without constraint to the
non-relativistic Abraham–Lorentz equation as well.
The Lorentz–Dirac equation of motion for classical relativistic charged parti-
cles is a third-order (in time) di erential equation. When certain asymptotic
conditions are imposed, the equation is converted into a second-order integro-
di erential equation according to which the acceleration of a charged particle
at proper time [t] is equal to the integral over the “e ective force” acting for
all times [tÕ > t]. As a result, the integro-di erential equation predicts “pre-
acceleration” e ects; e.g., if a sharp impulsive force acts on the particle at
time [t], then the particle will begin to accelerate before [t]. For the mo-
ment, I will assume that this result constitutes prima facie evidence that if
the equation in question were a true law of nature, then force would have
backward causal e ects. (Earman, 1976, p. 13)
Adolf Grünbaum, Earman’s harshest opponent on this matter, tried to prove him
wrong in two papers (Grünbaum, 1976; Grünbaum and Janis, 1977). Grünbaum
was convinced that electrodynamics doesn’t yield retrocausation. Let’s discuss their
disagreement.
4.4.1. Pre-Acceleration as Truncated Runaway
Earman’s argument above contains three steps. First, he notices that the accelera-
tion a˜(t) is mathematically determined by forces exerted on all future times tÕ > t in
the integral. Second, this obviously leads to pre-acceleration: the particle starts to
change its motion before external forces act on the particle. Third, Earman claims
that the pre-acceleration is a case of retrocausation: future forces cause the change
of motion of the particle at an earlier time, although they aren’t yet present.
I cannot disagree with the first point. It’s a mathematical fact that according
to equation (4.22) the acceleration at time t is mathematically determined by the
forces at tÕ > t. The second point isn’t controversial, either. The solutions to the
Abraham–Lorentz equation just state that there is acceleration before the imposi-
tion of forces. There is even acceleration without any forces at all, as seen by the
run-away solutions.
6They are often confused with integro-di erential equations (see, for example, Grünbaum and
Janis, 1977, pp. 478 and 481). It’s true, however, that in the relativistic case the same
procedure starting from the Lorentz–Dirac equation does lead to integro-di erential equations.
I deal with this equation in section 4.5.
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It’s Earman’s third step that is contentious because there he mentions causa-
tion. The problem, however, is that the motion of the particles isn’t only governed
by equation (4.22), but also by the Abraham–Lorentz equation, which describes
how forces at time t influence the acceleration at t. But Earman derives his con-
clusion just from the functional dependencies of (4.22). Is his line of reasoning
valid in deducing causal relations from functional relations and in disregarding the
Abraham–Lorentz equation? Are future forces indeed the cause for the acceleration
at t?
Let’s first discuss a toy model before we delve into the details of Grünbaum’s
attack on Earman (see Plass, 1961, section III; the paper contains many more
examples). The most instructive case is when the external forces act constantly
during a finite time interval, that is,
Fext(t) :=
Y__]__[
0, t < 0,
mk, 0 Æ t Æ t0,
0, t0 < t,
where m is the mass of the particle and k is an arbitrary constant. The general
solution to the Abraham–Lorentz equation is
a(t) =
Y__]__[
(k + A) et/· , t < 0,
k + Aet/· , 0 Æ t Æ t0,1
ke≠t0/· + A
2
et/· , t0 < t.
The constant A can be freely chosen. But if we want to avoid pre-acceleration then
we must choose A = ≠k, and the solutions becomes
aŒ(t) =
Y___]___[
0, t < 0,
k
1
1≠ et/·
2
, 0 Æ t Æ t0,
k
1
e≠t0/· ≠ 1
2
et/· , t0 < t.
This ultimately leads to a runaway behavior of the particle because of the expo-
nential function for t0 < t.
The non-runaway solutions require A = ≠ket0/· :
a˜(t) =
Y___]___[
k
1
1≠ et0/·
2
et/· , t < 0,
k
1
1≠ et≠ t0/·
2
, 0 Æ t Æ t0,
0, t0 < t.
Now we see that the particle starts moving before the forces act at t = 0. Con-
sequently, we cannot get rid of both runaway and pre-acceleration: either there is
runaway behavior, or there is pre-acceleration.
It’s illuminating to zoom in on how the general solution to this toy model is found
in the first place. First, three di erent versions of the Abraham–Lorentz equation
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are independently solved corresponding to the behavior of the external forces Fext
during t < 0, 0 Æ t Æ t0, and t0 < t. Second, the continuity of the acceleration
constrains the behavior at t = 0 and t = t0, where three di erent parts have to be
stuck together. This then leads to the general solution a(t), as shown above.
It’s remarkable that the solution for t < 0 doesn’t depend on future forces. If
Fext(t) = 0 for all times t, there would still be the same exponential acceleration.
So the counterfactual, “If there were no forces, there won’t be pre-acceleration,”
is wrong if we hold to the asymptotic condition (4.21). The external force doesn’t
make the particle move before it’s e ective; the particle starts moving for t < 0 even
if no external forces are exerted on it. How can the force cause pre-acceleration
when the counterfactual case isn’t true?
The case t < 0 in our toy model is nothing but the runaway solution that is
cut-o  after t = 0 when the force is applied. The role of the force isn’t to generate
motion during t < 0. In solving the equation of motion, we see that the motion of
the particle in this time interval is independent of the external forces. Rather, the
forces prevent the particle from accelerating infinitely—this is a consequence of the
continuity condition.7
Is pre-acceleration observed in nature?
I believe that backward causation is a conceptual possibility and that the
question of whether backward causation exists in nature is a question which
must be settled not by armchair philosophers but by natural philosophers. A
possible mechanism for backward causation is contained in the Dirac-Plass
theory of classical relativistic electrodynamics. According to this theory, an
impulsive force causes (I believe that ‘causes’ is the right word) a particle to
accelerate before the pulse arrives. For an electron, the preacceleration e ect
is on the order of 10≠23 seconds, and, therefore, it’s unlikely that it could
be detected by any classical apparatus; so even if it exists in nature, preac-
celeration may not give rise to any recognizable future analogues of traces.
But still the point remains that a coherent mechanism for the production of
traces of the future is at hand. (Earman, 1974, p. 41)
The Abraham–Lorentz equation isn’t an exact equation. So it isn’t a severe prob-
lem when it predicts phenomena that cannot be experimentally tested. Even if the
pre-acceleration e ect is too small to be observed, a discussion of this phenomenon
may be applied to a possible exact theory predicting some kind of pre-acceleration.
A Common Fault
Before analyzing Earman’s claim in detail, I would like to mention an interest-
ing point made by the physicist David Gri ths regarding the Abraham–Lorentz
7There is an interesting feature that isn’t related to pre-acceleration: external forces in the
Abraham–Lorentz equation behave di erently from forces in Newton’s second law. The force
doesn’t always increase the acceleration in the same direction. You can see this in the runaway
solution in our one-dimensional toy model. The external force is positive (indicating a force
from left to right), but the acceleration decreases until in the end it vanishes.
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equation:
These di culties [namely, pre-accleration] persist in the relativistic version
of the Abraham–Lorentz equation, which can be derived by starting with
Liénard’s formula instead of Larmor’s [. . . ]. Perhaps they are telling us that
there can be no such thing as a point charge in classical electrodynamics,
or maybe they presage the onset of quantum mechanics. (Gri ths, 1999, p.
467)
I would like to say it straight: pre-acceleration has nothing to do with the particles
being point-sized. The problem with point charges appears much earlier in the
Maxwell equations. The infinite self-energies can be interpreted as a problem of
point-sized charges, instead of a problem of fields, so that one strategy to avoid the
infinities is to introduce extended particles.
The idea that pre-acceleration foresees quantum mechanics is more than far-
fetched. This is one of many examples of physicists hoping that quantum mechanics
can solve the deepest issues in classical physics. In quantum field theory, the
infinities remain.
4.4.2. The Analogy with Newtonian Velocities
According to the standard interpretation of Newtonian mechanics, forces cause
acceleration. Since only future forces determine the acceleration in equation (4.22),
these forces retrocause their e ects. This is Earman’s argument in a nutshell.
More precisely, the conjunction of all external forces Fext(tÕ) on the interval [t,Œ)
uniquely determines the acceleration at t according to (4.22), while the acceleration
at time t doesn’t uniquely determine the external forces—the integral may have
the same value for di erent forces. This asymmetry between the forces and the
acceleration supports the standard interpretation of forces as being the cause of
acceleration. As the forces lie in the future, this is backward causation.
Grünbaum (1976) argues against backward causation by working out an analogy
with Newtonian mechanics. In doing so, he in fact uses two kinds of arguments.
First, there is a formal mathematical similarity between Newtonian mechanics and
the Abraham–Lorentz theory. Since there is no backward causation in Newtonian
mechanics, it has to be excluded from electrodynamics as well.
Second, the asymptotic condition (4.21) isn’t a law. Grünbaum interprets it as a
“de facto” boundary condition, that is, a contingent boundary condition imposed
on the Abraham–Lorentz equation. It’s contingent because not all solutions to
the Abraham–Lorentz equation vanish at infinity; the sole purpose of the asymp-
totic condition is to exclude runaway solutions. Being contingent, it cannot yield
causal relations that aren’t included by the Abraham–Lorentz equation itself. For
Grünbaum, the Abraham–Lorentz equation is the source of causal relation, as he
construes it as a law of motion for single charged particles.
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Let’s delve into the details of his arguments. In one dimension, Newton’s second
law is
m
dv
dt = F (t),
and the general solution for the velocity is given by
v(t) = v(t0) +
1
m
t⁄
t0
F (tÕ) dtÕ. (4.23)
The above formula bears the following important characteristics:
(a) The velocity v(t) can be zero even if the forces F (t) are non-zero for the
whole interval [t0, t]. This can happen if the initial velocity is minus the right
summand.
(b) The velocity v(t) can be non-zero even if the forces F (t) are zero for the whole
interval [t0, t]. This can happen if v(t0) ”= 0.
These two consequences of (4.23) show that a non-zero integral over the forces is
neither necessary nor su cient for a non-zero velocity. So just considering equation
(4.23) we cannot deduce any causal relation between forces and acceleration. The
mathematics abstains from giving us a clue.
Nevertheless, physicists and philosophers generally agree that the forces at a time
t cause the acceleration at t in Newtonian mechanics. Newton’s first law strong
supports this view. But Newton’s laws in the form of a di erential equation are in-
deed ambiguous about the causal relations between forces and acceleration because
acceleration mathematically determines the forces and vice versa. As I discussed
in section 3.4, Blondeau and Ghins (2012) show, however, that in a di erential
equation the derivative is always the e ect and the rest are the causes, thus again
establishing that forces are the causes of acceleration. Although the general so-
lution (4.23) doesn’t fix the causal relationship between forces and accelerations,
forces can be construed as the causes of acceleration if we include Newton’s law.
To make the argument more vivid, we can impose a boundary condition on the
Newtonian solutions (4.23). We demand that the velocity be zero if time goes to
infinity, that is, v(t) æ 0 if t æ 0. Applying this to the initial condition v(t0), we
get
v(t) = ≠ 1
m
Œ⁄
t
F (tÕ) dtÕ. (4.24)
No one would ever refer to this equation in order to defend backward causation
in Newtonian mechanics. It is true that the forces on [t,Œ) determine the velocity
at t, but the causal role of forces is explained by Newton’s second law. The forces
at t cause the acceleration at t. Choosing special initial conditions, the velocities
in Newtonian mechanics depend on the future forces. But this is only a mathemat-
ical dependency. In no way does equation (4.24) prove the existence of backward
causation in Newtonian mechanics.
108
4.4. Pre-Acceleration and Backward Causation
The pre-acceleration solutions (4.22) of the Abraham–Lorentz equation are math-
ematically almost identical to equation (4.24). So why should the forces retrocause
the acceleration in electrodynamics but not in Newtonian mechanics?
Grünbaum (1976) argues that owing to the mathematical similarities the solu-
tions (4.22) mustn’t be interpreted causally, since the Newtonian solutions aren’t
causally interpreted, either. He adds that the mathematical form of the solutions
of di erential equations aren’t suitable for deriving causal relations. In particu-
lar, the pre-acceleration solutions rely on the asymptotic condition (4.21), which is
contingent, like any other boundary or initial condition. The correct sources for a
causal analysis are the laws of motion.
In Newtonian mechanics, forces cause acceleration. This is supported by the
fact that the forces at time t uniquely determine the acceleration at t. But in
the Abraham–Lorentz equation the forces only determine m (x¨≠ · ...x). Therefore,
Grünbaum goes on, it’s wrong to regard the forces as the causes of acceleration.
Hence, there is no backward causation in classical electrodynamics.
4.4.3. Di erential Equations and their Solutions
Grünbaum and Janis (1977) don’t agree, either, with the conclusion drawn by Ear-
man (1974, 1976) that pre-acceleration solutions (4.22) instantiate retro-causation.
They try to disprove him by showing that the forces don’t uniquely determine
the acceleration. This cannot be deduced solely from the mathematical structure
of the pre-acceleration solutions; they will need to include the Abraham–Lorentz
equation. They stage their argument in five steps.
First, they point out that di erentiating the pre-acceleration solution (4.22)
yields the Abraham–Lorentz equation (4.17). Therefore, the pre-acceleration solu-
tion entails the Abraham–Lorentz equation.
Second, the crucial consequence of the first step is the following: if the Abraham–
Lorentz equation entails some proposition u, this very proposition can also be
deduced from the pre-acceleration solution (Grünbaum and Janis, 1977, p. 479),
because the pre-acceleration solutions mathematically entail the Abraham–Lorentz
equation. The proposition that is central to their argument is “acceleration de-
termines forces.” So if we can deduce from the Abraham–Lorentz equation that
acceleration determines forces, then the pre-acceleration solutions also entail that
acceleration determines forces.
Third, assume that the acceleration v˙(t) is given for all times t in a finite time
interval [t0, t1]. Then the Abraham–Lorentz equation states that the forces during
the time interval are uniquely determined by the acceleration. And because of the
previous two steps, the pre-acceleration solutions uniquely determine the forces,
too, given the acceleration in this interval.
But if the forces are given during [t0, t1] the pre-acceleration solutions don’t
determine the acceleration, because they need the forces on the infinite interval
[t0,Œ). Similarly, the Abraham–Lorentz equation doesn’t determine the accelera-
tion, either. If the external forces are given, the Abraham–Lorentz equation rather
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determines m (x¨≠ · ...x). Therefore, accelerations determine forces for a given finite
time interval, while the forces don’t determine the acceleration.
Furthermore, if the forces are given on [t0,Œ), they uniquely determine the
acceleration in the pre-acceleration solutions in contrast to the Abraham–Lorentz
equation. And if the accelerations are given on this infinite interval, then the
forces are uniquely determined in the Abraham–Lorentz equation—as with the
finite interval. Since the pre-acceleration solutions entail the Abraham–Lorentz
equation, these solutions uniquely determine the forces, too, according to the first
and second steps. On the infinite interval [t0,Œ), accelerations determine forces,
and forces determine acceleration.
Fourth, let’s look at the limiting case where the time interval reduces to one point.
According to the pre-acceleration solutions, the acceleration a(t0) at an instant t0
doesn’t determine the forces for any time t Ø t0. And the forces at one moment
don’t determine the acceleration for any time t Ø t0 either.
Fifth, Earman’s argument rests solely on an analysis of the pre-acceleration solu-
tions. Just considering this equation without the Abraham–Lorentz equation, the
values for the forces during t œ [t0,Œ) seem to uniquely determine the acceleration
at t0, while the acceleration at t0 doesn’t determine any value for future forces.
Earman regards this asymmetry between the forces and acceleration as an instance
of backward causation: the forces cause the acceleration a(t0), although they lie
in the future of a(t0). Grünbaum and Janis counter that they show in their third
step that the forces don’t determine the acceleration for any finite subinterval of
[t0,Œ). Moreover, they explain in their fourth step that forces at one moment t
don’t determine the acceleration either. Hence, there is no backward causation.
Do Solutions Entail their Equation?
The crucial ingredients for their argument lie in the first two steps; the rest is a
consequence thereof. In the first step, they claim that the pre-acceleration solutions
entail the Abraham–Lorentz equation because the latter follows from a simple dif-
ferentiation of the former. So the relation between these two equations is supposed
to be the same as the relation between the functions x2 and 2x: one is the derivative
of the other.
There is a subtle but crucial di erence. The Abraham–Lorentz equation (4.17)
is a di erential equation. There is a mathematical space of functions assigned to it
that represents all solutions—and we know that all solutions are of the form (4.18).
So a di erential equation is nothing but a shorthand for all the functions that
fulfill this equation. In order to pick one solution we have to specify a set of initial
conditions. The initial conditions for the Abraham–Lorentz equation yielding a
unique solution are the position, velocity, and acceleration at time t0. If we choose
the initial acceleration, regardless of the position and velocity, as given by the
asymptotic condition (4.21), then we get our well-known pre-acceleration solutions
(4.22). In other words, the Abraham–Lorentz equation entails the pre-acceleration
solutions if we require the asymptotic condition.
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By construction, the pre-acceleration solutions must fulfill the Abraham–Lorentz
equation. Indeed Grünbaum and Janis base their argument on the observation
that whatever we can deduce from a di erential equation we can deduce from a
special solution as well. When we deduce features from the di erential equations
we actually deduce features of the space of solution to this di erential equation.
The Moral of the Argument
In contrast to Earman, Grünbaum and Janis trace back where the pre-acceleration
solutions come from. They take the Abraham–Lorentz equation as the basic law
of motion and argued that forces there don’t uniquely determine the accelerations.
Furthermore, they emphasize that only if the forces are given on the infinite interval
[t0,Œ) do they uniquely determine the acceleration at t0 according to the pre-
acceleration solution, while the Abraham–Lorentz equation uniquely determines
the forces whenever the accelerations are given.
Grünbaum and Janis successfully counter Earman by carefully examining the
functional relationships between force and accelerations. Earman (1976, p. 19)
refers only to the mathematical dependencies of the pre-acceleration solutions.
Grünbaum and Janis, on the other hand, disprove him with the help of the Abraham–
Lorentz equation interpreted as a basic law of motion; the solutions aren’t su cient.
By no means do they aim to argue that the accelerations cause the forces; their
goal is simply to show that Earman could not read o  backward causation from
the mathematical form of solutions of di erential equations.
4.5. Electromagnetic Mass
In his seminal paper, Paul Dirac (1938) derives the Lorentz–Dirac equation, a
relativistic equation of motion for a single charged particle. A decisive step in his
derivation is his method of mass renormalization. I follow Barut (1980, Ch. V) in
his presentation of Dirac’s ideas. In Appendix B, I discuss what Dirac really did in
detail.
4.5.1. Mass Renormalization
Let’s start with the retarded Liénard-Wiechert field (4.9), which consists of a near
field F near and a radiation field F rad—the near field is like 1x , and the radiation field
like 1x2 :
F retµ‹ =
1
2F
rad
µ‹ +
1
2F
near
µ‹ .
According to this decomposition, there are three kinds of forces acting on the
particle. First, there is the force Kradself , which is the back-reaction of the radiation.
Second, there is the force originating from the particle’s near field KŒself . Third,
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there may be external forces Kext originating from other particles. Hence, the
equation of motion reads
mcz¨µ = Kradselfµ +KŒselfµ +Kextµ . (4.25)
The radiating field F rad poses no problems since it’s bounded at the particle’s
position, and its force on the particle is given by
Kradselfµ =
2
3
q2
4ﬁ
1...
z µ + z˙µz¨2
2
. (4.26)
Dirac (1938, Appendix) derived this expression from the Liénard-Wiechert fields
(4.9) and (4.10) by means of a Taylor expansion and further approximations (see
also Barut, 1980, section 5.C).
What is problematic, though, is the near field F near, as well as its associated
self-force KŒselfµ; neither are defined at the particle’s position (Barut, 1980, p. 190).
To circumvent this problem, we can use a mass renormalization procedure. We
stipulate that the self-force has to be finite and has to mimic Newton’s second
law by introducing a new mass ”m—we can justify this by making a clever Taylor
expansion (Barut, 1980, Ch. V, section 5D). Then the self-force has the form:
KŒselfµ = ≠”mcz¨µ. (4.27)
All in all, the equation of motion (4.25) becomes
(m+ ”m) cz¨µ =
2
3
q2
4ﬁ
1...
z µ + z˙µz¨2
2
+Kextµ , (4.28)
and Dirac concludes that the Lorentz–Dirac equation
mexpcz¨µ =
2
3
q2
4ﬁ
1...
z µ + z˙µz¨2
2
+Kextµ (4.29)
is the correct equation of motion for a single charged particle, wheremexp = m+”m
is the experimentally verified mass of the particle.
Runaway and Pre-Acceleration
Like the Abraham–Lorentz equation, the Lorentz–Dirac equation immediately yields
runaway solutions. With the help of the asymptotic condition (4.21), we can trans-
form this equation into an integro-di erential equation whose solutions no longer
reflect runaway behavior:
z¨µ(s) =
es/·
·
Œ⁄
s
e≠sÕ/·
1
Kµ(sÕ) + · z¨2(s)z˙µ(sÕ)
2
dsÕ. (4.30)
As we have seen with the Abraham–Lorentz equation, once we have eliminated the
runaway solutions, the Lorentz–Dirac equation presents pre-acceleration solutions—
the entre discussion of section 4.3 and 4.4 can be immediately applied.
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4.5.2. A New Kind of Mass?
Now let’s zoom into the transition from (4.28) to the Lorentz–Dirac equation (4.29),
focusing on what happens to the masses. According to special relativity, every
particle has an invariant rest mass m (Adler, 1987; Okun, 1989). The rest mass as
the analogue of Newtonian mass in classical mechanics is a dynamical quantity that
determines how particles move. And classical electrodynamics introduces charge
as another dynamical quantity. Mass renormalization postulates the quantity ”m
as a third dynamical quantity, which has the dimension of a mass. What is the
meaning of ”m? And does it a ect the meaning or numerical value of m and q?
Beware that equation (4.27) is indeed mathematically false because the left side
is infinite, while the right side is finite. Nonetheless, it’s needed in order to yield an
equation of motion. According to this relation, the near field can be interpreted as
contributing to the inertia of the particle. So apart from its rest mass m, a particle
also bears an electromagnetic mass ”m. And the experimentally detected mass of
particles mexp actually consists of a mechanical and an electromagnetic component
such that m+ ”m = mexp.
Disregarding the derivation of the Lorentz–Dirac equation and taking it rather
as a fundamental equation of motion, there are two further options for interpreting
the masses.
Zero Electromagnetic Mass
One is to set ”m = 0, so that the experimentally verified mass coincides with the
Newtonian one, that is, mexp = m. Setting ”m = 0 even for charged particles and
claiming that the entire mass is m isn’t convincing. The mass renormalization pro-
cedure rests on the hypothesis that ”m is finite but non-zero. If the electromagnetic
mass were zero then equation (4.27) would be even more of a cheat than it already
is: the infinite self-force would not a ect the particle in any way.
Zero Rest Mass
Another radical way of interpreting the electromagnetic mass is to regard it as the
sole mass of a particle (Barut, 1980, pp. 199–200); that is to say, the entire mass is of
electromagnetic origin, and mexp = ”m. This interpretation became popular in the
beginning of the 20th century (see Muller, 2007, p. 268). At this this time, physicists
believed that matter was composed solely of charged particles. The electron was
discovered by J. J. Thomson in 1897, and the proton was discovered by Rutherford
around 1911. So there were sensible experimental grounds for believing that mass
was of electromagnetic origin.
But in 1932 the neutron was discovered by James Chadwick, and Dirac (1938,
p. 148) admitted that the discovery of the neutron was a major threat for the
electromagnetic interpretation of mass—the theory of quarks, which says that elec-
trically charged quarks built the neutron, didn’t exist when Dirac wrote his article
in 1938. For the mass of neutrons cannot arise from their self-field because there is
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no self-field. And this would lead to a strange dichotomy too: electrically charged
particles get their mass from their self-field, while neutral particles get their mass
from elsewhere. And this “elsewhere” is totally obscure, as there is no physical
mechanism that assigns neutral particles their masses.
But what is the correct option? Is there electromagnetic mass in addition to
the mechanical rest mass? Or is all mass even electrodynamic? One might say
that the Lorentz–Dirac equation is derived from Taylor approximations and other
mathematical and physical idealizations; that it relies on mass renormalization;
that it doesn’t spell out what happens to the near fields; that it’s an e ective
equation; that it’s not a fundamental law of motion. All this skepticism stops the
Lorentz–Dirac equation from making any ontological conclusions. Being an e ective
description, the Lorentz–Dirac equation doesn’t add anything to our metaphysical
picture. The electrodynamic mass ”m is just a useful hypothesis in deriving the
equation. It originates from the mass renormalization procedure in getting rid
of the infinities by stipulation. And in the end we only need to calculate with
mexp. Whether this mass has di erent components isn’t only irrelevant—there is
no ontological division in the first place.
But we can take a di erent stance. What would the world be like if the Lorentz–
Dirac equation were a fundamental equation of motion? First and foremost, we
would have to draw our conclusions from equation (4.29) and the consequences
thereof; how we got to the equation in the first place isn’t relevant. The Lorentz–
Dirac equation assigns to every particle a mass mexp and a charge q, in case it’s
charged. Due to the first summand of the right side in (4.29), a moving charged
particle radiates electromagnetic waves. If a particle is electrically neutral the
Lorentz–Dirac equation can still be applied because it reduces to the relativistic
version of Newton’s second law if you grant that the external forces are of non-
electromagnetic origin.
Imagine that we have an electrically neutral particle of mass m. But once we
charge it the mass has to increase to match mexp, owing to the dynamical e ects of
the near field. This is unproblematic because mass is neither stu  nor an intrinsic
property that sets up the identity of the particle. If mass were stu  then it would
be utterly mysterious how this stu  can increase by just changing charge. And if
the particle’s identity were grounded in its mass then it had better be constant. As
I argued in Chapter 3, mass has to be interpreted as a dynamical property, that
is, as a property whose sole role is to generate the motion of a particle. There-
fore, a change in mass due to charging or uncharging is in accordance with this
interpretation of mass: altering the charge alters the dynamics.
4.6. The Ontology of Fields
The self-interaction problem is the Achilles’ heel of Maxwell–Lorentz electrodynam-
ics. And there is no general remedy. Depending on how you diagnose the source of
the problem, there are di erent ideas about how to cope with it. Some regard the
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size of the particles as the root of all evil. If the particles were bigger, with a non-
zero extension, the field would not become infinite. The Abraham model and the
Lorentz model are two prominent ideas for how to treat extended particles in the
Maxwell–Lorentz theory. The Lorentz model is relativistic, allowing the particle
to change its shape due to a Lorentz–Fitzgerald contraction, while the Abraham
model is non-relativistic because the shape and the size of the particle don’t change
during acceleration.
The electromagnetic field itself was found guilty of self-interaction by Wheeler
and Feynman. They therefore dismissed the fields altogether in their own theory
and kept point-size particles. There cannot be a self-interaction problem in an
action-at-a-distance theory. All interactions between the particles take place on
the light-cones without any mediating entity.
In the Born–Infeld theory and the Bopp–Podolsky theory, on the other hand,
the field is acquitted of any responsibility for the infinities. For them, the problem
lies in how the fields are implemented by the Maxwell equations. So they proposed
adjusting the field equations to tame the infinities.
There are other problems within the Maxwell–Lorentz theory in which the fields
are involved. Still, field theories may have certain advantages over action-at-a-
distance theories. Let’s discuss the advantages and drawbacks of fields.
4.6.1. What is a Field?
What is the electromagnetic field in the first place? In the Maxwell–Lorentz theory
the electric field E and the magnetic field B are introduced by the Maxwell equa-
tions (4.1) and (4.2)—in the covariant formulation, there is just an electromagnetic
tensor field F described by the equations (4.5) and (4.6). So physics defines fields
either as vector-valued functions or tensors on space-time. But the mathematical
description by itself isn’t enough to elucidate the ontological status of the field.
This is similar to the controversy over the status of the wave-function (see Chap-
ter 6). The wave-function is mathematically defined as a complex-valued function
on configuration space, but there has been ongoing debate about its ontological
meaning since the inception of quantum mechanics.
There are three possible modes of existence for the electromagnetic field (Lange,
2002): property, stu , or mathematical device. David Lewis (1986, pp. ix–x) re-
garded a field as a property or a continuous distribution of properties throughout
space-time. But his whole metaphysics leads to quiddity and humility, which is
unacceptable. If the electromagnetic field is construed as a distribution of disposi-
tional properties on space-time, it is, however, problematic to see how space-time
can have properties that don’t a ect its structure (see section 2.3).
If fields are interpreted as stu , then they are ontologically on a par with particles.
And this is what the Maxwell–Lorentz theory at first sight proposes. The Maxwell
equations are the fundamental equations for the temporal development of the fields,
while the Lorentz force law is the fundamental equation of motion for the particles.
As there is radiation and the possibility of further free fields that aren’t generated
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by particles, we can straightforwardly interpret the fields as independent stu  in
addition to the particles. Then the primitive stu  ontology consists of particles and
fields.
It’s crucial for the primitive stu  ontology that the fundamental entities don’t
have intrinsic properties that distinguish one entity from the other. The particles
are nothing but a discrete distribution of points throughout space, and an electro-
magnetic field is mathematically just a continuous distribution of points throughout
space. But what distinguishes a point that refers to a particle from a point that
refers to a field-value? Obviously, the two points move in a di erent manner: one
behaves according to the Maxwell equations, while the other behaves according to
the Lorentz force law. Nonetheless, being members of the primitive stu  ontology
the points are intrinsically the same.
If the elements of the primitive stu  ontology have properties according to a
dispositional account of laws of nature, the properties are only dynamical ones.
Their role is solely to generate the temporal development; they don’t contribute
to the identity of the entities. Rather, this identity stems from spatiotemporal
relations. And here lies the problem. If the points are only distinguished by the
spatiotemporal relations, then given two points one cannot distinguish whether the
two points are two particles or two points of the field, or whether they consist of one
particle and one point of the field. Therefore, in a primitive stu  ontology, where
the elements are distinguished by their spatiotemporal relations alone, it seems
that there is only room for one kind of stu : either there are particles, or there are
fields. Furthermore, whenever there are two kinds of basic entities in the ontology,
it has to be clear how one kind influences the other. A prominent case is the
mind–body problem. If you adhere to a Cartesian dualism claiming that the mind
is ontologically independent from the body or the brain, then you must explain in
what way the mind is able to influence the body, and vice versa. Descartes thought
that the mind met the brain in the pineal gland situated between the cerebral
hemispheres. This simple explanation has turned out to be wrong, and the mind–
body problem is still unsolved for a dualist. But if you’re a monist, thinking that
the mind is nothing but a certain configuration of the brain, then there is no longer
a conceptual problem about how the mind can a ect the brain.
In the Maxwell–Lorentz theory, the interaction between fields and particles yields
the self-interaction problem. The interaction between the two kinds of substances
always leads to the question of how the two substances influence one another.
But is the infinite self-energy of a charged particle solely a mathematical–physical
problem, or does it arise from an ontological dualism? The history of philosophy
has shown us that every dualism bears an “interaction” problem when it comes to
how one kind can a ect the other. So we expect some problems in the interaction
between fields and particles too (see also Feynman, 1966).
But it would exceed the power of philosophy to solve the self-interaction problem
from dualism alone. That the existence of fields and particles must lead to ill-
defined equations of motion is rather a mathematical–physical problem. Not every
kind of dualism leads to insurmountable physical obstacles. Bohmian mechanics,
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for instance, introduces particles and the wave-function. Notwithstanding that the
wave-function needs a philosophical explanation, the Bohmian theory is perfectly
mathematically consistent. In this theory, there is no self-interaction problem since
the particles don’t a ect the guiding field, which is generated by the wave-function.
The Born–Infeld theory and the Bopp–Podolsky theory are also counterexamples
to the idea that the dualism between fields and point-size particles has to lead
to a self-interaction problem. While the Born–Infeld theory gives us results for
static sources, the Bopp–Podolsky theory shows us that even for dynamic systems
particles and fields can peacefully coexist.
If fields were to be interpreted as further stu  in the ontology, a dispositionalist
would have to specify the dynamical properties of them. In classical electromag-
netism the particles have mass and charge. But what are the dispositions of the
electromagnetic field? Does it have intrinsic properties, like the particles? The
Maxwell–Lorentz theory doesn’t propose anything that could be a disposition of
the fields. That the fields are disposed to behave according to the Maxwell equa-
tions is a tautology. Similarly, particles are disposed to move according to the
Lorentz force law, and the sun is disposed to shine.
Fields don’t have a dispositional property similar to mass or charge, which might
indicate that they play a di erent role to particles. The particles are there to form
material objects. Fields, in contrast, are there to a ect the motion of particles. In
the end, the theory is about the behavior of matter that is nothing but the motion
of particles. So while particles are ontological entities, the electromagnetic field is
better seen as dynamical.
Interpreting particles as ontologically primary, because they compose material
objects, and the electromagnetic field as secondary, because it only influences the
behavior of the particles (see Maudlin’s distinction between primary and secondary
Ontology in section 2.2), the Maxwell–Lorentz theory should be introduced in a
slightly di erent order. One needs to start with the Lorentz force law, which
ultimately determines the motion of particles. And in its mathematical formulation
it uses fields as dynamical entities. The standard exposition of the Maxwell–Lorentz
equation is a little misleading because it introduces the field as the primary object.
Fields may be of primary concern for mathematical and physical problems, but
from an ontological point of view they are part of the secondary ontology, while
the particles are part of the primary ontology.
So it’s best for a dispositionalist to interpret the field as a mathematical device
rather than as additional stu  in the ontology. Mass and charge are the disposi-
tional properties. The electromagnetic field is a mathematical representation of the
properties of the particles. And the manifestation of the dispositions is the motion
of the particles.
In Hall’s Super-Humeanism too the electromagnetic field can be straightforwardly
interpreted as a mathematical device. Similar to the interpretation of the wave-
function by Esfeld et al. (2014), the electromagnetic field can be part of the best
system. A Humean can do so because she can easily put all dynamical entities, all
entities of the secondary ontology, into the best system.
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Maudlin (2013), however, argues that fields establish their own ontological cate-
gory, thereby granting the metaphysical possibility for and consistency of the simul-
taneous existence of fields and particles in general. In his version of primitivism
about laws, there is the field, in addition to the particle as part of the primary
ontology of the Maxwell–Lorentz theory. And he argues that an electromagnetic
field, like forces or the wave-function, could not be found or invented through purely
philosophical reasoning. Consequently, the classic ontological categories set up by
the Ancient Greeks aren’t appropriate for modern physics. Consequently, no meta-
physical problem arises from a dualism of particles and fields. The self-interaction
problem is a purely physical issue.
4.6.2. Is the Electromagnetic Field Stu ?
Let’s see whether the interpretation of the electric and magnetic fields as two sep-
arate entities ontologically on a par with the particles is tenable. The Maxwell
equations as such don’t give us any further information to clarify this issue; we
therefore need to examine specific examples.
Imagine a wire, as in figure 4.4.8 In the rest frame of the wire, there are negatively
charged particles moving in the upper part of the wire on a straight line from right
to left with velocity v. In the lower part, there are exactly the same number of
positively charged particles moving on a straight line from left to right with velocity
≠v. The motion of the negatively charged particles cause a current ≠⁄, while the
positively charged particles generate the current +⁄. In a distance s from the center
of the wire, there is a particle with charge q moving from left to right with velocity
u.
Figure 4.4.: Rest frame of wire
Assuming the radius of the wire is very small compared to the distance s, there
is no electrical net force on the particle q. The change of motion of the particle is
only due to its motion in the magnetic field generated by the currents in the wire.
Imagine now the very same situation but described from the rest frame of the
particle as depicted in figure 4.5. Because of the Lorentz contraction, the distance
8This example and Figures 4.4 and 4.5 are taken from Gri ths (1999, pp. 522–5).
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Figure 4.5.: Rest frame of charge q
between the negatively charged particles decreases, while the distance between the
positively charged particles increases. Moreover, the velocities of both currents are
no longer equal; the velocity of the negatively charged particles v≠ is bigger than
the velocity v+ of the other particles in the wire. Because the particle q is no longer
in motion in its own rest frame, its change in motion cannot be accounted for by
any magnetic field acting on it. Nevertheless, it has to experience an acceleration
either towards the wire or in the opposite direction (depending on its charge) that
is independent of any inertial reference frame. Consequently, an electric field has
to be changing the state of the particle. A net electric field is indeed generated by
both currents in the wire because the charges inside no longer equal out because of
Lorentz contraction.
Acceleration is independent of inertial reference frames, and the acceleration
of the particle in our example has to be explained in both of the frames we in-
troduced. It turns out that the fields causing this acceleration changes with the
reference frame. The electric and magnetic fields aren’t invariant entities relative
to inertial reference frames. Therefore, they cannot be stu  in the world. More pre-
cisely, the electric field cannot be stu , for example, electric stu , and the magnetic
field cannot be magnetic stu . This would imply the invariance of these entities
under a change of inertial reference frames—it’s not a logical consequence of the
definition that stu  needs to be invariant under coordinate transformation, but my
philosophical intuition tells me that this is a reasonable requirement.
Another example that shows that the electric and magnetic field aren’t invariant
stu  in space-time is the following. Imagine a metallic rod moving uniformly inside
a homogeneous magnetic field crossing its field lines perpendicularly, as indicated
in figure 4.6. Because of the motion of the rod, the free electrons inside experience
a Lorentz force Fm directed downwards so that the rod comes to be negatively
charged at the lower end b and positively charged at the upper end a. The Lorentz
force includes only terms of the magnetic field here, since there is no electric field
in this situation.
But in the rest frame of the rod the magnetic field is moving, and the free
electrons begin to accelerate towards the lower end b, too. This time, however, the
motion of the electrons isn’t due to the magnetic field but due to the forces caused
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Figure 4.6.: Rod moving in magnetic field
by an electric field generated by the moving magnetic field by means of induction.
A change of reference, of course, yields the same distribution of charges inside the
rod. The behavior of the particles doesn’t change, but the fields do.
4.7. Why Fields?
4.7.1. Locality
Action-at-a-distance is bad; locality is good. This has been a ubiquitous mantra
since Newton stated his reservations about his own theory:
That gravity should be innate, inherent and essential to matter, so that one
body may act upon another at a distance through a vacuum, without the
mediation of anything else by which their action and force may be conveyed
from one to another, is to me so great an absurdity that I believe no man
who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking can ever
fall into it. Gravity must be caused by an agent acting constantly according
to certain laws; but whether this agent be material or immaterial, I have left
to the consideration of my readers. (reprinted in Cohen, 1958, pp. 302–3)
Action-at-a-distance means that one physical object can a ect another over space
and time without another entity mediating the action. The action can be instan-
taneous, or it can be retarded. Retarded action-at-a-distance is generally regarded
as the more troublesome version of action-at-a-distance because there is a time
di erence between cause and e ect in the lack of an entity transmitting the e ect
through space. A field theory postulates a field as the mediating entity between
cause and e ect. Depending on the field theory the e ect can be instantaneously
transmitted, or it can take a certain amount of time.
Newton himself was concerned about his theory being an instantaneous action-at-
a-distance theory. He couldn’t do anything against the action being instantaneous
because this is just what his laws of motion say. What he was concerned about,
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rather, was the lack of a mediating entity in his theory of gravitation. He personally
thought about discrete particle-like transmitters, as well as of continuous immaterial
entities. Nothing succeeded, so his ideas were only ever expressed in private letters
(Stein, 1970).
Nowadays, we can postulate a gravitational field, which is the entity that trans-
mits the action of one particle to another. In this way, Newton’s gravitational
theory becomes a field theory. Nevertheless, this theory of gravitation bears an
element of non-locality: it’s dynamically non-local because of the instantaneous
action of the field. The motion of one particle influences the motion of all the other
particles that are on the same simultaneity slice. And this instantaneous e ect
continues in both the field theory version and the action-at-a-distance version.
In another sense, Newton’s gravitational field is local (see also Section 1.1).
Though dynamically non-local, it’s ontologically local.9 If we were to chop up
space into arbitrarily bounded chunks, the sum of the field values in every bounded
region of space gives us the whole gravitational field (modulo the field values on
overlapping regions). So in Bell’s words, the gravitational field is a local beable.
With respect to this terminology, the electromagnetic field of the Maxwell–Lorentz
theory is as local as we could wish for: it’s ontologically and dynamically local.
We notice that the pre-quantum theories may already be non-local, but this
non-locality is always a dynamical non-locality. The great innovation of quantum
mechanics was the wave-function as an ontologically non-local object. This non-
local object leads to a new kind of dynamical non-locality unknown to classical
physics. Tim Maudlin calls it EPR-non-locality.10
A physical theory is EPR-local i  according to the theory procedures carried
out in one region don’t immediately disturb the physical state of systems in
su ciently distant regions in any significant way. (2014, p. 8)
EPR-locality is the condition that Einstein et al. (1935) used to argue that quan-
tum mechanics is incomplete. This condition is natural to adopt because it had
been valid throughout classical physics.. It seems only natural to adopt this con-
dition since it had been valid throughout classical physics. The Maxwell–Lorentz
theory is EPR-local because one system cannot “immediately disturb the physical
state” of another system because of the finite speed of light. Newton’s gravitational
theory is EPR-local, too, because gravity decreases with the square of the distance.
So it doesn’t a ect another system in any significant way if the two systems are suf-
ficiently far away. For example, the gravitational e ects of the moon don’t disturb
me writing on a computer in any significant way, while they are responsible for the
tides. So in EPR-local theories two systems can always be isolated by increasing
their spatial distance; the systems then evolve independently from each other. This
is no longer possible for entangled quantum systems.
9I wish to thank Tim Maudlin for pointing out the distinction between ontological and dynamical
locality in a private conversation. In fact, ontological locality coincides with separability.
10There are many more locality conditions mentioned in the literature. Some of them are discussed
by Frisch (2005, Ch. 4).
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Beware that EPR-locality is a feature of a physical theory; it isn’t a feature
of the physical objects postulated. Independently of the ontological status of the
gravitational and electromagnetic field, Newton’s theory and the Maxwell–Lorentz
theory are both EPR-local. All (single-world) quantum theories, however, are EPR-
non-local theories—they’d better be, lest they violate Bell’s theorem.
4.7.2. Energy and Momentum
Newton’s third law is no longer valid for electrodynamics. There are two mecha-
nisms by which Newton’s third law may fail. One is due to the finite speed of the
electromagnetic interaction (Lange, 2002, Ch. 5). If there are two particles a certain
distance apart whose forces on each other initially obey Newton’s third law, then
the forces no longer cancel out whenever one particle starts to move. The motion
of the particle changes the electromagnetic field, but the e ect can only travel with
the speed of light. So as long as the force on the other particle doesn’t change due
to a change in the field, the forces aren’t even collinear.
Newton’s third law also fails because of the cross-product in the Lorentz force
law (Gri ths, 1999, section 8.2.1). Imagine two positively charged particles as
indicated in Figure 4.7 (which is taken from Gri ths’ book). Particle q1 moves on
the x-axis with velocity v1, and particle q2, on the y-axis with velocity v2.
Figure 4.7.: Violation of Newton’s third law
The magnetic field B1 on q2, which is generated by q1, is parallel to the z-axis
pointing in its negative direction; similarly, the magnetic field B2 points to the
positive direction of the z-axis. Although the electric force F e fulfills Newton’s
third law, the magnetic forces Fm are rectilinear according to the right-hand rule.
Disregarding the electromagnetic field, therefore, violates Newton’s third law and
also the conservation of momentum.11.
11Breitenberger (1968), however, shows that the generalized forces in the Lagrange formalism
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Fields, however, can restore the conservation of energy and momentum. The
most general result, disregarding self-fields, is Poynting’s theorem (Jackson, 1999,
section 6.7):
E˙m + E˙f =
j
S
S · dA, (4.31)
P˙m + P˙f =
j
S
T · dA.
Here, the dot stands for the derivative with respect to time. Em and Pm are the
mechanical energy and the mechanical momentum of particles within a volume V.
Ef and Pf are the field energy and the field momentum within V. The right side
of the equations symbolizes the energy and momentum crossing the surface S—
S is the energy flux density (the Poynting vector), and T is the momentum flux
density (the Maxwell stress tensor). Poynting’s theorem then states: energy and
momentum change inside a volume V if and only if energy and momentum cross
the surface S of V (see Fig. 4.8).
Em
Ef
S
SV
Figure 4.8.: The Poynting Theorem
4.7.3. Cauchy Data
Newton’s equations of motion have a familiar mathematical structure: once we
fix the positions and velocities of the particles at a certain time t0 the laws of
motion generate all future and past trajectories. These are the familiar initial
value problems or Cauchy problems. For this setup, mathematicians and physicists
have developed a rich arsenal of tools that can be applied to ordinary and partial
di erential equations.
fulfill Newton’s third law and that the canonical momentum is conserved.
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The Maxwell–Lorentz theory also allows us to formulate initial value problems,
but only if we include field variables. The positions and velocities of particles, as
well as the values of the electromagnetic field on a (su ciently smooth) space-like
hyperplane, are the Cauchy data that uniquely determine the future of the system.
Without the field values, we would not have a Cauchy problem, and the familiar
mathematical tools could not be applied. In this case, the entire past of the system
had to be taken into account in order to figure out the future evolution. This is
impossible for all practical purposes.
Initial Values are not Arbitrary
There is a crucial di erence between Newton’s gravitational field and the Maxwell–
Lorentz field. Whether we interpret Newton’s theory of gravitation as a field theory
or as an action-at-a-distance theory, the Cauchy data always consists of the posi-
tions and velocities of the particles on a simultaneity slice. The gravitational field
doesn’t give any input that isn’t included in the initial condition of particles. For
the gravitational field is always attached to the particles and transmits the e ects
with infinite speed.
The electromagnetic field encodes more information than is comprised in the
initial conditions of particles. But we need to be careful in setting the initial
conditions. Deckert and Hartenstein (2016) prove that the initial value problem
isn’t well-posed in the Maxwell–Lorentz theory. The idea is that on a Cauchy
surface the initial values for the particles and fields at time t0 cannot be chosen
arbitrarily because the history of the particles before t0 determines the fields at
t0—Maudlin (2007a, p. 130) also mentions that boundary conditions cannot be
freely chosen, but he doesn’t make the calculations. Whenever the field values are
chosen disregarding the history of the particles discontinuities or even singularities
can arise.
Let’s look at a simple example. Consider a particle at rest (see Fig. 4.9). If
the field at t0 is the electrostatic Coulomb field, the particle stays at rest and the
initial value problem is well-posed. But if we change the field on the Cauchy surface
irrespective of the behavior of the particles before t0, the new field might cause a
kink in the trajectory (see Fig. 4.10). The kink arises from a discontinuity in the
velocity because the acceleration is infinite at t0.
Deckert and Hartenstein conclude that in order to calculate the entire trajectory
q(t) one needs to have a certain piece of the trajectory as one’s initial data. This
then leads to delay di erential equations one already encounters in the Wheeler–
Feynman theory.
The Maxwell–Lorentz Theory as an Action-at-a-Distance Theory
Although the Maxwell–Lorentz theory is formulated as a field theory, it has been
suggested that it would be better regarded as an action-at-a-distance theory. One
example is Richard Feynman in his Lectures on Physics (Feynman et al., 1977, p.
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t0
q(t)
Cauchy surface
Figure 4.9.: Resting particle and Coulomb field as initial field values
t0
q(t)
kink
Cauchy surface
Figure 4.10.: A change in the field values on the Cauchy surface leads to a kink on
the trajectory
21-1). He proposes taking the Liénard-Wiechert fields (4.9) and (4.10) and plugging
them into the Lorentz force law (4.4). The result is the force generated by a charged
particle on an arbitrary test particle while no longer explicitly mentioning fields. By
superposing the forces of all the sources we can get the force on a particle generated
by an arbitrary charged object (Gri ths, 1999, p. 439). A similar strategy using
the retarded electromagnetic field tensor has been suggested by Mundy (1989).
Both strategies are a re-interpretation of Maxwell–Lorentz electrodynamics rather
than new action-at-a-distance formulations thereof. Both still use the same stan-
dard formalism. But what is the advantage? These theories put us in a very strange
situation. For such a theory itself lets us solve systems as Cauchy problems. But if
it’s interpreted as an action-at-a-distance theory we’re strictly speaking not allowed
to use the field values. The field has very useful practical advantages, but it’s some-
how not there. It would be insincere to call these interpretations genuine action-
at-a-distance theories. And more importantly, neither solve the self-interaction
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problem, either. A self-interaction problem in an action-at-distance-theory—what
a grotesque situation!
The Interpretation of Fields
There might be a dilemma: on the one hand, we can be anti-realist with respect
to fields, but on the other hand we cannot interpret the Maxwell–Lorentz theory
as an action-at-a-distance theory. Why? Because there is a di erence between
interpreting the ontological status of the field in a field theory and having an action-
at-a-distance theory. In the former case, there are several ways to embed the theory
in a metaphysical framework:you can be a realist or an anti-realist with respect to
the field. In the latter case, you have to be an anti-realist. It isn’t possible to
interpret the field as part of the ontology if the theory itself is an action-at-a-
distance theory.
The Wheeler–Feynman theory is an action-at-a-distance theory. Because it
doesn’t contain fields, there are unfortunately no Cauchy problems – actually, it
isn’t yet clear whether special systems exist that may allow for this. All the in-
teractions take place on the light-cones. And to calculate the motion of a particle
you have to know its entire past, as well as everything that happens on the forward
and backward light-cones. The proper mathematical tools have yet to be developed
for solving such problems. As a purely mathematical tool, however, the Wheeler–
Feynman theory uses the electromagnetic field tensor. Although this tensor is part
of the theory, we cannot interpret the theory as postulating fields. And there is
a philosophical problem, too. Usually, metaphysical theories on the status of laws
of nature, namely, Humeanism, primitivism, and dispositionalism, are interchange-
able. Given an arbitrary fundamental physical theory it used to be possible to
interpret it in a Humean framework, in a primitivist framework, and in a disposi-
tionalist framework. But the Wheeler–Feynman theory seems to be at odds with a
dispositional interpretation. Dispositionalism seems to presuppose objective simul-
taneity slices or the possibility of Cauchy hypersurfaces because the dispositions
at one time or at one hypersurface determines motion for all future times. This
is no longer appropriate in an action-at-a-distance theory that is formulated on
Minkowski space-time. A detailed analysis of the relation between dispositionalism
and relativistic theories is a task for future research.
There might be a dilemma: on the one hand, we can be anti-realist with respect
to fields, but on the other hand we cannot interpret the Maxwell–Lorentz theory
as an action-at-a-distance theory. Why? Because there is a di erence between
interpreting the ontological status of the field in a field theory and having an action-
at-a-distance theory. In the former case, there are several ways to embed the theory
in metaphysical framework; you can be a realist or an anti-realist with respect to the
field. In the latter case, you have to be an anti-realist. It isn’t possible to interpret
the field as part of the ontology, while the theory itself is an action-at-a-distance
theory.
In general, though, it seems that physics and philosophy agree that laws of nature
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must have the standard form of initial conditions plus time evolution. If it turns
out that there is no initial value problem in the Wheeler–Feynman theory, then we
need to revise our conception of laws of nature. It was Alfred North Whitehead
(1925) who questioned whether physics should be formulated as successions of in-
stantaneous states. Instead, he proposed an ontology of processes. It’s beyond the
scope of this thesis to examine Whitehead’s ideas in detail, but they are definitely
worth exploring in future research.
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Part III.
The Quantum Universe of Particles
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But why then had Born not told me of this ‘pilot wave’? If only to point out what was
wrong with it? Why did von Neumann not consider it? More extraordinarily, why did
people go on producing ‘impossibility’ proofs, after 1952, and as recently as 1978? When
even Pauli, Rosenfeld, and Heisenberg, could produce no more devastating criticism of
Bohm’s version than to brand it as ‘metaphysical’ and ‘ideological’? Why is the pilot
wave picture ignored in text books? Should it not be taught, not as the only way, but as
an antidote to the prevailing complacency? To show that vagueness, subjectivity, and
indeterminism, are not forced on us by experimental facts, but by deliberate theoretical
choice?
— John Bell (2004c, p. 160)
5.1. Definite Trajectories
Quantum mechanics has serious physical and philosophical problems; they have
been known since its inception in the 1920s. One is the notorious measurement
problem (see Maudlin, 1995), brilliantly illustrated by Schrödinger (1935) in his
famous cat paradox. The other is the lack of an ontology. Are quantum particles
really particles, or are they waves? And if there is this duality, when is a particle a
particle, and when is it a wave? In search of an ontology and in trying to clarifying
what quantum mechanics tells us about the fundamental structure of our world,
the big names, such as Bohr, Heisenberg, Schrödinger, Einstein, and Pauli, tried
to elucidate the meaning of this theory. But discussions about realism or Bohr’s
complementary principle rather seem to be desperate attempts to make sense of a
badly constructed physical theory.
Therefore, it’s hard to understand the reaction of physicists (and some philoso-
phers too) to the possibility of having quantum particles on definite trajectories.
What if we could remold quantum mechanics to have point particles that move on
plain continuous trajectories? Of course, the trajectories aren’t the familiar New-
tonian ones, but that’s exactly the point: to introduce particles that move in such
a way that they give rise to the same empirical predictions as quantum mechanics.
Every physical and philosophical riddle about quantum mechanics can be solved
through an analysis of these very trajectories. Nothing else has been done for a
long time with classical mechanics.
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You might guess that such a theory would have been welcomed by the scientific
community. Nothing could be further from the truth. When de de Broglie (1928)
presented his ideas about a theory of this kind at the 5th Solvay Conference in 1927,
he faced harsh criticism and was discouraged (see Bacciagaluppi and Valentini,
2009). After this, de Broglie dropped his project.
5.1.1. The Second-Order Theory
It was 25 years later that David Bohm (1952a,b) dared to search for trajectories
in quantum mechanics, unaware of the accomplishments of his French colleague.
As in standard quantum mechanics, Bohm took the Schrödinger equation as the
fundamental equation for the evolution of the wave-function:
i~ˆÂ
ˆt
= ≠
A
~
2m
B
Ò2Â + V (x)Â. (5.1)
Bohm’s crucial move was to rewrite the wave-function in polar form:
Â = R exp
3
iS
~
4
. (5.2)
In so doing, he derived a di erential equation for the phase, which resembles a
Hamilton–Jacobi equation:
ˆS
ˆt
= ≠
A
(ÒS)2
2m + V (x)≠
~2
2m
Ò2R
R
B
.
This equation di ers from the classical Hamilton–Jacobi equation only in the last
term, which is missing in the classical case. Bohm interpreted it as an additional
potential, the notorious quantum potential:
U(x) := ≠ ~
2
2m
Ò2R
R
.
Having developed the mathematical similarity with classical mechanics, the whole
formalism thereof was now at Bohm’s disposal. In particular, the particles have to
follow a revised Newtonian equation
m
d2x
dt2 = ≠Ò (V (x) + U(x)) , (5.3)
in which the total potential is adjusted by the quantum potential U .
In the Hamilton–Jacobi theory, the trajectories aren’t usually orthogonal to the
wave-fronts. But if they are orthogonal at one time t0 they are orthogonal forever.
The orthogonality of trajectories was crucial for Bohm, because the trajectories
should be consistent with the continuity equation and he wanted his theory to
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match the predictions of ordinary quantum mechanics. Therefore, Bohm (1952a,
p. 170) postulated that the initial velocity of particles needed to fulfill
v(x) = ÒS(x)
m
. (5.4)
Bohm believed that his second-order theory would be a more fundamental theory
than ordinary quantum mechanics. On atomic scales the trajectories would be
orthogonal to the wave–fronts, so his theory matches the standard quantum pre-
dictions, but on the subatomic scale (5.4) is violated, leading to new phenomena.
Like de Broglie, Bohm was attacked by his peers (see Myrvold, 2003), but his
theory didn’t fade into oblivion. On the contrary, Bohm’s theory has been exciting
philosophers and physicists alike for around two decades—although only a tiny
minority of physicists and philosophers of physics really defend it (for instance,
Belousek, 2000; Holland, 1993).
5.1.2. The First-Order Theory
John S. Bell has been the most prominent advocate of Bohm’s quantum theory.
In fact, he supported Bohm’s theory in a slightly di erent version, a version that
has been further developed by the mathematical physicists Detlef Dürr, Sheldon
Goldstein, and Nino Zanghì (DGZ). This theory is (slightly inappropriately) called
Bohmian mechanics. As in Bohm’s second-order theory, here one basic equation
is Schrödinger’s equation. The law of motion for the particles, dubbed the guiding
equation, is a di erent one. What Bohm used as a boundary condition for particle
motion on the atomic level, namely equation (5.4), is here raised to the law of
motion – a first-order di erential equation. In a more prolific notation the guiding
equation is
dQk
dt = v
Â
k (Q1, . . . , QN), (5.5)
where the N -tuple (Q1(t), . . . , QN(t)) represents the trajectories of particles,
Â(q1, . . . , qn) is the wave-function, and vÂk is the k-th component of the vector field
v  = ÒS(x)m generated by the wave-function.
Every physical prediction of this theory can be derived from to these two fun-
damental equations. If we know the positions of the particles at one time t, the
guiding equation (5.5) gives us their velocities at t and hence the entire trajectories.
It’s quite remarkable that we only need the positions as initial conditions. Contrary
to Newton’s second law, which is a second-order equation and hence requires posi-
tions and momenta as initial conditions, the law of motion of Bohmian mechanics
is first-order. Its mathematical structure is the simplest possible for a di erential
equation: ask for the trajectories by specifying a vector field v . Newton’s law is
in this sense more complicated because in order to get the trajectories we have to
take a detour over the accelerations by specifying the forces.
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What de Broglie Really Did
Louis de Broglies work is generally underestimated. But he is indeed the genuine
inventor of Bohmian mechanics. Bacciagaluppi and Valentini (2009, Ch. 2) discov-
ered that de Broglie had at the 5th Solvay conference presented at a theory much
more developed than generally recognized. There he showed the audience the Schrö-
dinger equation (5.1) and the first-order guiding equation (5.5) for a many-particle
system.
While he borrowed Schrödinger’s equation from its inventor, he reached the guid-
ing equation all by himself some years before in his PhD thesis. De Broglie was
motivated by physical problems: he wanted to explain discrete atomic energy levels
and the di raction of photons. He reasoned that one needs to find a new dynamics
that violates Newton’s first law because photons are di racted by an object without
touching the object itself. According to Newton’s first law, the light beam must
follow a straight line. In the quest for his new law of motion, de Broglie was in-
spired by Newton’s idea of a particle theory of light, and combined ideas from wave
optics and geometrical optics. He eventually used two action principles: Fermat’s
principle (an action principle for light-waves) and Maupertuis’ principle (an action
principle for particles), to derive the guiding equation.
Nowadays, the de Broglie–Bohm theory is justified because it solves the measure-
ment problem and provides an ontology for quantum mechanics. But this wasn’t
de Broglie’s concern! He wanted to explain empirical phenomena. That his theory
has these other (crucial) features was only later recognized and appreciated. As
a matter of historical fact, de Broglie developed his theory years before quantum
mechanics was born.
The Guiding Equation from Schrödinger’s Equation
There are many ways to derive the first-order guiding equation:
1. De Broglie combined Fermat’s principle with Maupertuis’ principle.
2. Dürr et al. (1992, section 3) suggested deriving the guiding equation from
symmetry principles.
3. One can integrate Bohm’s second-order equation.
But there is a simple derivation that only uses Schrödinger’s equation. Indeed, the
de Broglie–Bohm theory is already contained in standard quantum mechanics (see
also Sakurai and Napolitano, 1994, pp. 101–2).
From Schrödinger’s equation one can derive the continuity equation
ˆﬂ
ˆt
+Ò · j = 0,
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where ﬂ = |Â|2 and j = ( ~m)Im (ÂúÒÂ) is the quantum flux. From the polar form
of the wave-function (5.2), we immediately get that
j = ﬂÒS
m
.
Since the standard continuity equation from fluid dynamics reads
ˆﬂ
ˆt
+Ò · (ﬂv) = 0,
we get the velocity for particles following the quantum flux as
v = ÒS
m
,
which is the guiding equation.
5.1.3. Two Kinds of Wave-Functions
The Universal Wave-Function
Up to now, I have talked about the wave-function. But Bohmian mechanics distin-
guishes two kinds of wave-function: the universal wave-function   and the e ective
wave-function Â. This distinction stems from two di erent modes of application.
On the one hand, we can apply this theory to certain systems in a laboratory, like
the hydrogen atom or silver atoms emitted by an oven. In these cases we always use
the e ective wave-function. On the other hand, we can apply Bohmian mechanics
to the biggest system at our disposal, namely, the universe. The wave-function
assigned to the entire universe is the universal wave-function, which generates the
universal vector field v .
The problem is that we don’t know the universal wave-function. And no one
knows whether the universal wave-function would obey Schrödinger’s equation in
the first place. We can only guess what the universal wave-function might look like.
For example, it may be time-dependent, or it may be time-independent. It’s often
claimed that the wave-function must change in time because a dynamic universe
cannot have evolved from a static wave-function. But for change the universal wave-
function doesn’t have to change; it’s su cient for the particles to keep moving. The
Bohmian laws allow the existence of non-trivial particle trajectories that are guided
by a static universal wave-function. We’ll encounter more arguments in section 6.1
for a time-independent universal wave-function.
The E ective Wave-Function
There is both good news and bad news. The bad news is that if Bohmian mechanics
only consisted of the universal wave-function and the guiding equation it wouldn’t
be possible to make calculations. First, no one knows the universal wave-function.
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Second, even if we knew the universal wave-function the computational power that
we would need to get trajectories would exceed all current supercomputers taken
together.
The good new is, though, that from the universal wave-function we can derive
another kind of wave-function that is essential for empirical predictions. Let’s say
we would like to predict the motion of an electron. Its position in three-dimensional
space is Q1(t); the positions of all the other particles are Y (t) := (Q2, . . . ,Qn). We
can now define from the universal wave-function   another wave-function:
Ât(x) :=  (x, Y (t)). (5.6)
This is the conditional wave-function of the electron; it depends on time because
of the motion of the environment Y (t).
Although we can now assign a wave-function to an electron—and more generally,
to any physical subsystem via (5.6)—, we cannot use this wave-function because
we not only need to know the universal wave-function, we also need the position
of all the particles in the environment. In other words, if we want to predict the
motion of an electron we need to find the universal wave-function and the motion
of 1080 particles. Impossible.
Still, we can define another wave-function. For what we would like to describe is
the behavior of subsystems that are in some (yet to be specified) way isolated from
the environment. The definition of the conditional wave-function is too broad; it
allows us to assign wave-functions to systems that aren’t su ciently isolated.
What does isolated mean here? The most straightforward isolated subsystem Â
is found in a product state:
  = Â(x) (y),
where   is as always the universal wave-function, and   is the wave-function of
the environment. The product state is a very special quantum state since the
behavior of the y-system doesn’t influence the behavior of the x-system. Hence
the guiding equation gets decoupled into two equations, where the velocity of the
x-system only depends on the positions of x and the velocity of the y-system only
depends on the positions of y. But a subsystem that forms a product state with
the environment is too strict in application and highly unlikely, for there will be
interactions between both systems that result in an entangled state. Consequently,
the universal wave-function is probably in a superposition.
It turns out that we can get a reasonable wave-function for a subsystem if the uni-
versal wave-function is in the superposition of a product state and some remaining
wave-function  ‹ (Dürr et al., 2013, Sec. 2.5):
 (x, y) = Â(x) (y) + ‹(x, y). (5.7)
In order to assign the wave-function Â(x) to the x-system two conditions must be
met. First, the positions of the environment need to be in the support of  , that is,
Y (t) œ supp . Second,  (y) and  ‹(x, y) need to have a macroscopically disjoint
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y-support. That is to say, their y-supports are so far apart in configuration space
that there is a macroscopic di erence whether Y (t) œ supp  or Y (t) œ supp ‹.
As soon as all these requirements are satisfied Â(x) is called the e ective wave-
function of the x-system. We can define for every subsystem a conditional wave-
function, but only under the above conditions is there an e ective one. If the
e ective wave-function exists it coincides with the conditional wave-function.
The definition of the e ective wave-function is more complicated than the defi-
nition of the conditional wave-function. And both definitions presuppose the uni-
versal wave-function, which is impossible to know. So why have we introduced the
e ective wave-function in the first place?
There is a shortcut to reach the e ective wave-function, a shortcut where we don’t
need to know the universal wave-function. It goes by the name of Schrödinger’s
equation (5.1). Given the quantum Hamiltonian of the subsystem—physicists know
very well how to built Hamiltonians—Schrödinger’s equation gives us the e ective
wave-function Â. But why does the e ective wave-function follow Schrödinger’s
equation in the first place? The universal wave-function by definition fulfills Schrö-
dinger’s equation—even if it were time-independent it could fulfill Schrödinger’s
equation. If the e ective wave-function exists, we can for all practical purposes
neglect  ‹ in (5.7), and so Â (as well as  ) fulfills its own Schrödinger evolution
once the interaction potential between system and environment becomes negligible
(Dürr and Teufel, 2009, pp. 216–7).
Textbook quantum mechanics doesn’t make this Bohmian distinction between
universal and e ective wave-function. Indeed a wave-function for the entire universe
would collapse all the time, and so it doesn’t play a distinctive role as in the de
Broglie–Bohm theory. Nevertheless, in experiments physicists manipulate the wave-
functions of more or less closed systems. And in textbooks the systems introduced,
like the hydrogen atom or the potential well, don’t interact with the environment.
So the e ective wave-function makes precise what physicists are already familiar
with and thereby embeds quantum mechanics into a quantum theory of particles.
5.1.4. First-Order or Second-Order: Which is Better Physics?
Initial Conditions and Quantum Equilibrium
The first and second-order theories aren’t equivalent. They di er in their physical
predictions, in the way they explain phenomena, and in their ontology. Bohm’s
equation of motion for particles is (5.3). In order for it to yield trajectories, we
need to specify both the positions and velocities. While the guiding equation (5.5)
is first-order, we only need to specify positions.
In order to match the predictions of ordinary quantum mechanics, which fit ex-
tremely well with experiments, Bohm had to demand that the velocities of particles
equal the gradient of the phase of the wave-function (see equation 5.4). This bound-
ary condition can only be justified by empirical adequacy. In the first-order version
this condition is nothing but the guiding equation (5.5). In this case, it has the
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status of a law of nature.
Bohm has a di erent law of motion, and he needs to accept (5.4) as a very
special boundary condition to make his theory empirically successful. He clarified
that equation (5.4) is the proper boundary condition on atomic scales because it’s
in accordance with quantum mechanics and experiments. On shorter length scales,
however, “an arbitrary relation between [v] and ÒS” is possible (Bohm, 1952a,
p. 171). It seems that Bohm took these alternative trajectories very seriously,
since this would amount to new empirical predictions (see also Valentini, 1991a,b).
I’m not aware of any empirical results that require a violation of the boundary
condition (5.4), and Dürr et al. (1992) confirm that there is no need to analyze
quantum non-equilibrium, since our universe is already in quantum equilibrium.
Di erence in Ontology and Explanatory Value?
There are many arguments regarding which theory to prefer. Some rely on the onto-
logical or explanatory di erences instead of the mathematical or physical di erence
that I’ve just mentioned.. Belousek (2003) argues that the second-order theory is
explanatorily more powerful than the first-order theory. For him the first-order
theory only represents particle trajectories in a mathematical–formal way:
But [. . . ] this ‘guidance’ is merely a mathematical-formal definition of the
particle velocity in terms of the phase of the quantum state Â and can in no
sense be understood in physical terms unless Â itself is endowed with some
direct physical significance; that is, insofar as the quantum state Â is merely
a mathematical abstraction existing in a (fictitious) configuration space, as
DGZ (and de Broglie) insist that it is, one can in no sense say that it guides
particle motions in a physically significant way. On the DGZ view, then, the
guidance equation allows for only the prediction of particle trajectories. And
while correct numerical prediction via mathematical deduction is constitutive
of a good physical explanation, it is not by itself exhaustive thereof, for
equations are themselves ‘causes’ (in some sense) of only their mathematical-
logical consequences and not of the phenomena they predict. (Belousek, 2003,
p. 136)
For Belousek, the second-order theory is superior to the first-order theory be-
cause it introduces forces and potentials that explain the motion of particles. The
first-order theory lacks these concepts; it describes motion by directly specifying
velocities. This specification of velocities is said to be of mathematical-formal char-
acter. Belousek is correct in emphasizing that particles in physical space cannot
really be guided by the wave-function, which is itself defined on configuration space
– only Albert’s marvelous point is truly guided by the wave-function (Albert, 2015,
Ch. 6, for more on the marvelous point). But this is not what DGZ have in mind
when they talk about guidance. Guidance is just a metaphorical picture for guiding
our intuition. Moreover, it’s not a special feature of the first-order theory that the
wave-function exists “in a (fictitious) configuration space.” This is just a mathe-
matical truism in all quantum theories and is the source of quantum non-locality.
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The first sentence of Belousek’s paragraph can be equally formed in terms of the
second-order theory:
But the second-order equation is merely a mathematical-formal definition of
the particle acceleration in terms of the amplitude of the quantum state Â, as
well as the classical potential, and can in no sense be understood in physical
terms unless Â itself is endowed with some direct physical significance.
Unless the wave-function is assigned to single particles it cannot be interpreted as
a field in physical space, and therefore the quantum potential isn’t a potential in
physical space, either. So due to the quantum potential the velocity of one particle
depends on the position of all particles. This is also true for the classical potential,
but the classical potential, in contrast to the quantum potential, is determined by
direct interaction between two particles in physical space. The relation between
particles in the quantum potential takes place on the level of the wave-function,
and that happens in configuration space.
Belousek falls for the illusion that the quantum potential can “physically” explain
what is going on in 3-D space, because all the examples that he gives—the double-
slit, tunneling, and the stability of atoms—are systems that only need single-particle
wave-functions. Instead of explaining the trajectories in the double-slit experiment
as due to changes in the quantum potential, one could equally explain them by
means of changes in the values of the wave-function in physical space.
I don’t think that the quantum potential provides a physical explanation of tra-
jectories which the wave-function itself cannot render. But forces seem to be dif-
ferent. First, forces are familiar from classical mechanics. Once forces are specified
acceleration is specified. And having forces on the quantum level lets us recover
more of the classical ontology in the classical limit. In the classical limit of the
first-order theory forces don’t emerge. The task is “just” to recover classical tra-
jectories within an epsilon. The ontological continuity from the quantum to the
classical level may be an advantage of forces.
Second, forces are ontologically local objects since they are defined on three-
dimensional space. So the direct cause for the motion of the particles can be
given in local terms. As in classical mechanics, it’s possible that ontologically local
objects could generate dynamically non-local e ects; non-local correlations, like in
the EPR-experiment, remain of course in the second-order theory. But this gain
in local explanations shouldn’t fool one into thinking that quantum non-locality
can be entirely reduced to local interactions. In the background, there is still the
wave-function sitting on configuration space. Although forces mediate non-local
correlations on 3D space, they are themselves generated by a non-local beable.
And there is still a gap in physical space from one force to the other, a gap in the
sense of action-at-a-distance—in classical electrodynamics, for example, this gap is
filled by the field.
To my mind, Belousek is both too strict with and mistaken about the first-order
theory. The mistake lies in the last sentence of the quoted paragraph: “equations
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are themselves ‘causes’ (in some sense) of only their mathematical–logical conse-
quences and not of the phenomena they predict.” This statement isn’t valid for
primitivism about laws—and DGZ regard laws as primitive entities. It’s perfectly
legitimate and consistent to interpret certain equations as being part of the funda-
mental ontology.
Belousek is too strict when he says that the guiding equation is only a mathematical–
formal description of trajectories of particles. Similarly, Newton’s equation is also
a mathematical–formal description of trajectories, and the Maxwell equations are
a mathematical–formal description of the behavior of electromagnetic fields. Mod-
ern physics is founded on di erential equations, and to interpret them as merely
mathematical–formal descriptions designates our entire physics as at least explana-
torily insu cient. Physics is the science of matter in motion, and it’s also the
science of how to find clever di erential equations.
And the Winner Is. . .
The first-order and second-order theories di er in terms of their mathematical–
physical structure. First, they require di erent initial conditions. Second, the first-
order theory excludes the possibility that our universe might have evolved from
quantum non-equilibrium or that there is a violation of the guiding equation on the
subatomic level. To my mind, this is a strength of the first-order theory. We cannot
experimentally select initial positions or velocities; all we can do is manipulate a
system to have a certain wave-function. The distribution of positions and velocities
is always follows Born’s rule. Moreover, there has up to now been no empirical
confirmation of new (non-relativistic) quantum phenomena on the subatomic level.
So the first-order theory is as empirically successful in our world as the second-
order theory without introducing further parameters. As a matter of parsimony,
this point goes to the first-order theory.
What about Belousek’s argument? The second-order theory is said to explain
the behavior of particles causally and more informatively because it introduces the
quantum potential and forces. Since the first–oder theory lacks these tools, it merely
gives a mathematical–formal explanation of trajectories. While in the first-order
theory the wave-function directly determines the velocities, there is a causal chain
from the wave-function to the velocities in the second-order theory: wave-function
æ quantum potentialæ forcesæ accelerationæ velocity. According to Belousek,
the second-order equation isn’t a mathematical–formal description of trajectories
because it postulates the quantum potential and forces as objects in the world that
do change in motion.
Belousek’s argument, however, doesn’t hold up to scrutiny. The quantum po-
tential is a non-local beable as it is the wave-function. So it doesn’t literally guide
particles in physical space as the electromagnetic field might guide charged particles.
Examples of one-particle systems that Belousek uses are misleading in acknowledg-
ing the quantum potential as living on physical space.
Forces, on the other hand, even forces generated by the quantum potential, act on
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each single particle. They support this anachronistic picture of a push–pull physics.
But must a law of motion be formulated in terms of forces? Even classical mechanics
can be reformulated without forces, and the dynamics would be first-order on phase
space (Hamiltonian dynamics) or on the tangent bundle of configuration space
(Lagrangian dynamics).
The second-order theory might be more comprehensible in running the classical
limit, and the transition might be smoother. If the quantum potential goes to
zero, the trajectories are the familiar classical ones changed by the classical forces.
But if we don’t stick to these requirements—forces as necessary for dynamical
explanations and the classical limit—the first-order theory is again the preferred
version.
5.2. Indistinguishability, Identity, and Individuality
5.2.1. The Mystery of Indistinguishable Particles
Quantum mechanics is said to be a revolutionary theory. It has shown us that
particles may not have positions, that observers can collapse the wave-function,
that consciousness might be even more powerful than we think, that we may live in
Hilbert space, that there may be infinitely many copies of us in di erent worlds, that
physics is about our state of belief, and that quantum particles aren’t individuals.
It is this last point I will focus on now. In particular, it will become apparent that
quantum mechanics is “revolutionary” on the individuality of particles because it’s
an incomplete theory. In a complete theory, like the de Broglie–Bohm theory, there
would be no mystery about individuality, indistinguishability, or identity.
Let’s first see what this mystery is supposed to be and where it arises. Imagine a
box that is equally partitioned by a wall. The left part is filled with a gas A, argon
for example, with entropy SA, and the right part is filled with a di erent gas B,
oxygen for example, with entropy SB. Together the gases have entropy S = SA+SB.
Once the partition is lifted, the gases will adiabatically mix, that is, without an
exchange of heat with the environment, and entropy S will increase. The total
increase is the sum of the entropy increase of gases A and B:  S =  SA + SB.
But if gases A and B are identical, both gases are argon for example, the entropy
S of the entire system remains constant, that is,  S = 0. This is Gibbs’ paradox
(see, for instance, Schroeder, 2000, pp. 79–81).
In this case we expected, when the two identical gases were mixed, the entropy
to increase as well. The mistake was to assume that the calculation of the entropy
woudn’t change whether we mixed two di erent or two identical gases. But for the
mixing of argon with oxygen there are many more microstates leading to the same
macrostate, because the permutation of an argon molecule with an oxygen molecule
leads to a new microstate. Permuations among argon molecules don’t change the
microstate of argon. Therefore, if we calculate the entropy of the mixture of gases
A and B, we need to divide the microstate by the permutations that don’t change
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in case A and B are identical. The paradox is resolved because it rests on wrong
expectations.
The discussion of Gibbs paradox should end here. Everything that is physically
explainable is explained. Nonetheless, physicists have questioned the validity of
indistinguishable particles and found justification in quantum mechanics.
Physicists were skeptical about Gibbs’ proposal to ignore all states in calcu-
lating [the entropy] that arises from a permutation of particles. Years later,
he found justification in quantum theory. Identical particles, which share all
their properties (mass, charge, angular momentum, magnetic moment, etc.),
are indistinguishable. If they were distinguishable (by a number, a color,
a position, etc.), they would no longer be identical. Atoms cannot be num-
bered, colored, or fixed at certain positions without changing their properties
or structure. (Stierstadt, 2010, p. 70; my translation)
Indistinguishable particles are not a novelty of quantum mechanics! Identical
particles are not a novelty of quantum mechanics! The Gibbs’ paradox is a clas-
sical problem. Distinguishability is about our capability to discriminate particles.
Identity, on the other hand, is an ontological notion about the properties of par-
ticles. We may distinguish particles even if they are identical. Two perfect black
billiard balls are identical but they are distinguishable by their positions. Like-
wise, electrons are identical but distinguishable by their position. As I argued in
section 1.3, identical particles can always be labeled because we can label their
location.
If particles don’t have position, if a physical theory is incomplete, we get all this
fuss about the di erence between identity, indistinguishability, and individuality.
The argument that quantum “particles” cannot be distinguished goes as follows
(Ladyman and Ross, 2007, section 3.1). Take a helium atom in the ground state;
the two electrons share the same energy eigenstate and position state, and their
spin state is the singlet state:
|0, 0Í = 1Ô
2
1
|øÍ1 |¿Í2 ≠ |¿Í1 |øÍ2
2
.
The two electrons coincide in all their intrinsic properties: mass, charge, energy
state, position state. And they coincide in all their relational properties: if one
electron is spin-up the other is spin-down and if one electron is spin-down the other
is spin-up. Therefore, Ladyman and Ross (and others) conclude that electrons
are identical and indistinguishable. But can they be individuated? Are there two
electrons, or is there just one? Quantum mechanics doesn’t tell us. But somehow
there are two electrons in the helium atom. What we need to do is to go beyond
the physics of quantum mechanics. Here are two suggestions for doing so.
One can equip each electron with a primitive identity. Although electrons in the
ground-state of a helium atom share all their physically intrinsic and extrinsic (re-
lational) properties, there are two separate objects here, due to a primitive identity.
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It’s strange that a physical theory is incapable of telling us whether there are one
or two objects without introducing a metaphysical ad-hoc haecceity.
It would be much easier and less dubious if electrons had a precise position. Then
they could be distinguished by their location even if they could not be distinguished
by merely looking at their intrinsic and extrinsic quantum properties. When the
de Broglie–Bohm theory describes two electrons in a helium atom the electrons are
always here and there, and the discussion of identity and distinguishability becomes
trivial.
Now we can better understand Gibbs’ paradox. Classical particles have pre-
cise positions, and so they are distinguishable. But di erences in entropy are due
to something deeper, something objective about particles: whether particles are
identical or not changes the entropy of the gas.
There is still a small paradox left to be resolved: if classical particles are primitive
stu , as I’ve been arguing, shouldn’t entropy be constant for all mixtures of gases?
At first sight there is nothing, apart from position, that distinguishes particles. As
a permutation of primitive stu  particles doesn’t change the distribution of intrinsic
properties, so the microstate shouldn’t change either. This would be bad because
we couldn’t account for the physical truism that the mixture of oxygen with argon
increases entropy.
How can we resolve this problem? There are indeed two kinds of permutation.
We can permute particles, and we can permute trajectories. If we were realists
with respect to properties both permutations would be the same. But since we
disentangle the particles from their dynamics, we have more options. A permutation
of particles switches the positions of two actual particles, and since particles have
no intrinsic properties this kind of permutation doesn’t change the physical state of
a airs. Not so a permutation of trajectories. Here we don’t touch the particles; they
remain in their position. What we do, though, is permute the physical quantities
in the law of motion as if we would have switched the properties of particles if
they really had some (see Fig. 5.1). These permutations change trajectories. So
what we need to consider in Gibbs’ paradox isn’t the permutation of particles, but
permutations of trajectories, because these can change the physical state.
5.2.2. Bohmian Mechanics of Indistinguishable Particles
In Bohmian mechanics, identical particles are no more mysterious than non-identical
particles. The theory tells us how to deal with identical particles, that is, a system of
electrons, protons, or neutrons, etc. From the Bohmian formalism of identical par-
ticles, we can say that there are two kinds of particles, fermions and bosons, whose
wave-function is constrained by certain symmetries. Fermion wave-functions are an-
tisymmetric with respect to particle permutations, whereas boson wave-functions
are symmetric. To get these results it is crucial that we define the configurations
of identical particles on NR3 (see section 1.3).
We can take the idea of identical particles a step further and claim that not only
are particles of one species identical with each other, but particles from di erent
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oxygen trajectoriesargon trajectory
primitive particles
argon trajectory
primitive particles
Figure 5.1.: Permutation of trajectories of an argon and an oxygen molecule with-
out permutation of the molecules themselves. The permutation takes
place on the level of physical quantities in the law of motion. The per-
mutation may even change the shape of the trajectories (not depicted
in the picture)
species are identical as well. Intrinsically nothing distinguishes an electron from a
proton, for example. If we could freeze the world at one moment and zoom in on
matter down to the level of particles, we would only see a distribution of identical
dots, and nothing that we could do with the particles would allow us to identify
which dot belonged to which species. But if we turn on time, we see that some
dots move like electrons, and some dots move like protons, etc. It is motion that
distinguishes particles, not intrinsic properties. This idea must also be captured in
NR3, but in contrast to the single species case we also need to change the law of
motion in order to make it permutation-invariant for non-identical particles.
How to Deal with One Species of Particle?
Let’s say we want to describe a system of electrons. How would we do this? First,
these configurations need to be formalized in NR3. Second, we need to define a
wave-function on this new configuration space. Intuitively, we would think that
we can only define symmetric wave-functions on NR3, but this would mean that
indistinguishable particles are always bosons. So we need to dig deeper to find the
fermions and to exclude that wave-functions of indistinguishable particles can have
further symmetry properties apart from being symmetric or anti-symmetric.
What we need to notice is that NR3 is isomorphic to another space, namely the
space in which we subtract the diagonal line from the standard configuration space
R3N and quotient by the permutation group SN (see Dürr et al., 2006, for the
topological features):
NR3 ƒ R3N”= /SN
We see that R3N”= is a (periodic) covering space of R3N”= /SN , similar to the Riemann
surface of ln z as a (periodic) covering space of the complex plane. The goal is to
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define a Bohmian velocity field on the covering space that is projected on the con-
figuration space of identical particles. We have to require permutations of particles
to be guided by the same velocity vector. This periodicity condition for the vector
field translates to a constraint on the wave-function. Together with the require-
ment that particles are distributed according to Born’s rule, the wave-function (on
the covering space) can be either symmetric or anti-symmetric (see all the missing
details in Dürr and Teufel, 2009, section 8.5). So the fermion–boson distinction
arises in Bohmian mechanics from a topological analysis of the configuration space
NR3.
There Are No Particle Species: Bohmian Mechanics of Primitive Stu 
In order to treat all particles as identical we need to go beyond the usual treatment
of identical particles by making the guiding equation permutation-invariant for
arbitrary particle species1. This was proposed by Goldstein et al. (2005a,b). To
preserve equivariance, that is, the conservation of total probability by the Bohmian
flow, the symmetrization has to be performed in the following way. First, Goldstein
et al. re-wrote the standard guiding equation (5.5) in the form
dQ
dt =
j (Q(t))
ﬂ (Q(t)) , (5.8)
where
ﬂ = ÂúÂ
is the probability density and j = (j1, . . . , jN) with
ji =
~
mi
ImÂúÒiÂ
the probability current corresponding to the system’s wave-function Â.
Then they independently symmetrized both the numerator and the denominator
in equation (5.8) by summing over all possible permutations of particles. Hence,
we get a new, permutation-invariant guiding equation, which reads2
dQk
dt =
q
‡œSN j‡(k) ¶ ‡q
‡œSN ﬂ ¶ ‡
(Q(t)). (5.9)
In this theory, which Goldstein et al. dubbed identity-based Bohmian mechanics
(symmetrized Bohmian mechanics would be more appropriate), we don’t a priori
1Most of what I’m going to discuss here has previously been published in Esfeld, Lazarovici,
Lam, and Hubert (2015b, section 3).
2Here, the sum goes over all elements of the permutation group SN , and
‡Q :=
!
Q‡≠1(1), . . . , Q‡≠1(N)
"
means that every coordinate Qi is assigned a new index Q‡≠1(i), changing the order in the
N -tuples.
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attribute any mass to any particle. The law of motion merely determines N trajec-
tories for N particles, and it’s characteristic of this law that one of those trajectories
happens to behave—at least in the relevant circumstances—like the trajectory of a
particle with mass m1, another like the trajectory of a particle with mass m2, and
so on, depending only on the (contingent) initial conditions of the system.
Let’s discuss an example given in Goldstein et al. (2005a, section 3) that compares
the standard formulation of Bohmian mechanics with the symmetrized version.
Consider a two-particle universe consisting of an electron with mass me and a muon
with mass mµ. Suppose that they are in a product state  (q1, q2) = „(q1)‰(q2).
Then, the standard guiding law (5.5) leads to the following equations of motion:
dQ1
dt =
~
me
ImÒ„(Q1)
„(Q1)
,
dQ2
dt =
~
mµ
ImÒ‰(Q2)
‰(Q2)
.
(5.10)
In contrast, the symmetrized guiding equation (5.9) reads
dQ1
dt =
~
me
|‰(Q2)|2 Im („ú(Q1)Ò„(Q1)) + ~mµ |„(Q2)|
2 Im (‰ú(Q1)Ò‰(Q1))
|„(Q1)|2 |‰(Q2)|2 + |„(Q2)|2 |‰(Q1)|2
dQ2
dt =
~
mµ
|„(Q1)|2 Im (‰ú(Q2)Ò‰(Q2)) + ~me |‰(Q1)|
2 Im („ú(Q2)Ò„(Q2))
|„(Q1)|2 |‰(Q2)|2 + |„(Q2)|2 |‰(Q1)|2
.
(5.11)
We see that equation (5.10) ascribes an intrinsic mass to every particle: particle
1, described by the coordinates Q1, is the electron with mass me, while particle 2,
described by the coordinates Q2, is the muon with mass mµ. In equation (5.11), by
contrast, neither Q1 nor Q2 is designated as the position of the electron, respectively
the muon. A priori, the two particles are distinguished only by the position that
they occupy at time t. But if we consider a situation in which „ and ‰ have disjoint
support, one of the two sums in the nominators and denominators will be zero, so
that the equation of motion e ectively reduces to equation (5.10) (possibly with
the indices 1 and 2 interchanged). In other words, in situations where the two-
particle wave-function is suitably decohered, one of the particles will play the role
of the electron—being e ectively described by equations (5.5) and (5.1) with the
parameter me—while the other will play the role of the muon—being e ectively
described by equations (5.5) and (5.1) with parameter mµ.
Which trajectory turns out to be guided by which part of the wave-function
thereby depends only on the law of motion and the (contingent) initial conditions
of the system, rather than on intrinsic properties of the particles. In fact, if both
parts of the wave-function were brought back together and then separated again,
one and the same particle could switch its role from being the electron to being the
muon. Therefore, like a particle’s spin, to be an electron, a muon, or a positron
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is nothing more and nothing less than to move under certain circumstances elec-
tronwise, muonwise, or positronwise. No properties in this theory define di erent
species of particles, but only primitive stu , following a law of motion that accounts
for the phenomena conventionally attributed to a multiplicity of particle-types.
One obvious objection to symmetrized Bohmian mechanics is that the guiding
law (5.9) is much more contrived and complex than that in standard Bohmian
mechanics. That’s correct, and we are indeed trading a sparse ontology for a more
complicated mathematical formalism. But this worry can be addressed in a few
ways.
First, the apparent complexity of equation (5.9) is indeed the price for expressing
a law of motion for configurations in NR3 instead of the coordinate space R3N . It’s
often true that a sparser ontology leads to a mathematically more complicated
physical theory, and symmetrized Bohmian mechanics is an example.
Second, the symmetrized guiding equation (5.9) in general yields di erent trajec-
tories to the usual one—the above example of the electron and muon is a special case
in which both guiding equations coincide in the decoherence regime. In application,
however, the very shape of the trajectories is irrelevant. What’s important is that
the theory predicts the correct statistical distributions. Although the equation of
motion is di erent, symmetrized Bohmian mechanics manages to reproduce Born’s
rule. And so it’s empirically equivalent to Bohmian mechanics and to standard
quantum mechanics.
Conclusion
Ontology must never be read o  from the mathematical formalism. Yet mathe-
matical formalism isn’t indi erent to all ontological interpretations. The mathe-
matical form of the guiding equation suggests that particles have intrinsic prop-
erties. We can ignore this; we can ignore that the law uses n-tuples to describe
configuration; we can ignore that the guiding equation (for non-identical parti-
cles) isn’t permutation-invariant. These mathematical features notwithstanding, a
metaphysician may still stipulate that particles have neither a primitive identity
nor intrinsic properties. But that would be like interpreting electromagnetic fields
in the Maxwell–Lorentz theory as non-existent: one would be disregarding crucial
features of a physical theory.
The idea of primitive particles without particle species finds a rigorous form in
symmetrized Bohmian mechanics. Here the mathematics doesn’t allow us to assign
primitive identities or intrinsic properties to particles. But the price we pay is a
more complicated law of motion, so calculating trajectories is much more tedious
and cumbersome. The precise shape of Bohmian trajectories isn’t relevant for
empirical predictions. What’s important is the statistical distribution of particles,
and the symmetrized version of Bohmian mechanics agrees with its standard version
on this. For physicists symmetrized Bohmian mechanics might not be interesting,
but it shows the metaphysician that some of her ideas can be woven into the
formalism of physics.
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What is the ontological status of the wave-function? This question is as old as quan-
tum mechanics itself. Historically the debate centered on what the wave-function
actually represents. Does it represent some objective facts? Certain elements of re-
ality? Or does it rather stand for our epistemic knowledge about a physical system?
These questions have seeped into the philosophical community and are still being
heavily debated. Contemporary philosophers of physics merged physicists’ ideas
about the wave-function with their own insights on what the status of the laws of
nature is (Humeanism, primitivism about laws, and dispositionalism)—but in fact,
the ontological ideas of Dürr, Goldstein, and Zanghì preceded this philosophical
analysis of the early 1990s.
This strategy, making the status of the wave-function dependent on the status
of laws of nature, was particularly fruitful for the de Broglie–Bohm theory. The
latter theory was susceptible to philosophical work because it started with a well-
formulated primitive ontology. When we have a primitive ontology this makes it
straightforward to talk about the fundamental level of reality, and it lets us start to
discuss the relation between laws of nature and this fundamental reality. Only after
we have gotten clear about the status of Schrödinger’s equation and the guiding
equation can we philosophize about the status of the wave-function. More precisely,
we need to clarify the status of both the universal and e ective wave-functions.
6.1. The Nomological View
Let’s say that Schrödinger’s equation and the guiding equation are primitive. What
might the status of the wave-function be? It might be a physical field. In crucial
features, it would di er from the electromagnetic field. First, it’s defined on con-
figuration space. Second, it would be a non-local beable on physical space.
Third, particles don’t act back on the wave-function. In electromagnetism, the
field influences the motion of particles, and the motion of particles changes the field.
In particular, accelerated particles radiate. But the wave-function is indi erent to
the behavior of particles. This might show us that it cannot refer to something
physical in space-time. If it were physical it would need to interact with matter,
but in the present case the “interaction” only goes one-way, namely, from the field
to particles.
Dürr, Goldstein, and Zanghì therefore argue that the universal wave-function is
instead a nomological entity (Dürr et al., 1997; Goldstein and Zanghì, 2013), that
is, something law-like. More precisely, being nomological means here that there is
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no physical entity out there in the world that is mathematically described by the
wave-function. The single role of the wave-function is to generate the vector field
in the guiding equation, and hence to generate motion via the guiding equation.
6.1.1. The Universal Wave-Function is not a Law!
In their writings, Dürr, Goldstein, and Zanghì sometimes claim that the wave-
function is the law (see, for example, Dürr et al., 1997). I don’t think that this is
a good way of explaining the status of the wave-function. The wave-function is a
mathematical function, and the law of motion of Bohmian mechanics is the guiding
equation. One can interpret the wave-function as nomological but not as a law.
Maudlin (2013) agrees with Dürr, Goldstein, and Zanghì that the Bohmian law of
motion is primitive, while the wave-function isn’t nomological. For him, the wave-
function refers to a physical entity, which he calls the quantum state. The quantum
state is a non-local beable on four-dimensional space-time and is mathematically
represented by the wave-function on configuration space.
We know that the quantum state bears some unusual features: it’s independent
of the motion of particles, it’s non-local in space-time, and we don’t have direct
empirical access to it. So Maudlin remarks that no philosophical category is ap-
propriate for the quantum state:
We do not even know the right general ontological category in which to put
it. Indeed, there is no reason to believe that any theorizing or speculation on
the nature of the physical world that took place before the advent of quantum
theory would have hit on the right ontological category for the quantum state:
because it is so hidden, there would have been nothing relevant to speculate
about. Whether one finds the possibility invigorating or disheartening, the
best ontological category for the quantum state might simply be the category
Quantum State, just as the right ontological category for a classical field is
Field, not ‘stress in a medium’ or ‘collection of particles.’ (2013, pp. 151–2)
This means that, for Maudlin, the quantum state is neither a substance nor a
property. Philosophy just hasn’t been able to discover or invent the appropriate
categories for modern physics. In particular, the quantum state founds the category
“quantum state”. In sum, what distinguishes Maudlin from Dürr, Goldstein, and
Zanghì is that he adds the quantum state as a novel physical and metaphysical
entity to the fundamental ontology, whereas the laws remain primitive.
6.1.2. The E ective Wave-Function is not Quasi-Nomological!
What is the status of the e ective wave-function if the universal one is nomological?
At first sight, there seems to be an overdetermination of motion. As the universe
has its own wave-function, every subsystem is guided by the velocity-field gener-
ated universal wave-function. There are certain subsystems, namely those that are
su ciently decohered from the environment, that seem in addition to be guided
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by an e ective wave-function. Overdetermination as such isn’t always a problem,
but here it is, if we construe the e ective wave-function as a primitive nomological
entity in addition to and on a par with the universal wave-function. It su ces to
have just one entity that “really” guides the particles. Ockham’s razor is here well
applied here.
Goldstein and Zanghì (2013) oddly claim that the status of the e ective wave-
function isn’t interesting to analyze:
Our point is rather that once the status of the wave function of the universe
has been settled, the question about the status of Â is rather secondary—
something about which one might well feel no need to worry. (Goldstein and
Zanghì, 2013, p. 276)
Nevertheless, the metaphysical status of the e ective wave-function needs to be
explained, just as everyone agrees that the status of the universal wave-function
needs to be explained.
Notwithstanding their initial statement, Goldstein and Zanghì still try to eluci-
date the metaphysics of the e ective wave-function:
Be that as it may, we would like to regard Â as quasi-nomological. We mean
by this that while there are serious obstacles to regarding the wave function
of a subsystem as fully nomological, Â does have a nomological aspect in
that it seems more like an entity that is relevant to the behavior of concrete
physical reality (the primitive ontology) and not so much like a concrete
physical reality itself. (2013, p. 276)
So the universal wave-function is fully nomological, while the e ective one is not—
it’s quasi-nomological. But what does “fully” mean here? And is the e ective
wave-function only half nomological?
Let’s try to make this more precise. The “nomological aspect” of the e ective
wave-function is inherited from the universal wave-function. Since the e ective
wave-function is derived from its universal mother, it’s ontological status must be
nomological; that is, the e ective wave-function doesn’t refer to an entity out there
in the world.
For all practical purposes, we use the e ective wave-function by means of Schrö-
dinger’s equation and never the universal wave-function. So in applying Bohmian
mechanics, the entity that is “relevant to the behavior of concrete physical reality”
is the e ective wave-function. This might give us a clue about the meaning of
“quasi”. The universal wave-function is the primary (because primitive) nomolog-
ical entity in Bohmian mechanics; the e ective wave-function is nomological, too,
but it’s defined in terms of the universal wave-function.
The notion quasi-nomological is a bit unfortunate. For it suggests that the ef-
fective wave-function belongs to a novel ontological category. But there is no such
category, and therefore I wouldn’t dub it quasi-nomological. The e ective wave-
function is a device for calculation, which can be defined if certain circumstances are
fulfilled. But it’s always the universal wave-function that is dynamically e cacious.
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6.2. Quantum Humeanism
6.2.1. The Marvelous Point
David Albert (1996) and Barry Loewer (1996) were the first to develop a Humean
theory of Bohmian mechanics. For them the universal wave-function is a field on
configuration space:
The sorts of physical objects that wave functions are, on this way of thinking,
are (plainly) fields – which is to say that they are the sorts of objects whose
states one specifies by specifying the values of some set of numbers at every
point in the space where they live, the sorts of objects whose states one
specifies (in this case) by specifying the values of two numbers (one of which
is usually referred to as an amplitude, and the other as a phase) at every
point in the universe’s so-called configuration space.
The values of the amplitude and the phase are thought of (as with all
fields) as intrinsic properties of the points in the configuration space with
which they are associated. (Albert, 1996, p. 278)
Albert takes the 3N -dimensional configuration space as the fundamental space of
Bohmian mechanics, and every point of this very high-dimensional space is assigned
a unique value of the universal wave-function. This is Albert’s Humean mosaic.
Maudlin (2013) points out that Albert must accept unobservable physical facts,
since any change in the wave-function induces a change in values of the intrinsic
properties of configuration space. For example, we can multiply wave-functions
by a global phase without changing the Bohmian velocity field. Albert, however,
has to bite the bullet and say that those wave-functions represent di erent physical
situations or di erent physical worlds.
Bohmian mechanics isn’t a monist theory, in which only the universal wave-
function exists. There are also particles. But in Albert’s ontology particles don’t
live in three-dimensional space. And there isn’t a multitude of them either; there
is just one.
On Bohm’s theory, for example, the world will consist of exactly two physical
objects. One of those is the universal wave function and the other is the
universal particle.
And the story of the world consists, in its entirety, of a continuous suc-
cession of changes of the shape of the former and a continuous succession of
changes in the position of the latter.
And the dynamical laws that govern all those changes – that is: the Schrö-
dinger equation and the Bohmian guidance condition – are completely de-
terministic, and (in the high-dimensional space in which these objects live)
completely local. (Albert, 1996, p. 278)
Here Albert claims that our world is very peculiar on the fundamental level. Our
universe actually consists of one single particle in configuration space, which is a
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mere dot in a 3N -dimensional space. Sheldon Goldstein (with a little grain of irony)
dubbed Albert’s universal particle the marvelous point. The familiar world that we
perceive is in fact a shadow of the marvelous point (Albert, 2015, Ch. 6)
Life in configuration space is local. It’s dynamically local because there is only
one particle; there are no non-local e ects on other particles in configuration space.
And this world is ontologically local because the universal wave-function is de-
fined on the very space, in which the universal particle is defined. According to
Bell’s definition, Albert construes the universal wave-function as a local beable in
configuration space.
The Problem of Communication
When we have particle and fields in the same space, they are geometrically related:
the value of the field in position x determines the motion of a particle at x. The sit-
uation is di erent if you regard configuration space and three-dimensional physical
space as both real and independent.
But this makes no sense. Think about it: what the guidance condition
would have to amount to, on a picture like this, is a fundamental law of na-
ture whereby one concrete entity (the wave function) in a 3N - dimensional
space tells a set of N concrete entities (the corpuscles) in an altogether dif-
ferent space—the three-dimensional space of our everyday physical experi-
ence—how to move. What we’re used to doing in physics (remember) is
writing down laws of the interactions of two or more concrete entities in the
same space. And in circumstances like that, questions like “In what spatial
direction does B move as a result of its interaction with A?” (think here, say,
of collisions, and of Newtonian gravitational interactions, and of interparti-
cle electrical forces, and so on) are invariably settled by geometrical relations
between A and B themselves. But in the present case there are no geomet-
rical relations between A (the wave function) and B (the corpuscles) at all!
In the present case (then) there can be no idea whatever of A’s a ecting B
by pushing or pulling or poking or prodding, either directly or indirectly,
either locally or nonlocally. And this (mind you) is not merely an o ence to
intuition—it is a straightforward logical problem: lacking any geometrical re-
lationship between A and B, there is nothing about the condition of A in its
space that is structurally capable of picking out anything like a direction, or
anything like a particular corpuscle, or anything whatsoever, in the B-space.
Period. End of story. (Albert, 2015, pp. 124–5)
If configuration space and physical space are primitive spaces that exist indepen-
dently of each other, then there is no link between how things happening in con-
figuration space and what happens in three-dimensional space. How can anything
that exists outside of our universe a ect the motion of objects in our universe? God
may be capable of doing so but not the wave-function. For Albert, this isn’t due
to physical or metaphysical reasons, “it is a straightforward logical problem.”
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If configuration space and three-dimensional space exist independently from each
other we not only face the problem of how configuration space might a ect our
familiar physical space in principle but also that of fleshing out the details.
And note that the trajectory of a world-particle like this one can patently
contain no suggestion whatever as to whether we are dealing here with a
single material particle moving freely in an N -dimensional physical space,
or (say) N/3 distinct material particles moving freely in a three-dimensional
physical space, or N/2 distinct material particles moving freely in a two-
dimensional physical space, or N distinct material particles moving freely in
a one-dimensional physical space. Nothing about a trajectory like that (to
put it slightly di erently) can make it natural or make it plausible or make it
reasonable or make it simple or make it elegant or make it any other desirable
thing to suppose that any particular one of those possibilities, as opposed to
any one of the others I mentioned, or any one of the others I didn’t mention,
actually obtains. (Albert, 1996, p. 280)
In order to connect configuration space and physical space there has to be a map-
ping, an isomorphism, that maps what happens in one space to what happens in
the other. A point in configuration space is written as a 3N -tuple (x1, x2, . . . , x3N),
and Albert correctly notices that there is no natural or a priori grouping of the
coordinates so that (x1, x2, x3) represent the position of the first particle in physi-
cal space and (x4, x5, x6) represent the position of the second particle, and so on.
The same configuration space might represent particles in a two-dimensional or
one-dimensional space.
I question Albert’s argument. He obviously takes the mathematical formalism
of Bohmian mechanics at face value and tries to read o  the ontology o  from
the mathematical representation. For mathematical representations never uniquely
refer to the same physical system. Similar mathematical formalisms used in physics
can even represent biological or economic behavior.
As Maudlin (2013) shows, Albert indeed used an inappropriate mathematical
formalism. Since classical mechanics, configurations have been represented by n-
tuples. This mathematical structure leads to relatively simple equations of motions,
but creates unnecessary surplus structure if you describe indistinguishable particles.
In particular, a permutation of particles leads to a di erent n-tuple and hence to a
di erent mathematical representation. So Albert has to accept further unobservable
facts in his metaphysics: two configurations that di er by permutations cannot be
distinguished by observation although they represent di erent physical states of
a airs (see Section 1.3 for more details).
The proper mathematical space for configurations of particles is rather NR3. Had
Albert based his interpretation of Bohmian mechanics on this space he wouldn’t
have wondered about the di erent physical situations to which an n-tuple might
refer. From the elements of NR3 alone it’s set that we deal with N particles in three-
dimensional space—an element is {x1, . . . ,xN}, where xi œ R3 for i œ {1, . . . , N}.
Nevertheless, the problem of communication remains.
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6.2.2. Super-Humeanism
There is a completely di erent way of constructing a Humean world of Bohmian
mechanics (see Esfeld et al., 2014; Miller, 2014), a way that Albert (2015, p. 126)
simply calls crazy. Let’s see how crazy this strategy really is. We start by pos-
tulating a three-dimensional world, in which particles move. This space is the
fundamental physical space of Bohmian mechanics. Contrary to Albert’s mosaic,
this mosaic consists of a primitive stu  ontology of particles. The wave-function,
the guiding equation, Schrödinger’s equation, and configuration space are deter-
mined by the motion of particles throughout the history of the universe. They are
all part of the best system in describing the behavior of the particles.
We cannot simply derive the wave-function from the positions of particles at
any time t. It is, however, possible to interpret the universal wave-function as
supervening on the entire history of particles. Imagine an ideal observer who is
capable of observing everything that happens in the universe from beginning to
end without interfering with it. What laws will the ideal observer write down if
we ask her to do so? Laws that best combine simplicity and strength will be the
Bohmian ones.
But writing down the laws doesn’t reify the wave-function or configuration space.
Nor is there a problem regarding how the wave-function can refer to objects in
ordinary space. The whole theory supervenes on the primitive stu  ontology.
Miller’s Humeanism
In a footnote, Elizabeth Miller claims that she has developed a Humean theory of
Bohmian mechanics that di ers from the account given by Esfeld et al. (2014):
Esfeld and his co-authors suggest that Bohmian mechanics may be combined
with a Humean account of laws, but it is not clear from their discussion
exactly how they expect this to go and, especially, whether they take this to
be a realist treatment of the Bohmian pilot wave. My proposal may be read
as a suggestion in a similar Humean spirit, one that fleshes out a (distinct,
explicitly realist) Humean treatment of the pilot wave by way of an analogy
to a Humean account of objective chance and that o ers this treatment as a
response to the non-separability argument. (Miller, 2014, p. 579)
I don’t see the di erences that Miller purports to notice. Her Humean account
is exactly the same as the one I introduced above, and it’s exactly the one that
Esfeld et al. advocate.
Moreover, Miller distinguishes her project as a “realist treatment of the Bohmian
pilot wave,” while Esfeld et al. argue for a nomological interpretation. To my mind,
this is just a matter of terminology. Some Humeans defend a realist interpretation
of chance, a realist interpretation of mass, or a realist interpretation of the wave-
function, although all these are always part of the best system. But claiming to be
a realist about the best system doesn’t make the best system real in the same way
that particles of the Humean mosaic are real.
155
6. The Status of the Wave-Function
I would say that a real realist about chance is someone who regards chance as an
irreducible part of nature, like someone who regards the GRW laws to be true. A
real realist about mass is someone who regards mass as a categorical or dispositional
property. And a real realist about the wave-function regards it as non-nomological.
Bhogal and Perry on Separability
Another treatment of Humean Bohmian mechanics has recent been put forward by
Bhogal and Perry (2015). I don’t intend to discuss their results regarding how to
apply Humeanism to Bohmian mechanics, since their core idea matches Miller’s and
Esfeld’s while introducing some new (and, I think, not particularly illuminating)
terminology. What I would like to analyze in some detail, though, is their discussion
of the principle of separability.
Remember that Maudlin (2007a, p. 51) defines separability in the following way:
The complete physical state of the world is determined by (supervenes on)
the intrinsic physical state of each spacetime point (or each pointlike object)
and the spatio-temporal relations between those points.
Maudlin aims to refute Humeanism by showing that entangled states cannot be
reduced to intrinsic states of the Humean mosaic. The simplest entangled state
is the singlet state. Contrary to a product state, where each particle has a well-
defined quantum state, the system in a singlet state only has this state as a whole.
If quantum mechanics is taken to be complete, and the wave-function refers to a
physical quantum state, the argument goes, Humeanism has to add these entangled
states as primitive relations. But then there are further physical facts that no longer
supervene on local properties. And that is no longer a Humean world.
Now Bhogal and Perry (2015) accuse Maudlin of using too strict a notion of
separability. According to them, Maudlin actually shows the incompatibility of
Humeanism with strong separability:
The complete physical state of any region R is determined by (supervenes
on) the intrinsic physical states [of] (and relations between) R’s sub-regions.
(Bhogal and Perry, 2015, p. 4)
Given two (disjunct) regions R1 and R2, the intrinsic properties of either region
determine the physical state of both regions, that is, the state of R1 ﬁ R2. But if
R1 ﬁR2 is in an entangled state, neither subregion has intrinsic properties that are
independent of the other region. This is the meaning of strong separability, and
this is also the meaning to which Maudlin adheres in his definition.
As Maudlin’s formulation of separability is about the complete physical state
of the world, it’s su ciently general to allow another interpretation. If the two
particles in the singlet state are in regions R1 and R2 respectively, their physical
state doesn’t merely depend on the intrinsic properties of R1 and R2 but on the
intrinsic properties of the entire Humean mosaic:
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A pair of particles being in the Singlet state is not determined by the intrinsic
physical states of those two particles; rather, it’s determined by the states
of the pair together with the intrinsic physical states at other points in the
mosaic. (Bhogal and Perry, 2015, p. 3)
This is exactly the same as the idea proposed by Esfeld et al. (2014) and Miller
(2014), namely to apply Humeanism to Bohmian mechanics. I don’t think one can
properly speak about the Humean mosaic of ordinary quantum mechanics because
only the wave-function on the fundamental level lacks a physical description of in-
trinsic properties. But the wave-function in Bohmian mechanics may be interpreted
as supervening on the motion of all the particles in the universe.
The main claim of Bhogal and Perry is that they have rescued separable Humean
quantum metaphysics. I don’t agree. Indeed they have changed the meaning of
separability so that physical states are separable states whenever they supervene
on the behavior of the whole mosaic. Although I think that this is an appropriate
strategy for interpreting the wave-function, I disagree with their definition of sep-
arability. For what they dub strong separability is the core idea of separability in
the first place. This is not only obvious in Maudlin’s paper but also when Einstein
speaks about this notion in a famous letter to Max Born:
If one asks what, irrespective of quantum mechanics, is characteristic of the
world of ideas of physics, one is first of all struck by the following: the
concepts of physics relate to a real outside world, that is, ideas are established
relating to things such as bodies, fields, etc., which claim ‘real existence’
that is independent of the perceiving subject – ideas which, on the other
hand, have been brought into as secure a relationship as possible with the
sense-data. It is further characteristic of these physical objects that they are
thought of as arranged in a space-time continuum. An essential aspect of this
arrangement of things in physics is that they lay claim, at a certain time, to
an existence independent of one another, provided these objects ‘are situated
in di erent parts of space’. Unless one makes this kind of assumption about
the independence of the existence (the ‘being-thus’) of objects which are far
apart from one another in space – which stems in the first place from everyday
thinking – physical thinking in the familiar sense would not be possible. It
is also hard to see any way of formulating and testing the laws of physics
unless one makes a clear distinction of this kind. This principle has been
carried to extremes in the field theory by localizing the elementary objects
on which it is based and which exist independently of each other, as well as
the elementary laws which have been postulated for it, in the infinitely small
(four-dimensional) elements of space. (Born, 1971, pp. 170–1)
The essence of separability is spelled out by Einstein: “An essential aspect of
this arrangement of things in physics is that they lay claim, at a certain time, to
an existence independent of one another, provided these objects ‘are situated in
di erent parts of space.’ ” So if a physical system is situated in a region that can be
divided into two disjunct parts R1 and R2, and the subsystem in R1 is in a physical
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state that is independent of the state of R2, then the state of R1ﬁR2 is a separable
state.
The singlet state, however, is a non-separable state. Ordinary quantum me-
chanics interpreted as an ontologically complete theory1 is a non-separable theory.
Bohmian mechanics is a non-separable theory. Separability is hence rather a feature
of a physical theory than a feature of a metaphysical framework.
Somehow Albert’s interpretation of Bohmian mechanics seems to be an excep-
tion. The universal wave-function interpreted as a physical field is separable since
the entire wave-function is determined by its intrinsic values in each point of con-
figuration space. Bhogal and Perry claim that Albert follows neither the principle
of separability nor of strong separability; instead, they say that Albert denies sep-
arability in favor of a weakened fundamental state separability:
The complete physical state of the world is determined by (supervenes on)
the intrinsic physical state of each point in the fundamental space of that
theory (and on the geometric relations between points in that fundamental
space). (Bhogal and Perry, 2015, p. 16)
Of course, Albert violates both Maudlin’s definition of separability and Bhogal
and Perry’s definition of strong separability. And he does so because he takes
configuration space to be the fundamental space instead of space-time. But it
seems a little odd that this violation of separability just hinges on which space you
take to be the most basic. The crucial idea behind separability is not to build
an ontology on three-dimensional space or four-dimensional space-time. Maudlin’s
formulation notwithstanding, the heart of separability is that it should be always
possible to assign physical states to arbitrary subregions of your fundamental space,
whether it’s low-dimensional or high-dimensional. And this is exactly what Einstein
(as I understand him) wanted to point out. Therefore, the wave-function in super-
Humeanism is non-separable, while it’s separable in Albert’s ontology.
What are Physical States?
Something important but less visible in Maudlin (2007a, Ch. 2) and Bhogal and
Perry (2015) is their use of physical states. They seem to presuppose that the
reader clearly understands what physical states are, as they nowhere attempt to
define them. Physicists talk all the time about the physical states of systems,
but they use the term in a very narrow sense. I’m not always sure whether this
is the intended sense in the abovementioned papers; nevertheless, it’s the sense
that I prefer and generally use. So for physicists a physical state is the complete
description of a system that is needed for the basic laws to predict the behavior of
the system.
In Newtonian mechanics, for example, the physical state of a particle at time t
consists of its position and velocity, that is, (x(t),v(t)). The physical state of a
1Maudlin (2007b) distinguishes between informationally complete and ontologically complete
physical theories.
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particle in Hamiltonian mechanics consists of position and momentum (q(t),p(t)).
A physical state in Maxwell-Lorentz electrodynamics consists of the positions and
velocities of the particle, as well as of the values of the electric and magnetic field,
that is, (x,v,E,B). In textbook quantum mechanics the state of a system is fully
described by its wave-function Â, whereas in Bohmian mechanics the physical state
also comprises the positions. So the Bohmian state is represented as (Q,Â).
The physical state is first and foremost an abstract entity that together with the
laws describes the behavior of the system (see Curiel, 2014, section 2). It’s then
a matter of interpretation when it comes to disentangling the ontological status of
the objects that are part of the state or working out what the state refers to in the
first place. Like Curiel, you can be indi erent to this ontological issue. Physical
states as such don’t make any ontological commitments, and they are necessary
and su cient for accurate empirical predictions. But they aren’t su cient for a
complete description of empirical phenomena. To do so, we need an ontology. And
as we see above, the objects that describe physical states are the notorious ones:
particles, fields, and wave-functions.
6.3. The Wave-Function as a Disposition
We saw in Chapter3 that a primitive ontology consisting merely of particles and
intrinsic dispositions doesn’t work because it leads to metaphysical action-at-a-
distance. Hence, we needed to introduce fields or relations. Now, with Bohmian
mechanics, we have a theory that obliges us for physical reasons to introduce re-
lational dispositions owing to quantum entanglement. The novelty of quantum
entanglement is that the entangled state cannot be reduced to actual individual
states of particles—Maudlin used this feature to argue against Humeanism (see
section 2.1.3). Consider two electrons in the spin singlet state. Neither electron
has spin-up or spin-down, but after a measurement in the same direction one elec-
tron is always spin-up and the other is always spin down. Contrary to Maudlin,
who construes entanglement as established by a novel and unspecified quantum
state that is mathematically represented by the wave-function, we can regard the
wave-function as representing the disposition of particles to move in a certain way.
There are two ideas for a dispositional account of the wave-function. Esfeld et al.
(2014) state that all particles taken together have one holistic disposition, while
Suárez (2015) introduces an infinite set of intrinsic dispositional properties for each
particle. After explaining these views, I will outline the bare bones of an often
neglected interpretation of the wave-function, namely as a multi-field on ordinary
physical space. A multi-field wave-function is as ontologically local as possible
without changing the mathematics—it’s an attempt to interpret the wave-function
or what the wave-function represents as a local beable. Having the wave-function as
a genuine local beable on three-dimensional space, however, requires a new physical
theory, and this has been attempted by Norsen (2010).
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6.3.1. A Holistic Disposition, aka an Ontic Structure
If the universal wave-function were in a product state, every particle would have its
own quantum state, and the motion of every particle would be independent of the
other particles. Then we could interpret quantum states of particles as local disposi-
tions; each local disposition determines how each particle moves. Consequently, the
universal wave-function, as it determines the dynamics of all the particles, would
represent a set of individual dispositions: it would supervene on local properties of
particles. The universal wave-function, however, is in general not a product state.
The idea of Esfeld et al. (2014) is therefore to interpret the universal wave-
function as a holistic disposition; that is, the set of all particles has exactly one
disposition. This holistic disposition constrains the motion of all particles so that
they follow Bohmian trajectories. But we must make sure that there are no external
triggering conditions for the manifestation of the holistic dispositions because there
is nothing outside the universe. In the standard cases of the fragility of glass or the
solubility of sugar, the triggering conditions are imposed on the system—namely,
by a flying stone or water. But here the disposition is always manifested; particles
have a velocity because they have position.
As the motion of each particle depends on the positions of all the other particles,
this holistic disposition is relational. And so the universal wave-function instanti-
ates an ontic structure (Esfeld et al., 2015b)—an ontic structure that dynamically
relates all particles in three-dimensional space (Lam, 2015).
Advantages and Disadvantages
The universal wave-function counters two related problems. Remember Albert’s
problem of communication (see p. 153), namely that it would be mysterious how
the wave-function could a ect anything in the real world if the real world were a
three-dimensional one. A dispositionalist would understand the problem of com-
munication di erently: it would be mysterious how the wave-function could a ect
anything in the real world if the real entity that the wave-function refers to in-
deed existed in configuration space. Therefore, the dispositionalist (similar to a
Humean, I would say) emphasizes that the wave-function is only mathematically
defined on configuration space and thus that it’s a tool for calculating trajectories
and statistical distribution, but (contrary to a Humean) the wave-function stands
for a holistic disposition (or an ontic structure) in ordinary physical space (Esfeld
et al., 2015b, section 5)—in section 2.3.3 I argued that the only intelligible version
of OSR I accept coincides with relational dispositionalism.
The dispositionalist’s interpretation of the wave-function is said to solve a (to
my mind alleged) problem of primitive laws. If laws are abstract primitive entities,
it’s mysterious, according to the dispositionalist, how they can govern the behavior
of real, concrete, substantive particles. It is, in particular, unfathomable how a
nomological wave-function can do so. By assigning a disposition to particles, there
is something in the world that changes the behavior of something in the world. By
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having a holistic disposition in three-dimensional space, you cannot object that it’s
mysterious how laws or a mathematical wave-function can guide real substantive
particles. For the dynamical e cacious entity is neither the law nor the mathemat-
ical wave-function but the disposition.
In primitivism, particles move as they do because there are laws. The dispo-
sitionalist then asks how laws can e ect this motion and expects an answer that
goes beyond laws. Something in the world or in the particles must move particles,
not abstract mathematical laws. Abstract entities influencing concrete objects in
space and time sounds like a category mistake. But primitive laws govern particles
because they are primitive laws. There is nothing to add or to unravel.
Let’s turn to another feature of the structuralist construal of the wave-function.
If the wave-function represents an ontic structure, it’s said that we no longer face
the miracle of particles a ecting each other instantaneously over arbitrary dis-
tances. Quantum non-locality is hence not action-at-a-distance because this action
is mediated by dynamical relations:
By contrast to an account of quantum non-locality in terms of superluminal
interaction [. . . ], there is no action at a distance among anything in BM,
simply because a modal structure instantiated by the configuration of matter
is another conception of the determination of the temporal development of
physical objects than direct interaction among the parts of that configuration.
Hence, there is quantum non-locality because the temporal development of
quantum systems is not determined by properties that are intrinsic to each
object (as mass and charge are intrinsic properties of particles in classical
mechanics and determine their temporal development), but by a structure
that is instantiated by the configuration of all the quantum objects. (Esfeld,
2014, p. 10)
To my mind, this argument is a red herring. First, one needs to distinguish
between a metaphysical and a physical action-at-a-distance. What a dynamical
ontic structure overcomes is metaphysical action-at-a-distance, not the physical
kind. For there is no physical mechanism, like the exchange of particles or the
transmission of fields, that mediates between two entangled particles. For all kinds
of actions-at-a-distance—for retarded, but especially for instantaneous action—one
can introduce an ontic structure that “generates” the dynamics. But then one
replaces one black box, non-local interactions, with another black box, namely an
ontic structure.
To my mind, this argument is a red herring. First, you need to distinguish
between a metaphysical and a physical action-at-a-distance. What a dynamical
ontic structure overcomes is metaphysical action-at-a-distance, not a physical one.
For there is no physical mechanism, like the exchange of particles or the transmis-
sion of fields, that mediates between two entangled particles. You can introduce for
all kinds of actions-at-a-distance—also for retarded but especially for instantaneous
action—an ontic structure that is “generating” the dynamics. But then you replace
one black box, non-local interactions, with another black box, an ontic structure.
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Second, an ontic structure doesn’t specify how it can be causally or dynamically
e cacious. The precise dynamics is always described by the law of motion. So why
not take the law itself as the dynamical relation? The law is something that we
need anyway, and by raising the law to be the primary dynamical entity we abstain
from postulating dubious dynamical relations that are purported to be di erent
from laws, although they don’t do more than laws or better clarify any issue..
6.3.2. Myriads of Dispositions
Suárez (2015) presents another idea for a dispositional wave-function. The aim is
to have a distribution of intrinsic dispositions on every point of space. The wave-
function defines a velocity vector field on configuration space; that is, it assigns to
every point of configuration space a velocity vector at every time t. We can now fix
a point xi œ R3 and attribute a set of velocity vectors in the following way: take
the universal particle in configuration space and move it along xi = const. This
will give us all the possible velocity vectors at xi at time t. Of course, we can do
this for all points and receive an infinite stack of velocity vectors for every point in
physical space.
So according to Suárez, a particle in an arbitrary spot has the disposition, rep-
resented by the velocity vectors, to move in all those directions indicated by these
vectors (see Fig. 6.1). Of course, only one velocity per particle can be manifested
Figure 6.1.: A stack of dispositions for each particle. Drawn lines represent mani-
fested dispositions; dashed lines represent unmanifested ones.
at a moment in time. But this manifestation depends non-locally on the position
of all the other particles in the universe. So even if one particle remains in its spot
(because we hold it tight), it’s future motion will change once the particles in the
environment have changed their position (see Fig. 6.2).
Advantages, Disadvantages, and Misconceptions
With respect to the problem of communication and primitivism about laws, the
advantages of Suarez’ interpretation of the wave-function are the same as Esfeld’s.
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Figure 6.2.: Non-local dependency of velocity by the positions of other particles.
The particle on the right from Fig. 6.1 is now in a di erent position.
The manifested disposition of the other particles changes as well.
What Suarez doesn’t have in this ontology, however, is an ontological connection
among particles; Esfeld, on the other hand, introduces a holistic disposition, where
due to holism all particles are by definition ontologically related. Suarez’ ontology
consists of a distribution of local dispositions; that is, every point in physical space
is equipped with infinitely many dispositions, which are mathematically represented
as velocity vectors. A particle will choose exactly one of those velocity vectors—the
disposition comes to be manifested—according to the positions of the other particles
at a time t. This is what the guiding equation tells us. Although this non-local
connection is described by the law, which is supposed to be a mere representation of
dispositions, there is nothing in Suarez’ ontology that establishes this connection.
So this ontology already su ers from a metaphysical action-at-a-distance, something
that a dispositionalist is supposed to avoid as she defends modal connections.
Suárez and Esfeld agree on the primitive stu  ontology: the Bohmian world is
three-dimensional and contains particles. They agree that particles have dispo-
sitions. And they agree that the manifestation of dispositions is the velocity of
each single particle. Where they disagree—and this is subtle but crucial—is on the
number of dispositions and where those dispositions are “located.” But for some
inexplicable reason, Suárez misrepresents Esfeld’s theory:
A comparison is instructive with the alternative account o ered by [Esfeld
et al. (2014)]. On their account only the universal particle in configuration
space has dispositions, and the velocity field is defined over configuration
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space. The actual velocities of particles in 3D space are thought instead as
the manifestation of these universal particle dispositions [(Esfeld et al., 2014,
p. 785)]. I understand this to mean that there are no genuine dispositions for
the individual particles taken in isolation. The only dispositions that exist are
those represented by the universal wavefunction for all the particles, which
concern the universal particle; these dispositions manifest themselves in the
first instance in the evolution of the universal particle itself. True, these are
perceived as motions of each of the individual particles in 3D space, but there
are no dispositions ‘residing in’ physical 3d space—neither in the points of
3D space nor in the 3d particles that occupy such points.
This ‘Esfeld’ disposition, as we may call it, is a holistic property of the
universal wavefunction. So the manifestations will appear to be non-local,
in the sense that it will appear as if the velocity of a particular particle over
here depends upon the positions of particles elsewhere. But in reality there
are no dispositions in 3D space or in the 3D particles, there is only one higher
rank disposition of the universal particle, which is necessarily entangled or
holistic (but not non-local since there is only one universal particle with a
particular location at all times). (2015, p. 3217)
Nearly every sentence of this quote is wrong. Let me briefly correct some miscon-
ceptions:
1. In Esfeld’s ontology, there is no universal particle, let alone one that has
a disposition. The ontology is about particles in three-dimensional space.
Suárez confuses the mathematical representation of the holistic disposition
with the actual bearers of this disposition.
2. The velocity field is always defined on configuration space. That’s not special
to Esfeld’s account. But Esfeld thinks (as all Bohmian physicists do) that this
velocity field eventually describes the motion of particles in three-dimensional
space.
3. The holistic disposition is not a “holistic property of the universal wavefunc-
tion.” The universal wave-function rather represents a holistic disposition of
all the particles taken together.
4. I don’t understand what Suárez means when he says that “the manifestations
will appear to be non-local.” Non-locality isn’t a matter of appearance. In
the de Broglie–Bohm theory, non-locality is a physical fact that immediately
pops out of the guiding equation once you have entangled wave-functions.
5. The non-locality—rather the not non-locality; is that locality?—that Suárez
mentions in the last sentence is particularly confusing. Does he want to char-
acterize the disposition or the universal particle? Both the universal wave-
function and the universal particle are local beables in configuration space;
this is ontological locality or separability. There is, of course, no dynamical
non-locality in configuration space, because there is no other particle that can
interact with the universal particle.
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6.3.3. The Multi–Field Account: Two Versions
Belot (2012) gives an idiosyncratic interpretation of the wave-function first posited
by Forrest (1988), which now seems to be gaining popularity. The basic idea is
to regard the wave-function not as an ordinary field on configurations space, as
David Albert does, but as a novel physical field: a multi-field in three-dimensional
physical space. This would counteract the problem of communication because what
the universal wave-function actually represents would be a field in the same space,
in which particles move.
The basic idea is to regard the wave-function not as an ordinary field on config-
urations space, as David Albert does, but as a novel physical field: a multi-field on
three-dimensional physical space. This would counteract the problem of commu-
nication because what the universal wave-function actually represents would be a
field in the same space, in which particles move.
Forrest (1988, pp. 155–9) distinguished between monowaves (monadic waves)
and polywaves (polyadic waves, which were dubbed multi-fields by Belot, 2012).
Monowaves are already familiar from classical electrodynamics and hydrodynam-
ics; these are scalar or vector-valued fields that depend on the three-dimensional
position x and time t. The electric field E(x, t) and the one-particle wave-function
Â(x, t) are examples of monowaves.
Polywaves, on the other hand, take as arguments x1, . . .xN such that the many-
particle wave-function Â(x1, . . .xN , t) is a polywave. While a monowave assigns a
unique value to a point in space at a certain time t, a polywave relates N spatial
points by assigning all these points together a unique value at a time t. These kind
of waves are unknown from classical physics, and I know of no good way to depict
them, but they are objects in three-dimensional space.
Only some polywaves can be decomposed into monowaves, whereas all monowave
can be decomposed into their Fourier parts. In case the wave-function is in a
product state Â1(x1)¢ · · ·¢ ÂN(xN), this many–particle wave-function is trivially
decomposed into monowaves, where each particle receives its own wave-function.
I suspect that the multi-field account over-promises and under-delivers. It pre-
tends to make the wave-function local, or rather, to make the entity that it repre-
sents local. Yet, it does so in an unsophisticated and non-convincing way. Forrest
just draws a formal analogy with ordinary fields, and pretends to have invented
or discovered a new physical object, whose only di erence to standard fields is the
larger argument—the multi-field depends on N points x1, . . .xN , whereas an ordi-
nary field depends on x. In the end, , Forrest just switches the name tags around:
what was formerly called a wave-function is now dubbed a multi-field or polywave.
There is no change in the mathematics, nor any alteration in the ontology.
In a way, this is similar to Maudlin’s interpretation of the wave-function. For
him, the wave-function represents a non-local quantum state in physical space. We
cannot ask what the quantum state is or where it is localized. For the quantum
state is the quantum state, a novel ontological entity, and it’s represented by the
wave-function on configuration space. Apart from its e ects on particles, this is all
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that we can know about the quantum state, according to Maudlin. I find Maudlin’s
explanation unsatisfactory, but I prefer it over the multi-field interpretation, be-
cause the introduction of the multi-field happens only on the formal mathematical
level. Maudlin, on the other hand, is explicit about his ontology, both about its
virtues and about its limitations.
Therefore, I would propose an alternative reading of the multi-field, based on
Suárez’ ontology. The wave-function mathematically defines a velocity vector field
on configuration space, that is, a distribution of field values on points of configu-
ration space. By projecting this vector field onto three-dimensional space, we get
an ontologically local field in physical space similar to the electromagnetic field.
Here is how the projection looks like. The universal particle at (x1, . . . ,xN) as-
signs to every particle at x1, . . . ,xN a velocity v1, . . . ,vN . We can now keep one xi
fixed and change the universal particle in all other possible directions. Then, every
infinitesimal movement of the universal particle gives us a new velocity vi. By
bundling all these vi together we get a stack of possible velocities for the particle
at xi.
So contrary to classical fields, the projected universal velocity field assigns a mul-
titude of velocity vectors to each point in space. To have a well-defined dynamics,
only one vector out of this multitude must be chosen to “guide” the actual particle,
and this choice depends on the position of all the other particles. Besides, particles
don’t act back on the multi-field; the stack of field values doesn’t change whatever
particles do.
What’s the di erence between this multi-field interpretation and Suárez’ dispo-
sitions? The projections of the universal vector field on three-dimensional space
coincide.But Suárez presents only one option for interpreting what fields are. In
section 4.6, I discussed how fields (from an ontological point of view) can be either
stu , properties, or mere mathematical devices (see Lange, 2002). By interpret-
ing the wave-function as a distribution of dispositions, Suárez is clearly on the
side of properties. The multi-field interpretation, on the other hand, is liberal to
its ontological reading and shows that there is a conceptual continuity between
electrodynamics and quantum mechanics. Fig. 6.1 and Fig. 6.2, therefore, in fact
represent in fact a multi-field.
This latter version of the multi-field interpretation of the wave-function shows
that the wave-function can be seen as a field on three-dimensional space. We don’t
need to go as far as David Albert (2015, p. 130) in downgrading our world as a mere
shadow of what happens in configuration space. We can retain our familiar space as
the fundamental space, but if we have the wave-function as a field in this space we
need to generalize what we mean by a field. Once we accept that this novel multi-
field is a genuine physical entity, we have an interpretation of the wave-function
at hand that makes it (the wave-function) ontologically local without changing the
mathematics. It’s now a local beable mathematically represented in configuration
space.
But if you happen to be unsatisfied, because the mathematical representation
of a local object must be in physical space as well,there is a quantum theory that
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can help: the theory of exclusively local beables. Let’s zoom in and look at it more
closely.
6.3.4. The Wave-Function as a Local Beable
Travis Norsen (2010) proposed a Bohmian quantum theory in which there is no
longer a wave-function on configuration space (see also Norsen et al., 2015). Instead,
the main dynamical entity is the conditional wave-function; that is to say, every
particle is guided by a conditional wave-function. The conditional wave-functions,
however, don’t su ce to recover all the predictions of the de Broglie–Bohm theory,
and Norsen presents a nice example showing why this is so.
Imagine two particles that are about to collide. We can prepare the system in
two di erent ways. In the first case, we start with a non-entangled wave-function
(see Fig. 6.3), and in the second case, we prepare the system to be entangled (see
Fig. 6.4). The initial particle positions are the same. And, more importantly, the
initial conditional wave-functions of both particles are the same, too. Yet we can
prepare each system in such a way that the particles move di erently after collision.
Figure 6.3.: Scattering of two non-entangled particles represented in the two-
particle configuration space. A particle moves parallel to the x1-axis
approaching a particle that sits at x2 = 0. The potential of the resting
particle is marked as a light grey diagonal line. Their initial wave-
function is marked in dark grey. After scattering, the first moving par-
ticle stops, and the other particle moves upwards. The wave-function
is then in a superposition indicated by two light grey wave-functions.
(Picture from Norsen, 2010, p. 1867)
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Figure 6.4.: Scattering of two entangled particles represented in the two-particle
configuration space. As in Fig. 6.3, a particle approaches a resting
particle from the left and collides at x2 = 0. Their entangled initial
wave-function is depicted in dark grey. After scattering, the resting
particle starts moving to the right parallel to the x1-axis, while the
other particle stops at x2 = 0. The post-scattering wave-function is
drawn in light grey. (Picture from Norsen, 2010, p. 1868)
This shows that conditional wave-functions cannot do the job alone when it
comes to retrieving all Bohmian trajectories. While conditional wave-functions
can render the correct trajectories in the first example, they cannot do so for the
entangled system. The information about entanglement gets lost in the definition
of conditional wave-functions—it’s the same for the reduced density matrix in an
EPR experiment, where it merely gives us the statistics for one particle irrespective
of what happens to the other particle.
Norsen’s idea is now to add additional local fields to the conditional wave-
functions. The task of these new fields is to change the conditional wave-functions
of each particle in such a way that they render the correct trajectories even if the
system is entangled; in fact, these fields are non-zero only if there is entanglement.
Norsen’s theory of exclusively local beables makes the very same empirical predic-
tions as the de Broglie–Bohm theory—it even predicts the very same trajectories—,
but the price is a more contrived law for the evolution of all those local fields. First,
it turns out that there are infinitely many such interacting fields since the evolution
of the interaction fields requires further interaction fields—a never ending recursion.
And it’s not clear yet that one can get satisfactory results with only a finite set of
these fields. Second, each conditional wave-function follows a modified Schrödinger
168
6.3. The Wave-Function as a Disposition
equation, in which the other interaction fields are included. And these interaction
fields themselves have their own evolution equation. This makes the theory almost
useless for making calculations.
But this doesn’t make the theory less interesting for metaphysics. On the con-
trary! First, Norsen gave us an outline of what a theory with local wave-functions
might look like. Second, we can take Norsen’s de Broglie–Bohm theory to inves-
tigate the ontological status of the wave-function(s), and see whether his physical
theory makes a di erence to the current debate. Here, I’ll briefly discuss his theory
in the context of dispositions.
Esfeld and Suarez deliver a dispositional interpretation that strive to have the
wave-function represent something in three-dimensional space, although it is math-
ematically defined on configuration space. Either the wave-function represents a
holistic disposition, or it represents a distribution of intrinsic dispositions in three-
dimensional space.
Norsen’s theory has only local beables; even the wave-function is turned into a
local beable, since every particle is guided by its own quantum state. We can inter-
pret every such (conditional) wave-function as representing primary dispositions,
namely those that directly guide particles. And the interaction fields can be con-
strued as secondary dispositions influencing the primary dispositions. By having
these interaction fields in the ontology, this metaphysics of dispositions no longer
su ers from a metaphysical or a physical action-at-a-distance. These shortcomings
are now overcome. Remember that Suarez only has these primary dispositions in
his ontology, and it’s there mysterious how these dispositions are connected over ar-
bitrary distances. But Norsen provides a physical mechanism in three-dimensional
space showing how the position of a particle can influence the velocity of another
one.
Since the wave-function is now a local beable, Norsen’s theory is the first and
only quantum theory that is ontologically local in physical space. Still, the motion
of one particle depends on the positions of all particles. This dynamical non-locality
is not something we can get rid of. The interacting fields must mediate the action
with infinite speed in order to be consistent with Bell’s theorem. At some point we
always have to deal with quantum non-locality.
6.3.5. There are still Classical Properties, Aren’t There?
As we have seen, the universal wave-function can be construed as a disposition,
that is, a certain kind of property that causes motion. There are several versions
on the table. The wave-function can be seen as a holistic disposition of all particles
together, or it can be regarded as an ontic structure—I don’t think there is a
di erence between these positions. Another possibility is to take the wave-function
as representing a distribution of intrinsic dispositions in three-dimensional space.
What all these strategies have in common is that the wave-function is su cient
to generate trajectories: once the initial wave-function and the initial particle posi-
tions are given, the motion follows from the Schrödinger equation and the guiding
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equation. But there are still “classical” properties, such as mass and charge. What
is their role in determining motion? As is generally agreed upon, in classical physics,
they function as intrinsic dispositions, and it seems that in the quantum realm they
are epiphenomena since they are not mentioned or used in either interpretation of
the wave-function that I have presented so far. But the wave-function still might
not be enough to fix the trajectories (given some initial conditions); maybe classical
properties need to complement the wave-function.
It’s important, though, not to be fooled by our classical intuitions. The de
Broglie–Bohm theory isn’t a classical theory. As I argued in section 1.2.3 the free
parameters in the guiding equation can be named “mass” and “charge” once we
get to the classical limit. But they are parameters in quantum law, so if they
are construed as intrinsic properties they are di erent from their classical cousins.
They may in some sense coincide within a certain regime, but due to their role in
the new theory they are to be understood as novel entities.
It’s not clear, however, whether Bohmian masses and Bohmian charges really
reside in the particles. There are quantum phenomena that incline us to think
that mass and charge are rather properties of the wave-function. If so, Bohmian
masses and Bohmian charges would be second-order properties or second-order
dispositions for the first-order disposition represented by the wave-function. There
are even arguments aiming to show that mass and charge are in fact properties of
both the wave-function and particles. Let’s see how plausible all this is.
Does the Wave-Function bear Classical Properties?
The most compelling arguments that there may be some reality to the (e ective)
wave-function and that the (e ective) wave-function carries mass and charge come
from research on weak measurements (Aharonov et al., 1988) and protective mea-
surements (Aharonov and Vaidman, 1993). Here, the measurement apparatus is
very weakly coupled to the system so that a measurement doesn’t change the quan-
tum state—in standard language, weak and protective measurements don’t collapse
the wave-function. With the help of this idea, physicists have a new method for
examining quantum systems; for example, they can now reconstruct the shape of
the wave-function or measure the expectation value of an arbitrary observable by
making measurements on just one quantum system.
The consequences for experimental physics aren’t relevant here. What’s impor-
tant, though, is another experiment, in which weak interactions play a pivotal role.
And this experiment can be used to show that mass and charge are properties of
the wave-function.
Let’s start with a preliminary set-up as in Fig. 6.5; we need this to illustrate
how the trajectories of the wave-functions di er from the trajectories of particles
(Bell, 2004b). As shown in the figure, the wave-functions follow what might be
called classical trajectories. They cross the interference region and hit the screen.
A Bohmian particle does something di erent. Let’s say it enters the beam splitter
and is guided by Â1. Like its guiding wave, it is reflected by the upper mirror
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Figure 6.5.: An e ective wave-function Â enters a beam splitter and is split into
two parts Â1 and Â2. One follows the upper path; the other follows the
lower. After they are reflected by a mirror they interfere where both
paths cross. Then Â1 hits the lower part of the screen, while Â2 hits
the upper part.
and enters the interference region. And here something happens that we’re not
familiar with from classical physics. When the particle approaches the symmetry
axis (dashed line), it bounces o  and is suddenly guided by Â2, heading to the
upper part of the screen. By symmetry a particle first guided by Â2 after the beam
splitter will be guided by Â1 when it has reached the interference region.
We can now slightly, but very importantly, modify the experimental set-up—first
presented by Englert et al. (1992), here in a simplified version from Dewdney et al.
(1993). We insert a measurement device into one of the paths before the interference
region. The device is built so that it weakly interferes with the wave-function of
the particle in order to leave the quantum state unchanged. The crucial step is that
we can prepare the entire system in such a way that the physical state of the weak
measurement device will change, that is, it will measure something, although the
particle takes the other path. It seems that the measurement device measures the
trajectory of the particle without the particle being actually there. On this basis,
Englert et al. (1992) dubbed Bohmian trajectories, those that are predicted by the
guiding equation, surrealistic. The true path, according to them, is a di erent one,
namely the one we can measure.
Dürr et al. (1993) and Dewdney et al. (1993) reply that there is nothing surre-
alistic about Bohmian trajectories and that there is nothing surprising in the fact
that the weak measurement device changes in terms of its physical state when in-
teracting with the empty wave (see also Barrett 1999, Ch. 5, and Barrett 2000).
That’s just a prediction of the theory. A detailed analysis of this model by means of
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Figure 6.6.: This is the same arrangement as in Fig. 6.5 but with a weakly coupled
measurement device (grey box) between the beam splitter and the lower
mirror. We assume that the particle crosses the beam splitter and is
guided by Â1. The de Broglie–Bohm theory tells us that the particle
will hit the screen in the upper half. Nevertheless, the weakly coupled
measurement device changes its state after the particle hits the screen.
What has it measured?
Bohmian mechanics shows that under certain circumstances a measurement device
measures something without there being any particle. That’s a manifestation of
non-locality rather than a flaw of the theory (Holland, 2014).
From a metaphysical point of view, one may reason that the wave-function itself
must carry some dynamical properties in order to interact with matter. Since the
particles in the weak measurement device have mass and charge—and they change
their state after an interaction with the empty wave—the empty wave itself must
carry mass and charge. This is one argument that Brown et al. (1996) use to assign
properties to the wave-function—Brown et al. (1995) even claim that the wave-
function carries gravitational mass. But for Brown et al. (1996) the wave-function
cannot be the sole bearer of mass and charge; particles must have them too.
Classical Properties in the Particles and in the Wave–Function
Brown et al. (1996) use two arguments in order to show that the classical proper-
ties must be part of the wave-function and particles. Let’s begin with the first one.
Assume that the classical properties merely reside in the wave-function. Then par-
ticles are propertyless stu , and there is no intrinsic feature by which to distinguish
one particle from the other. This leads, Brown et al. (1996) claim, to the problem of
recognition; that is, a wave-function cannot know how to guide a particle because
it doesn’t recognize which species the particle belongs to.
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Imagine a wave-function that is in a superposition of a muon wave-function and
an electron wave-function, and let’s assume that these two wave packets are spa-
tially separated. If the (propertyless) particle is in one of the wave packets it moves
like a muon or like an electron. The problem of recognition arises if we let the two
wave packets interfere: if the particle doesn’t have intrinsic properties that identify
it as either a muon or an electron the wave-function doesn’t “know” how to guide
this propertyless object. Is the particle in the interference regime a muon or an
electron? Of course, if the particle were to have intrinsic properties, a specific mass
and a specific charge, then the wave-function could decide how to guide it; the
intrinsic properties uniquely identify the species of a particle.
According to Brown et al. (1996), there are two ways out of this. First, one may
label particles; that is, “each corpuscle carried a distinct label which can be read
by the associated Â-field [. . . ]. This first option is tantamount to accepting that
the pilot wave interpretation is incomplete, since no such labels are specified in the
theory” (p. 314). In my opinion, labelling particles doesn’t solve the problem of
recognition, because labels don’t change the ontology. The wave-function doesn’t
care whether we label particles or not. Therefore, what Brown et al. mean to
suggest, I assume, is equipping particles with a quiddity. This primitive identity can
be assigned to particles without them having intrinsic properties. A particle would
then be a muon or an electron because it carries with it an intrinsic primitive feature
(or essence) that identifies the particle as belonging to this species irrespective of
the wave-function. The way the wave-function guides a particle must of course be
consistent with its quiddity; it’s not possible for a muon to be guided by an electron
wave-function. As Brown et al. correctly emphasize, quiddities aren’t specified by
the de Broglie–Bohm theory—indeed by any physical theory.2
A second way to solve the problem of recognition would be to distinguish particles
not by their intrinsic features but by their motion, that is, by their history. An
electron is an electron because it moves like an electron. And a muon is a muon
because it moves like a muon. Brown et al. dismiss this idea since “[t]he second
option amounts to an admission that the interpretation is non-local in time as well
as space” (p. 314).
Introducing non-locality here is like killing a fly with a bulldozer. Usually we
use non-locality in two di erent situations. One is an ontological reading, which
coincides with the famous notion of separability, and another is a dynamical reading,
2There is a subtle di erence between quiddity and haecceity (Wüthrich, 2009, p. 1042). Whereas
quiddity is the same as type-identity, that is, a primitive feature that selects a type or kind an
object belongs to, haecceity is much stronger. Haecceity is token-identity, that is, it specifies
the identity of a particular object. In more metaphysical terms, quiddity is the essence of
universals, and haecceity is the essence of particulars. Often any kind of primitive identity
is dismissed. I think, however, that there are situations in which they are useful. It’s true
that we don’t have empirical access to these primitive identities, but this doesn’t mean we
should dismiss them as occult concepts that need to be avoided at all costs, like a vampire
avoiding garlic. For example, if you adhere to space-time substantivalism, and in particular to
Newton’s absolute space, the haecceity of each spatial point can prevent a substantival space
from collapsing into one single point (Maudlin, 2012, p. 41).
173
6. The Status of the Wave-Function
when two objects non-locally interact. Neither of these cases applies to the history
of particles. The trajectories are not non-separable, and nor is there a non-local
dynamical influence from the past trajectory to future points on the trajectory.
Next, there are two things we need to distinguish. First, a particle’s momentary
motion specifies whether the particle is an electron or a muon provided that it’s
guided by an electron wave-function or a muon wave-function. Remember that
it’s (theoretically) possible for a particle to change its species once we bring two
waves in to interfere. Second, the supposedly “non-local” aspect might be that the
identity of a particle persists throughout its entire history, irrespective of the shape
of the trajectory as long as it remains continuous. So a particle’s history determines
that at time t = t1 we have the same particle—the same primitive stu —as before,
at time t = t0. But that the identity of particles as grounded in their location in
space is the only means we have for identity unless we introduce intrinsic properties,
quiddities, or haecceities. And it’s parsimonious and straightforward. You cannot
disqualify the idea because it leads to an alleged non-locality.
In the light of a primitive stu  ontology, I think that the problem of recognition
is a pseudo-problem. Only in the decoherence regime can we say that this particle
here is an electron, while that particle over there is a muon. What determines the
species of particles in a primitive stu  ontology is their motion, and their motion
is determined by the wave-function. So if we happen to have an electron wave-
function interfering with a muon wave-function, the particle in the interference
region is neither an electron nor a muon. And the particle will still move in a
unique way due to the velocity field generated by the interfering wave-functions. A
wave-function will always correctly recognize the particle!
Here is the second argument from Brown et al. regarding why Bohmian particles
carry intrinsic properties: mass and charge appear in the guiding equation. And
they appear in the guiding equation in such a way that m1 is assigned to particle
1, m2 to particle 2, etc. This seems to be a pretty strong argument (the same that
can be used in classical physics), unless you know that you can symmetrize the
guiding equation without altering any empirical prediction (see section 5.2.2). In
the symmetrized formalism, it’s no longer possible to assign an intrinsic property
to any particle. Only under special circumstances (the decoherence regime), can
we assign particles mass and charge for practical or intuitive purposes.
One might be inclined to think that there are two versions of Bohmian mechan-
ics, the standard version and the symmetrized version, which require two di erent
ontologies, one with intrinsic properties and the other without. Since we cannot
and should not read ontologies o  of mathematical formalisms, we could have de-
veloped a primitive stu  ontology for the standard version of Bohmian mechanics.
But within the symmetrized version this ontology is much more natural. In the
end, we can think about symmetrized Bohmian mechanics for ontological purposes
and use the standard version for making calculations.
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Misapprehensions about Bohmian Particles
We’re now in a position to clear up some misunderstandings about Bohmian par-
ticles. Ladyman and Ross try to downgrade the de Broglie–Bohm theory on some
dubious arguments:
Of course, there is a version of quantum theory, namely Bohm theory, accord-
ing to which QM is not complete and particles do have definite trajectories
at all times. However, Harvey Brown et al. (1996) argue that the ‘particles’
of Bohm theory are not those of classical mechanics. The dynamics of the
theory are such that the properties, like mass, charge, and so on, normally
associated with particles are in fact inherent in the quantum field and not
in the particles. It seems that the particles only have position. We may be
happy that trajectories are enough to individuate particles in Bohm theory,
but what will distinguish an ‘empty’ trajectory from an ‘occupied’ one? Since
none of the physical properties ascribed to the particle will actually inhere
in points of the trajectory, giving content to the claim that there is actually
a ‘particle’ there would seem to require some notion of the raw stu  of the
particle; in other words haecceities seem to be needed for the individuality
of particles of Bohm theory too. (2007, p. 136)
Let’s unpick this paragraph. First, Ladyman and Ross misrepresent the aims of
Brown et al.. Brown et al. clearly argue that mass and charge are properties of
both particles and the wave-function. Second, the rhetorical question “What will
distinguish an ‘empty’ trajectory from an ‘occupied’ one?” rests on a confusion
about the meaning of experiments with empty waves, which I discussed above.
The actual trajectories of Bohmian particles are those that are predicted by the
guiding equation. An “unoccupied” trajectory is an oxymoron; it doesn’t make
sense, and it doesn’t exist. The interaction of an empty wave with a measurement
device or the traces of an empty wave in a bubble chamber (see Vaidman, 2005) are
often misnamed “unoccupied” or “empty” trajectories—notions that expel these
experimental facts as contradictions within the de Broglie–Bohm theory. But due
to non-locality in Bohmian mechanics, empty waves can a ect other particles. As
I’ve repeatedly argued, if we interpret particles as raw stu  their individuality still
doesn’t need haecceity. So the initial appeal of the arguments by Ladyman and
Ross against the de Broglie–Bohm theory vanishes into thin air.3
One might read the above quote as saying that Ladyman and Ross are concerned
with the di erence between a bare particle and a spatial point. What distinguishes a
particle from a spatial point when the particle doesn’t have intrinsic properties? In
my opinion, this is yet another occasion for introducing benign primitive identities.
3People often argue against Bohmian mechanics because it’s non-local and it doesn’t allow for
a relativistic extension. Both arguments can be successfully countered. A natural reading of
Bell’s theorem—and in fact Bell’s own understanding of his theorem—shows that there are
non-local connections in our world (see, for instance, Norsen, 2006, 2009, 2011). A relativistic
Bohmian theory is possible, but it forces us to be very clear on what we mean by relativistic
(see Maudlin, 2011; Dürr et al., 2014).
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Not haecceities, since they are too strong, but quiddities. A particle has a quiddity
that indicates that it’s a particle and not a point in space. Two particles can be
distinguished by their location in space; no haecceities are needed for that. For
points of space, however, we need haecceities to distinguish that this point here is
di erent from that point over there. But that’s harmless.
The Nomological Interpretation of Classical Properties
What, now, is the true status of classical properties in the de Broglie–Bohm theory?
We have discussed very strong arguments supporting the view that mass and charge
reside as intrinsic properties in Bohmian particles. Yet, to every one of these
arguments, even if they involve empirical phenomena, there is an equal or even
more convincing counter. If mass and charge aren’t intrinsic properties of particles
or the wave-function, what are they?
Mass and charge have a dynamical role, because when you change them you
change the shape of trajectories—on the mathematical level the change takes place
in the guiding equation, as well as in the Schrödinger equation. Primitive property-
less particles can be maintained when you regard the wave-function as a disposition
governing the motion of particles and the “classical properties” as nomological.
By interpreting properties as nomological, they are no longer properties of any-
thing; rather, they are physical parameters in the law that fine-tune the disposition—
laws in dispositionalism are but representations of the dispositions. Intrinsic prop-
erties sit on particles, and they don’t change what the particles do. Whether an
intrinsic property is categorical or dispositional doesn’t change that the property
is part of the essence of a particle. Hence, by having mass and charge as nomologi-
cal “properties” the only dynamical e cacious entities in the ontology of Bohmian
mechanics are dispositions represented by the universal wave-function, and in the
mathematical description of these dispositions (beware: in Esfeld’s proposal there is
just one holistic disposition) we find physical parameters, namely mass and charge,
which specify the dispositions.
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This thesis provides the following results in metaphysics and philosophy of physics:
1. I gave a historical and conceptual analysis of John Bell’s local beables and
primitive ontology. I pointed out that there is a slight but crucial di erence
between these concepts.
2. Based on Esfeld, Lazarovici, Lam, and Hubert (2015b), I discussed and de-
veloped a primitive stu  ontology.
3. Also based on the above paper, I introduced and discussed a novel version of
Humeanism that dispenses with local qualities.
4. I gave a new critique of Ladyman’s ontic structural realism.
5. I analyzed mass and forces in classical mechanics. I embedded the status of
mass in the current metaphysical debate and criticized the major contempo-
rary interpretations of forces.
6. I explicitly mentioned and explained the self-interaction problem in classical
electrodynamics, which is still ignored by physicists and philosophers alike.
7. I criticized Mathias Frisch’s argument that classical electrodynamics is incon-
sistent.
8. I evaluated the arguments regarding whether there is backward causation in
classical electrodynamics and concluded that there is not.
9. I highlighted the most important arguments regarding why electromagnetic
fields may exist.
10. I gave the first philosophical discussion of the Born–Infeld theory and the
Bopp–Podolsky theory.
11. I discussed recently published work by Deckert and Hartenstein (2016) show-
ing that the initial value problem of classical electrodynamics is ill-defined
unless one restricts the initial values.
12. I countered old and recent arguments claiming that the first-order formulation
of the de Broglie–Bohm theory is explanatorily weaker than the second-order
formulation.
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13. I criticized the current discussion of identical particles and showed that all
problems can be solved within the de Broglie–Bohm theory by means of a
primitive stu  ontology.
14. I pointed out that the wave-function cannot be construed as a law and that
the e ective wave-function is not quasi-nomological.
15. I showed how the wave-function can be interpreted in the framework of super-
Humeanism (see also Esfeld, Lazarovici, Lam, and Hubert, 2015b).
16. I discussed the dispositional interpretation of the wave-function (see also Es-
feld, Lazarovici, Hubert, and Dürr, 2014).
17. I showed how the wave-function in the de Broglie–Bohm theory can be seen
as a multi–field.
18. I made the connection between Norsen’s theory of exclusively local beables
and a dispositional interpretation of the wave-function.
19. Based on Esfeld, Lazarovici, Lam, and Hubert (2015b), I showed how classical
properties are better regarded as nomological in the de Broglie–Bohm theory.
My thesis shows that there are a lot of old and new problems to be tackled by
philosophers and physicists alike. Four future projects are of particular interest for
philosophers of physics:
1. A theory of primitive stu  with primitive laws.
2. A study of the status of fields within the primitive stu  ontology.
3. A detailed philosophical analysis of the work of Deckert and Hartenstein
(2016). Does their proof serve as a novel derivation of the Wheeler–Feynman
theory?
4. Analysis of whether we need a new concept of laws of nature in order to un-
derstand theories like the Wheeler–Feynman theory, which aren’t formulated
as initial value problems. Would the ideas of Whitehead (1925) suit such a
new understanding?
5. A detailed study of the multi-field interpretation of the wave-function in the
de Broglie–Bohm theory. Can it be extended to other quantum theories?
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A. Newton’s Three Aspects of
Forces
One of Newton’s goals in the Principia was to explain the motion of planets. There-
fore, he defines centripetal forces very early.
Definition 5
Centripetal force is the force by which bodies are drawn from all sides, are
impelled, or in any way tend, toward some point as to a center.
One force if this kind is gravity, by which bodies tend toward the center
of the earth; another is magnetic force, by which iron seeks a lodestone;
and yet another is that force, whatever it may be, by which the planets are
continually drawn back from rectilinear motions and compelled to revolve in
curved lines. (Newton, 1999, p. 405)
Then he defines three aspects of centripetal forces, but it’s clear from his descrip-
tion that they are to be found in all forces.
Definition 6
The absolute quantity of centripetal force is the measure of this force that is
greater or less in proportion to the e cacy of the cause propagating it from
a center through the surrounding regions.
An example is magnetic force, which is greater in one lodestone and less
in another, in proportion to the bulk or potency of the lodestone. (Newton,
1999, p. 406)
Definition 7
The accelerative quantity of centripetal force is the measure of this force that
is proportional to the velocity which it generates in a given time.
One example is the potency of a lodestone, which, for a given lodestone is
greater at a smaller distance and less at a greater distance. Another example
is the force that produces gravity, which is greater in valleys and less on the
peaks of high mountains and still less (as will be made clear below) at greater
distances from the body of the earth, but which is everywhere the same at
equal distances, because it equally accelerates all falling bodies (heavy or
light, great or small), provided that the resistance of the air is removed.
(Newton, 1999, p. 407)
Definition 8
The motive quantity of centripetal force is the measure of this force that is
proportional to the motion which it generates in a given time.
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An example is weight, which is greater in a larger body and less in a smaller
body; and in one and the same body is greater near the earth and less out
the heavens. This quantity is centripetency, or propensity toward a center,
of the whole body, and (so to speak) its weight, and it ay always be known
from the force opposite and equal to it, which can prevent the body from
falling. (Newton, 1999, p. 407)
These quantities of forces, for the sake of brevity, may be called motive,
accelerative, and absolute forces, and, for the sake of di erentiation, may
be referred to bodies seeking a center, to the places of the bodies, and to
the center of the forces: that is, motive force my be referred to a body as
an endeavor of the whole directed toward a center and compounded of the
endeavors of all the parts; accelerative force, to the place of the body as
a certain e cacy di used from the center through each of the surrounding
places in order to move the bodies that are in those places; and absolute
force, to the center as having some cause without which the motive forces
are not propagated through the surrounding regions, whether this cause is
some central body (such as a lodestone in the center of a magnetic force or
the earth in the center of a force that produces gravity) or whether it is some
other cause which is not apparent. This concept is purely mathematical, for
I am not now considering the physical causes and sites of forces.
Therefore, accelerative force is to motive force as velocity to motion. For
quantity of motion arises from velocity and quantity of matter jointly, and
motive force from accelerative force and quantity of matter jointly. For the
sum of the actions of the accelerative force on the individual particles of
body is the motive force of the whole body. As a consequence, near the
surface of the earth, where the accelerative gravity, or the force that produces
gravity, is the same in all bodies universally, the motive gravity, or weight,
is as the body, but in an ascent to regions where the accelerative gravity
becomes less, the weight will decrease proportionately and will always be
as the body and the accelerative gravity jointly. Thus in regions where the
accelerative gravity is half as great, a body one-half of one-third as great
will have a weight four or six times less. Further, it is in this same sense
that I call attractions and impulses accelerative and motive. Moreover, I use
interchangeably and indiscriminately words signifying attraction, impulse,
or any sort of propensity toward a center, considering these forces not from
a physical but only from a mathematical point of view. Therefore, let the
ready beware of thinking that by words of this kind I am anywhere defining a
species or mode of action or physical cause or reason, or that I am attributing
forces in a true and physical sense to centers (which are mathematical points)
if I happen to say that centers attract or that centers have forces. (Newton,
1999, pp. 407–8)
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Renormalization
Dirac (1938) never mentioned the decomposition
F retµ‹ =
1
2F
rad
µ‹ +
1
2F
near
µ‹ .
But from the formulas he gave we can derive this equation.
The Maxwell equations don’t distinguish between the retarded and advanced
fields; both can be used to build up the actual field F µ‹act at a position x. If we pick
out the retarded fields we need to add the external fields F µ‹in , which Dirac calls
incident fields:
F µ‹act = F µ‹ret + F µ‹in .
If we pick out the advanced fields we get the decomposition
F µ‹act = F µ‹adv + F µ‹out,
thereby defining the field F µ‹out of outgoing radiation.
It turns out that the radiation field F µ‹rad has the following form
F µ‹rad = F µ‹out ≠ F µ‹in = F µ‹ret ≠ F µ‹adv.
Then Dirac defines a new field
fµ‹ := F µ‹act ≠ 12 (F
µ‹
ret + F µ‹adv) =
1
2 (F
µ‹
in + F µ‹out) .
Now from this new field we get the decomposition of the retarded field into the
radiation and near field:
F µ‹ret =
1
2 (F
µ‹
in + F µ‹out)≠ F µ‹in + 12 (F
µ‹
ret + F µ‹adv)
= 12 (F
µ‹
out ≠ F µ‹in )¸ ˚˙ ˝
Fµ‹rad
+12 (F
µ‹
ret + F µ‹adv)¸ ˚˙ ˝
Fµ‹near
.
Now let’s follow how Dirac derived the Lorentz–Dirac equation. In order to do
so, he approached the field fµ‹ from two sides.
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On the one hand, it follows from the definition
fµ‹ = F µ‹act ≠ 12 (F
µ‹
ret + F µ‹adv)
= F µ‹ret + F µ‹in ≠ 12 (F
µ‹
ret + F µ‹adv)
= Finµ‹ +
1
2 (F
µ‹
ret ≠ F µ‹adv)
= F µ‹in +
1
2F
µ‹
rad
As Dirac shows in the Appendix (see also Barut, 1980, Chap. V, Sec. 5C) that
F radµ‹ =
4e
3 (v¨µv‹ ≠ v¨‹vµ) ,
we get
f ‹µ = F ‹inµ +
2e
3 (v¨µv
‹ ≠ v¨‹vµ) . (B.1)
And now comes the mass renormalization procedure in order to get rid of f ‹µ .
The argument rests on energy–momentum conservation. We imagine the world-line
of a particle to be surrounded by a thin tube, whose surface has a distance ‘ from
the world-line (see Fig. B.1).
ε
world-line
Figure B.1.: Dirac’s reasoning for mass renormalization
Dirac calculated the flow of energy and momentum crossing the surface of the
tube. In doing so he used the stress–energy tensor Tµﬂ given by
4ﬁTµﬂ = Factµ‹F ‹act ﬂ +
1
4gµﬂFact–—F
–—
act ,
where gµﬂ is the Minkowski metric.
Dirac very precisely describes his strategy:
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We then have the information that the total flow of energy (or momentum)
out from the surface of any finite length of tube must equal the di erence
in the energy (or momentum) residing within the tube at the two ends of
this length, and must thus depend only on conditions at the two ends of this
length. In mathematical language, the rate of flow of energy (or momentum)
out from the surface of the tube must be a perfect di erential.
It is easily seen that the information obtained in this way is independent
of what shape and size we give to our tube (provided it is su ciently small
for the Taylor expansions used in the calculations to be valid). If we take two
tubes surrounding the singular world-line, the divergence of the stress tensor
will vanish everywhere in the region of space-time between them, since there
are no singularities in this region [. . . ]. Expressing the integral⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄
ˆTµﬂ
ˆxﬂ
· dx0dx1dx2dx3
over the region of space-time between a certain length of the two tubes as a
surface integral over the (three-dimensional) surface of this region, we obtain
immediately that the di erence in the flows of energy (or momentum) across
the surfaces of the two tubes depends only on conditions at the two ends of
the length considered. Thus the information provided by the conservation
laws is well defined. (Dirac, 1938, p. 153)
Dirac calculated (and that’s rather cumbersome) the flow of energy and momen-
tum through the surface of the tube to be⁄ Ae2
2‘ v˙µ ≠ ev‹f
‹
µ
B
ds,
which is a vectorial integral over the length of the tube. Beware that this integral
isn’t exact; it’s part of a Taylor series, where the higher order terms in ‘ were
omitted.
As Dirac explained above, the integrand must be a conservative vector-field. So
there is a vector Bµ such that
e2
2‘ v˙µ ≠ ev‹f
‹
µ = B˙µ. (B.2)
The whole procedure of energy–momentum conservation was aimed at deriving this
very equation.
Now we need to specify Bµ. Since a short calculation shows that v ·B = 0, the
simplest choice of B would be to have it parallel to the velocity of the particle, that
is,
Bµ = kvµ,
with some constant k.
We then get A
e2
2‘ ≠ k
B
v˙µ = ev‹f ‹µ .
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Dirac postulated that the term in parentheses to be a constant m, that is inde-
pendent of ‘, that is,
m := e
2
2‘ ≠ k. (B.3)
Here it is where Dirac stipulated a term that goes to infinity to be finite. This
move give us the equation
mv˙µ = ev‹f ‹µ . (B.4)
And with his former calculation (B.1), we get the Lorentz–Dirac equation
mv˙µ ≠ 23e
2v¨µ ≠ 23e
2v˙2vµ = ev‹F ‹inµ.
The zeroth component of this equation,
mv˙0 ≠ 23e
2v¨0 ≠ 23e
2v˙2v0 = ev‹F ‹in 0,
has a nice physical interpretation. The first term, mv˙0 is the derivative of the
relativistic kinetic energy of the particle mv0. The second term, ≠23e2v¨0, is the
derivative of ≠23e2v˙0, which can be interpreted as a kind of acceleration energy of
the particle. Changes in the accelerative energy correspond to a reversible form of
emission or absorption of field energy, which never gets far from the electron. It so
describes the e ects of the (now finite) near field. The third term, ≠23e2v˙2v0, is the
radiation damping term describing the irreversible emission of radiation. Of course,
the term on the right side of the equation represents the external fields doing work
on the particle.
Let’s end with how Dirac interprets mass renormalization:
Let us see how the kinetic energy term arises. The B, introduced in [(B.2)]
can be interpreted as minus the vector of energy and momentum residing
within the tube at any value of the proper-time. Thus, from [(B.3)] and
[(B.4)], the energy within the tube must be negative and must tend to ≠Œ
as ‘ tends to zero. This negative energy is needed to compensate for the large
positive energy of the Coulomb field just outside the tube, to keep the total
energy down to the value appropriate to the rest-mass m. If we want a model
of the electron, we must suppose that there is an infinite negative mass at
its centre such that, when subtracted from the infinite positive mass of the
surrounding Coulomb field, the di erence is well defined and is just equal to
m. Such a model is hardly a plausible one according to current physical ideas
but, as discussed in the Introduction, this is not an objection to the theory
provided we have a reasonable mathematical scheme. (1938, p. 155)
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